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Federal Unity Colleges and Nation Building: An Assessment of Federal Government College, Wukari, 1978-2018

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Abstract

Nigeria is a country made up of diverse ethno-religious groups that existed independent of each other harmoniously before colonialism merged them together under one political entity through the amalgamation of 1914. In the course of their interaction with each other since the amalgamation, several divisive factors, such as regionalism, sectionalism, religious differences and ethnicity, among others, set into their history of political development, causing sour relationship among the groups at independence. Thus, it became imperative for the early leaders of the country to adopt some mechanisms for a united Nigeria. One of such mechanisms was the establishment of Federal Government Colleges, also called Federal Unity Colleges, to pull together children of diverse socio-cultural backgrounds from all states of the Federation for the purpose of national integration and unity. The Unity Colleges set out to become centers of excellence, moulding characters of Nigerian children to become future leaders in all sectors of the country, thus contributing to nation building. Despite their achievements in contributing to national integration and unity of the country, the Colleges are faced with several challenges, threatening the main aim of their establishment. It is based on the foregoing that this paper attempts to assess the contribution of the Federal Government College, Wukari, to nation building from 1978, when it was established, to 2018, when it celebrated its 40th anniversary. Adopting a multi-disciplinary approach, the paper utilizes primarily and secondary sources for data collection and analysis. The paper concludes by proposing some recommendations on

how to improve or maximize the attainment of the goals for the establishment of the Unity Colleges in Nigeria.

Keywords: Challenges, Children, Federal Government, Leaders, Nation-Building, Unity Colleges.

Introduction.

The importance of Education in any human society cannot be overemphasised, as it constitutes a crucial sector in the development process. Studies and experiences have clearly demonstrated that at all levels, and in any form, it constitutes a vital tool for addressing virtually all global issues. It plays a crucial role in long-term productivity and growth at both micro and macro levels. Thus, Rajaj and Chiv states that, it is a key instrument for bringing about changes in knowledge, values and behaviour and lifestyles required to achieve sustainability and stability within and among countries.ⁱ It is seen as the greatest force that can be used to bring about changes meant to guarantee and sustain nation building efforts. In

Agbu's view, the greatest investment any nation can make for its national development is the commitment it puts to the training of its citizens in terms of educational development.ⁱⁱ Education provides the people with necessary knowledge and skills to solve the problems confronting them and contribute to the development of their nation and society. In this regard, Agbu further notes that the place of education in the development of a nation or state is not only important, but fundamental.ⁱⁱⁱ This is why governments of both the developed and developing countries pay special attention to their educational sector. The centrality of the role of education in national development world over, explains why the state of education in Nigeria has continued to be an item of national discourse, and also explains the nature of Nigerian Government's policy towards national development. Thus, according to Nigeria National Policy on Education of 2004:

Education shall continue to be highly rated in the national development plans because education is the most important instrument for change; any fundamental change in the intellectual and social outlook of any society has to be preceded by an educational revolution.^{iv}

Taking cognizance of the above, the Federal Government of Nigeria, among many policies and programmes in the educational sector,

established Federal Government Colleges (also known as Federal Unity Colleges) to guarantee national integration, unity and nation building. Similarly, the Colleges provide opportunity to the Nigerian children, at a very tender age, to live, learn and socialise together in an ideal educational environment.

To what extent has these seemingly laudable policies of the federal Government regarding the Federal Unity Colleges have really contributed to national integration, unity and nation building in Nigeria. In effort to interrogate this central research question, this paper provides an assessment of the role of Federal Government College, Wukari, in national integration, unity and nation building, from 1978, when the College was established, to 2018, when it celebrated its 40th anniversary. The paper also discusses some of the challenges being faced by Federal Government College, Wukari, and, by extension, all Federal Unity Colleges in Nigeria, thereby limiting them from achieving the main aims for their establishment, as well as from being the models they were established to be in other states of the nation. Finally, the paper suggests possible ways towards reforming the Federal Unity Colleges in Nigeria in order for them to continue to maximize the achievements of the aims for their establishment.

The Dynamics of Nation-Building.

The process of nation-building encompasses several facets such as, tapping the potentials of human resources, reducing the social and economic disparity that exist in the society and creating an enabling environment, wherein, individuals can live freely and attain their best in life.^v In this context, Adigun sees nation-building as a systematic process of making a people, who hitherto are from different cultural, ethnic, religious, racial or national backgrounds, to feel they belong together under a nation.^{vi}

Agbu and Shishi envisaged that a successful nation building process produces a socio-cultural projection of the nation containing a certain set of assumptions, values and beliefs which can function as the legitimizing foundation of a state's structures. It includes an open system of stratification, allowing and encouraging social mobility, the pursuit of economic and cultural growth and establishing collective meaning and identity for all envisaged members of the society.^{vii}

The process of nation-building is a more thorough psychological/mental process, not just political. It involves building a political entity which corresponds to a given territory based on some generally accepted rules, norms and principles. It is about building institutions which symbolizes political entity. It is about building a common sense of purpose, a sense of shared identity, a collective imagination of belonging.^{viii} Nation-building

is, therefore, about building the tangible and intangible threads that hold a political entity together, and give it a sense of purpose.^{ix}

According to Ashafa, in nation-building process, many factors, such as, security, education, the economy, politics and governance, play very critical roles, through which public institutions, infrastructure and peaceful intergroup nexus among diverse ethno-tribal nationalities, gender divides, and religious affiliations, among others emerge.^x He further notes that, there are three core elements running through nation-building. They are integrative ideology, integration of a society and development of a functional state. The critical nexus is that, for a successful nation-building process to be achieved, there must be a social integration and ideological legitimacy as its core ingredients.^{xi} Therefore, the core elements, as outlined by Ashafa, in nation-building, can either be introduced from outside or be built from inside, through functional public institutions such as Federal Unity Colleges in Nigeria.

History of Federal Government College, Wukari.

When the founding fathers of Nigeria were thinking of various mechanisms for building a united nation out of the diverse ethnic nationalities that make up the country, among the bright ideas that came forth were the establishment of Federal Government Colleges (FGCs), also known as Federal Unity Colleges (FUCs) and the National Youth Service Corp (NYSC), forming two formidable blocks upon which the search for the nation's super-structure for the modern Nigerian State was built.^{xii} The great idea behind the establishment of Federal Unity Colleges was to bring together Nigerian children from diverse socio-cultural and religious backgrounds for national integration and academic excellence. These children who are considered to be at the impressionable age bracket were to constitute the crop of those that would set the agenda for a united and progressive Nigeria devoid of extreme attachment to ethnicity, religion, creed, social status and other divisive tendencies.

It is pertinent to state that the solidarity and esprit d'corp exhibited by the alumni and alumnae of Kings' and Queens' Colleges nationally were the triggers that brought about the birth of Federal Government Colleges, with a common motto: 'Pro Unitate'.^{xiii} This means that, the history of Federal Unity Colleges can be traced to the successes of Kings' and Queens' Colleges in Lagos, which were established in 1900 and 1927 respectively. Unfortunately, in the First Republic, the Federal Government of Nigeria noticed some major challenges in governance associated with inadequate understanding of the backgrounds of Nigerian people by those governing the new nation and the political crisis in the country in 1963/64. It was in the search for the solution to these challenges that the Federal Government of Nigeria decided to establish

what was then known as 'Inter-Regional Secondary Schools', which were later called Federal Government Colleges in the old regions of north, east and west in 1966.^{xiv} The three schools established then were Federal Government College, Okposi, in eastern region, Federal Government College, Sokoto, in northern region and Federal Government College, Warri, in mid-western region.

It is worthy to note that the Federal Government Colleges were established with the purpose of bringing together young boys and girls from all regions of the country, irrespective of their socio-economic backgrounds, to learn, socialise, work and live together under one roof in order to remove the virtual mysteries surrounding the evolution of the people who made up the regions. This was to create a homogenous family, devoid of rancour, suspicion or distrust.^{xv} In other words, the Colleges were established to foster national integration and academic excellence among Nigerian young boys and girls.

The successes of the first three FUCs were so impressive that in 1970, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, made a pronouncement on the establishment of similar Colleges in all the then 12 States of the Federation, as part of his reconciliation strategies after the Nigerian civil war. Consequently, by 1973, nine second generation FUCs were established. They were: FGC, Ilorin; FGC, Jos; FGC, Kaduna; FGC, Kano; FGC, Port-Harcourt; FGC, Ikot-Ekpene; FGC, Odugbolu; FGC, Calabar;^{xvi} and FGC, Enugu; which was established to replace the one at Okposi, vandalized during the Nigerian civil war.^{xvii} Thereafter, other FUCs were established by successive governments in all the States of the Federation, including the Federal Capital Territory, among which is Federal Government College, Wukari, in the defunct Gongola State, now in Taraba State, established in October, 1978.^{xviii}

Federal Government College, Wukari, started operating at its temporary site along Wukari - Zaki-Biam road in 1978, until 1983, when it relocated to its permanent site along Wukari-Jalingo road. In order to achieve the aims of its establishment, which include national integration, unity and academic excellence, the first principal and teachers to start FGC Wukari, were deployed to Wukari from different parts of Nigeria, with different ethno-religious, social and cultural backgrounds. The pioneer principal was Sir S.N Abia (1978-1989), while Mr. B.O Okafor was the first among the pioneer staff to be on ground in Wukari. Other principals after S.N. Abia are; Mr. S.I. Balogun (1989-1991), Mr. E.S. Abah (1991-1993), Dr. Bukar Gana (1993-1995), Mr. G.O. Iwambe (1995-2001), Mr. J.B. Ladan (2001-2008), Mrs. E.E. Azeh (2008-2010), Dr. Bukar Bukarbe (2010-2012), Alh. M. Sa'ad (2012-2014), Mr. J.S. Ojo (2014-2017), Mrs. Z.A. Kendo (2017-2018) and Mrs. N.Y. Diden (2018-Date).^{xix}

In similar vein, some members of staff posted to the College between 1978 and 1988 included, among others, Mr. O.M.A. Ike, Mr. C.N. Osakwe, Mr. G.O. Iwambe, Mr. L.O. Ofor, Mr. S.S. Ekeanyanwu, Mr. J.T. Oguntoye, Mr. G.O. Amunuba, Mr. E.O. Okoye, and Mr. K. Vhritherhire. Others are Mr. E.P.O. Agbo, Mr. L.I. Kelle, Mr. J.T. Sombu, Mrs. A.C Ekeanyanwu, Mr. B.O. Ochogwu, Mr. V.O. Okolo, Mrs. E.E. Ike, Mrs. M.I. Okafor, Mr. E.S. Adimbo and Mr. G.K.P. Zidon, among others.^{xx} These members of staff, who were from diverse ethno-religious and socio-cultural backgrounds, laid a solid foundation which impacted greatly on the students in the actualization of the goals of national integration, unity and academic excellence, as well as in contributing to nation-building.

Historically, the first set of students graduated in June, 1983, thus climaxing the work of the pioneer principal, S.N. Abia. Some of the pioneer graduating students are; Lawan Hameed (Head-Boy), Bilkisu Ibrahim (Head-Girl), Kande Nuhu, Tani Zaki, Maigari Adamu, Aishatu Ibrahim, Usman Bala, Markus Danjuma, Ibe Amamze, Lucie-Ann M. Laha, and a host of others, from all parts of Nigeria, numbering seventy-two. The overall performance of the students at the exit examinations was such remarkable that the school was considered centre of academic excellence that was sought after by people all over the country. Subsequent graduates of the school continued to raise the bar in their performances to a point that foreign students were also attracted. The height of this was when students from Namibia were enlisted as students in FGC Wukari during the apartheid era and the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Since 1983, FGC Wukari has been consistent in turning out quality graduates every year, except in 1987 when the new policy on education (6:3:3:4) was introduced.

The Contribution of Federal Government College, Wukari, to Nation-Building.

The aims of establishing Federal Unity Colleges, including FGC, Wukari, are to:

- i. Promote Nigerian unity by bringing together children of different ethnic groups to live and study together.
- ii. Promote excellence in academic work, conduct and in the field of sports.
- iii. Provide broad-based education to enable the individual student develop his/her potentials to the fullest so that he/she can contribute something positive to the social and economic life of this country.^{xxi}

In order to achieve the aims above, the principals and staff (both teaching and non-teaching) worked hard to train the students to become great tools for nation-building. However, the question to be answered is; 'what

did FGC, Wukari, like other FUCs, offer to her students to make them positive tools for nation-building, and how? The answers are provided below.

Promotion of national unity: To achieve the aim of promoting national integration and unity among Nigerian children of different ethno-religious and socio-cultural backgrounds, FGC, Wukari, like other FUCs, within the period under review, gave her students the understanding for the need to be united and integrated as a nation. Admission into the College was very competitive, to ensure that brilliant students were admitted to precipitate healthy academic competition. The students were admitted from various regions with different ethno-religious backgrounds. Even though the students usually went into the College at first time with their diverse ethnic and religious orientations, after living together for between 5 to 6 years, socializing and studying together under same condition, they learnt from each other's values, including languages and cultures, thus, establishing a strong bond which they lived with after completing their stay in the College.

Against the foregoing backdrop, the graduands of FGC, Wukari, saw themselves as Nigerians, because, despite their different socio-cultural backgrounds, they faced similar challenges in the College and had same dreams and aspirations. Therefore, they grew up with this bond and thereafter, became agents of national integration as adults in their places of work and in their communities.

In the area of religion, nothing differentiated Christian and Muslim students of FGC, Wukari, particularly during the period of study. They wore same styles of uniform, and lived together peacefully. A former Head boy of 1993/94 set, Etemi Garba, said he never knew the difference between the two religions while in the College. This was because on Sundays, while the Christian students were being conveyed to the Churches in the town, some of their Muslim colleagues also followed, for the sake of entering the town; and when on Fridays the Muslim students were being conveyed to the Mosques in the town, some of their Christian colleagues also followed them for same reason earlier mentioned. During the period of Ramadan fasting, the Christian students happily woke their Muslim friends for the *Sahur*, and they happily shared their food with their Christian friends.^{xxii} In fact, Mr E.S. Abah, the College principal between 1991 and 1993, once stated that:

This College is not a place where we train Pastors and Imams. But is our responsibility to train you to pass your JSCE and SSCE. You can wait, when you get home, then, you can worship your stones and irokos. As the principal of this

school, I am not a Christian or a Muslim or a Traditionalist, but am all.^{xxiii}

Also, during preparation for speech and prize giving days, or cultural competitions, students from different cultural backgrounds happily learnt the dancing steps and songs of the various ethnic groups that would perform at the occasion, such as Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Jukun and Tiv cultural dances. For example, when the College participated in the Zonal Arts and Cultural competition in Potiskum, 1990, many of the students that participated in the '*Akisha*' dance, representing FGC, Wukari, were of non-Jukun background.^{xxiv} They only learnt the dance steps, songs and how to beat the drums in the College, and happily participated in the competition. It is with the foregoing understanding about the heterogeneity of the Nigerian society that some of the students graduated and went into the University and are now working in different sectors of the Nigerian economy, and even abroad, contributing to Nigeria's nation-building.

Promotion of academic excellence and sporting activities: In its effort to achieve academic excellence among Nigerian students, admission into the College, within the period under review, like other FUCs, was very competitive. Merit was the first consideration and only the best were admitted into the College. The pioneer principal and staff, and others that came after them, sacrificed their personal resources and time, for the students to achieve academic excellence. There was the zeal in both teachers and students to produce excellent results in both internal and external examinations. To affirm this, the first attempt at the West African School Certificate Examination in 1983 was resoundingly successful in not only the science subjects, but also in the arts.^{xxv}

In the field of the sciences, the College has made national and international impact. Its products are found in all spheres of scientific and technological life. For instance, FGC, Wukari, has produced pilots,^{xxvi} engineers,^{xxvii} medical doctors^{xxviii} and other health personnel, among others. It has also produced science teachers and lecturers, pharmacists, and other science-related professionals. For instance, Engr. Chukwuma Akpuokwe, a product of the College, made the best result, so far, on record in the Department of Civil Engineering, University of Nigeria, Nsukka; Dr Abubakar Musa Song, left an indelible record at the Medical College, University of Maiduguri. Similarly, one of the Chemistry teachers, Mr. Emoitologa, G., was honoured with a National Award for outstanding performance in 2000. Similarly, he was given the Best Teachers Award by Cadbury Nigeria, PLC in 2000.^{xxix} In 2003, the College came first position in Taraba State at the Cowbell Mathematic Competition and represented the State at the National Competition in Lagos.

Today, many ex-students of Federal Government College, Wukari, are performing excellently in the science-related disciplines.^{xxx} The College surely has secured a pride of place among institutions that have contributed in developing science and technology in Nigeria, thus contributing to nation-building.

In the Arts disciplines, the College has also excelled academically. For instance, in the external examination of 1983, the College scored 93% in English Language and 97% in Lit-in-English. In 1985, it was 98% and 100% in English Language and Lit-in-English respectively. In 1989, the students scored 100% in both English Language and Lit-in-English. Even when NECO examination came on board, the students continued to excel in the same subjects in external examinations. For instance, in 2001, they scored 99% and 100% in English Language and Lit-in-English respectively.

In addition to the records above, the students also gave account of themselves in other external competitions to prove their academic excellence. For instance, in the essay competition organized by Food and Agricultural Organization in the 1995/96 session, Master Nwambe Garba came first position. In another competition organized by Conservation Foundation in the 1999/2000 session, Master Kingsley Okafor came first position. In 2001, Master Triumph Ikwe came third in a national essay competition organized by Longman, Nigeria, PLC.^{xxxi} In 2002, at the North-East Zone of FUCs inter-secondary school debate, Miss Rita Nnajofofor emerged the best speaker. It is relevant to state, also, that the College has performed excellently in all subjects taught in the College. Today, ex-students of FGC, Wukari, are doing well in the disciplines of Law, Literature, History and Entertainment, among others.^{xxxii}

In the area of sporting activities, the students of the College performed excellently in local, zonal and national competitions. For instance, during inter-house competitions organized by other secondary schools in Wukari town, team-FGC, Wukari, always came first position in the 4×100M relay. In 1991, at Wukari 91', the College came first position in the North-East and North-Central Zones Games of Federal Unity Colleges. It won most of the gold trophies, including the coveted football trophy. Again, in 1992, at the FUCs North-East Zone Inter-Collegiate Games, tagged 'Azare 92', the College came first position among the twelve Colleges that participated. In the National Federal Government Colleges Games, tagged 'Port-Harcourt 2002', FGC, Wukari, came third position in the competition in which 67 FUCs participated.

In the field of Arts and Culture, the College also trained the students, and they did not only perform well while in school, but some of them are today performing in the entertainment industry.^{xxxiii} For instance, in 1990, the

College participated in the North-East Zonal Arts and Culture Competition for FUCs, in FGGC, Potiskum;^{xxxiv} in 1996, it participated in the Inter-Collegiate Arts and Cultural Competition organized by the North-East Zone of FUCs at FGGC, Langtang, and came first position in dance drama and second position in cultural dance.^{xxxv} From the foregoing, it is clear that within the time frame of this paper, FGC, Wukari, achieved its objective of promoting excellence in academic work, conduct and in the field of sports.

Provision of broad-based education for positive contribution to the social and economic life of the country.

It is important to mention here that Federal Government College, Wukari, provided a broad-based education to develop the potentials of students to contribute positively to the social and economic life of Nigeria. Apart from teaching the students the basic secondary school subjects in the classroom, which contributed to their academic excellence, the students learnt also as they related with one another in the hostels, fields, while on excursions, and so on. This broadened their mind-set on issues of life generally.

In similar development, the boarding system instilled discipline and hard work in the students, as they learnt how to make their beds, clean their rooms and environment, orderly conduct in the dining hall during meals, and so on. It is important to note that the boarding system in the College started with only two Houses (Green and Yellow), but in September, 1980, increased to four Houses (School, Independent, Republic and Federal) as the number of students increased.^{xxxvi} The Houses were, in 2003, renamed Aku-Uka, Abia, Ladan and College Houses during the J.B. Ladan period as principal.^{xxxvii} There was a well-established administrative structure in the Houses for effective administration. The hierarchy was from the Senior Boarding House Master/Mistress down to House Masters/Mistresses, to House Captains, to Room Heads, working together to instil discipline and orderliness among the students. Thus, Tanko^{xxxviii} notes that every activity in the boarding system was comprehensive in nature as it attracted awards at the end of the term or session, making it possible for the students to be actively involved in one event or the other. This, without any doubt, helped in promoting discipline among the students. Living as families in the Houses made it possible for the students to relate well with each other, using terms such as bed-mate, room-mate, master, table-mate, and so on. This went a long way in fostering harmony and friendship among the students within and outside the College.^{xxxix}

In the area of Clubs and Societies, their activities helped in broadening the understanding of the students of the College, and when they graduated into the wider world, they used such knowledge to contribute

positively to social, political and economic development of the nation, thus, contributing to nation building. In the period under study, all students of the College belonged to one club and society or the other, and the teachings and training received from these clubs and societies broadened their knowledge and developed their potentials to the fullest and they contributed positively to nation-building. Examples of Clubs and Societies in FGC, Wukari, included; the Press Club, Entertainment Club, Literary & Debating Club, Environmental Conservation Club, JET Club, the Commonwealth Club, FRSC Club, Drama Society, Muslim Students' Society, Fellowship of Christian Students, the Man O' War, and others.^{xi} These Clubs and Societies impacted on the students in one way or another, and prepared some of them for their present professions and endeavours. Some are now journalists due to the impact of the Press Club,^{xii} some are military, Police and para-military officers and men due to the training they got from Man O' War.^{xiii} Similarly, others are into the entertainment industry because of the influence of Entertainment, Drama and Music Clubs^{xiii}, and so on. In the area of morality, the Muslim Students' Society and Fellowship of Christian Students, instilled positive societal and religious values in the students and broadened their understanding of religious tolerance and mutual respect for each other.^{xiv}

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the years of dealing with the diversity of culture, surviving under hard condition of scarce resources have helped to produce a group of Nigerians who are more tolerant of each other, understanding objective and open-minded in their interaction with one another anywhere in Nigeria. The students established contacts and friendships across the nation devoid of religious, ethnic or economic difference. According to Abdul-Buba,^{xv} "the integration was strong, the mind-set broadened and we grew together as equals in excellence".

The challenges faced by Federal Government College, Wukari.

From the discussion so far, it would not be out of place to say that Federal Unity Colleges in Nigeria are great tools for nation-building, and their products should take the lead in building this nation due to their understanding of what national integration and unity mean for this nation. However, the successes recorded by FGC, Wukari, towards achieving the aims of national integration and unity; academic excellence as well as outstanding performance in extra-curricular activities; and broad-based education, from 1978 to 2018, for contribution to nation-building, were not without challenges. Some of the challenges faced by the College in the period under study included:

- (a) Inadequate staff in all the subjects.
- (b) Inadequate water supply.
- (c) Inadequate electricity supply.

- (d) Incessant communal conflicts.
- (e) Dilapidated infrastructures.

Inadequate Staffing: This has been a serious challenge facing not only FGC, Wukari, but most FUCs in Nigeria. However, in the case of FGC, Wukari, since its establishment in 1978, inadequate staffing in all subject areas has been a challenge. According to Rev. Canon B.O. Okafor,^{xlvi} when the College took-off in October, 1978, there were only two staff on permanent employment. They were the Principal and Okafor himself. This was the story of staffing in FGC, Wukari, up to 2018, after 40 years of establishment. The only remedy has been recruitment of staff by the College Management on temporary basis, and NYSC members assisting in teaching and other responsibilities. Also, the Parents Teachers Association (PTA) of the College recruited temporary teaching and non-teaching staff to assist, who were, and are still being, paid, by the contribution from parents in the name of PTA levy.^{xlvi}

Inadequate Water Supply: This is one of the greatest challenges faced by both staff and students of FGC, Wukari. In fact, there is no child that stepped into the College, and stayed for the 5 to 6 years, without experiencing acute water shortage. All the Principals, from S.N. Abia (1978-1989) to N.Y. Diden (2018-date), attested to the fact that inadequate water supply was their greatest challenge, and still a serious challenge in the College.^{xlvi} Though successive Principals of the College and PTA Leadership invested in sinking boreholes in the College, and the use of water tankers to supply water from Ibi, Donga and Gindin-Dorowa (the nearest communities with rivers), yet the problem continued. Mr J.B. Ladan said that 'in respect to inadequate supply of water, the boreholes were sunk and the existing ones were reactivated. We also spent a lot on the old tanker to keep it on the road'.^{xlvi}

Inadequate Electricity Supply: The College relied on public power supply to service the administrative blocks, staff quarters and hostels. However, power supply in Wukari, like in other places in north-eastern Nigeria, has been very poor and most times, students are in total darkness in the night. However, in order to reduce the problem, the College initially acquired a Lister Generator to supply light to the kitchen in the evening hours from 7pm to 10pm whenever the national power went off. Mr J.B. Ladan stated further that 'in respect to shortage of electricity supply, we appealed to parents who kindly donated to the College a 200KVA electricity generator, costing N4.2 million'.¹

Dilapidated Structures: The College suffered wear and tear of the structures that were constructed in the 1980s when it moved to the permanent site in 1983. Among these structures are the students' hostels, the staff quarters, the administrative block, the kitchen and dining hall.

When the College celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2008, some of the Old Boys visited the hostels to recall the memories of the boarding house experiences, but what they saw was a terrible condition that was not palatable for the students. For instance, the roofs were leaking, the walls and floors of the rooms and toilets were broken. In fact, Ephraim Audu^{li} and Thetmen Baba^{lii} saw the hostels as in a very unfortunate condition. The condition of the students' hostels made the Old Boys of the College to rehabilitate one block of the boys' hostels and also constructed new tables and benches for use in the College Dining Hall.^{liii}

Incessant Communal Conflicts: Wukari, the host community of the College, experienced different communal conflicts in the period under study. These included the Jukun and Tiv crises in 1990/91 and 2001/02,^{liv} and the Wukari ethno-religious conflicts between 2013 and 2015.^{lv} These conflicts seriously affected the progress of the College. They contributed to withdrawal of many students from the College by their parents for safety, thus, drastically reducing the number of students in the College.^{lvi} Also, many staff worked their transfers out of Wukari, to other FUCs, consequent of the conflicts and other reasons. This affected teaching and learning in the College. According to Josiah Gani, collaborating Mrs Didenon:^{lvii}

Many staff that were employed and posted to FGC, Wukari, to reduce its problem of shortage of staff, from the Federal Ministry of Education, after accepting the employment, and completing their documentation in the FME, worked their reposting to other FUCs in State capitals, leaving FGC, Wukari, to suffer the effects of inadequate staff. This they claim is because of insecurity in Wukari.^{lviii}

The foregoing are some of the challenges faced by FGC Wukari between 1978 and 2018, yet, it excelled in achieving its objectives by raising boys and girls who are today doing great in their places of endeavour, promoting national unity and contributing to nation-building.

Conclusion.

From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that Federal Government College, Wukari, in Taraba State, Nigeria, achieved, to a large extent, the aims for the establishment of Federal Government Colleges in Nigeria between 1978 and 2018. From the start, students and staff were brought together from all parts of Nigeria, thereby creating room for socio-cultural integration among them. The students lived under same roofs despite their ethnic, religious and economic differences, and integrated very well. With the mind-set, they graduated into the wider world, making impact.

Thus, it is satisfying to note that Federal Government College, Wukari, like other FUCs, has, over the years, particularly between 1978 and 2018, nurtured thousands of young men and women, transforming them into great personalities of great repute, in different walks of life, well disciplined, with broadened mind-set of tolerance and respect for each other's ways of life. They have, indeed, contributed, and are still contributing, their quotas, in one way or another, towards national integration and unity, thereby, contributing to nation-building. A good example of them are found in all sectors of the Nigerian economy and even abroad. Some of them are today medical professionals and consultants, judges and lawyers, journalists, civil and public servants, lecturers and teachers, military, paramilitary and policemen, business men and women and farmers, among others.

Consequently, one can confidently say that Federal Unity Colleges, using FGC, Wukari, between 1978 and 2018, as a case study, have raised many Nigerians, both males and females, who have done well in the society by being well accomplished leaders in both public and private sectors of Nigeria's economy. Such successful products of FUCs have a good understanding of Nigeria's socio-cultural and religious diversities and have integrated very well. Therefore, they must rise up and take responsibility of this great nation for national unity in order to build the nation well.

However, due to the challenges the Federal Unity Colleges have faced, and are still facing, this paper hereby suggests the followings in order for the Colleges to continue to achieve the aims for their establishment:

- i. Provision of Security:** The Federal Government, being the proprietor of the Colleges, in collaboration with State and Local Governments, should rise up to their constitutional responsibility of securing lives and property of all Nigerians, in all parts of the country. Adequate security personnel should be properly equipped and deployed, particularly, to States and communities that host these FUCs; also adequate security personnel be deployed to the Colleges for the security of both the staff, students and property in the Colleges. Also, CCTV cameras should be mounted at strategic locations within the Colleges to monitor all movements. Through these strategies, parents from all regions of Nigeria would have confidence to take their children to the FUCs in any part of Nigeria.
- ii. Recruitment and deployment of qualified teachers to the FUCs:** The Federal Ministry of Education should also live up to its responsibility by recruiting adequately qualified teachers and posting them to all the FUCs without bias. Particular

attention should be given to FUCs located in towns that are not State Capitals, because they are the most hit in terms of inadequate teachers. Where staff fail to report to any of the Colleges where they are posted to for their primary assignment, their appointments should be terminated.

- iii. Construction of modern structures with adequate teaching and learning facilities in the FUCs:** The Federal Government, in collaboration with International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and State Governments, should construct modern structures in the Colleges, to replace the old ones. More so, adequate modern teaching and learning equipment should be provided in the structures to be constructed, for effective and efficient teaching and learning.
- iv. Provision of portable water:** The Federal, States and Local Governments where these FUCs are located should assist in providing clean water for use in the Colleges. Both electric-powered and manual boreholes should be sunk within the Colleges, in addition to provision of over-head water tanks in the hostels, kitchen/dining, class areas and staff quarters, which should always be supplied with adequate water for use. Water pipes should be laid to connect the boreholes to the over-head tanks for the supply of good drinking water for use in the Colleges. Furthermore, water tankers should be procured and distributed to the FUCs for water supply.
- v. Regular Electricity Supply:** The Federal Government, through the Ministry of Power, should make provision to connect all the FUCs to the National Electricity Power Supply. It should also provide adequate functional electricity transformers in the Colleges for adequate electricity supply. Also, generators and solar power panels should be provided to the Colleges to supply power when the National Power Supply goes off. Furthermore, street lights should be provided in the hostels, class areas, and staff quarters; and all over the premises of the Colleges to provide light at night.
- vi. Regular monitoring and evaluation:** The Federal Ministry of Education should take monitoring and evaluation of the FUCs seriously. Through this means, the College principals and teachers would sit up to perform their duties diligently, in order to guarantee optimal performance by students. There should also be a deliberate policy of rewarding hard work

among the principals, teachers and students in the Colleges to encourage others to put in their best.

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- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State*, Vol.4, No1, 2003, p.31.
- ♦ The portraits of all principals of the College with dates are in the office of the principal, FGC Wukari.
- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State*, Vol.4, No1, 2003.
- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State*, Vol.2, No1, 1988, p.25.
- ♦ Prof Etemi Garba was the head boy of the College in 1993/94 session. He made this statement during the 94 set Reunion in Abuja on 28th May, 2022.

- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003, p.84*
- ♦ Ruth I. Angyu was among the students that participated in the cultural competition in Potiskum, 1990.
- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003.*
- ♦ Examples are Captain Ismaila Waziri and Captain Idoko Michael.
- ♦ Examples are Engr. Ibe Amanze, Engr. Idris Ogunesan, & Engr. Yakubu Audu, among many others.
- ♦ Dr. Hamidu Lawan, Dr. Abubakar Musa Hong, Dr. Osahun Enabulele, Pharm. Hauwa Baba Idris, Dr. Ahmadu Baba Usman, Dr. Ahizechukwu Eke & Dr. Lazarus Bosler, among many others.
- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003.*
- ♦ A random survey of the ex-students of FGC Wukari in the science-related disciplines showed that many of them are medical doctors, some are consultants in their fields of specialization, some are pharmacists, pilots, engineers, among others, and they are excellently doing well in the disciplines.
- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003.*
- ♦ Some of FGC Wukari ex-student in the Judiciary & Legal profession include: Justice Bilkisu A., Justice Momsisure, B., Prof Offornze D. Amucheazi (SAN), Eko, E.E. (SAN), Nwokoma W., Adamu A., Funsho, A., Zainab K., & Late Enoch M. Azariah (former president of FGC Wukari Old Boys Association).
- ♦ Examples of FGC Wukari ex-students performing in the entertainment industry include Ogheneovo Imonieroh (Novo), an actor, songwriter & stage performer; Emmanuel Emelu (Luciano), a singer; Mike Ezuruonye, an actor, and others.
- ♦ One of the authors, Atando Dauda A. is among the students that went to Potiskum for the competition in 1990.
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- ♦ Mr Aliyu, a one-time House Master of Republic House & a former Senior Boarding House Master in the College, making comment during the 94 set reunion on 28th May, 2022, in Abuja.
- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.3, No1, 1998, p.50.*
- ♦ Examples are Abimbola Bello of LTV and Kissinger Bukar of Adamawa Broadcasting Corporation, Yola.
- ♦ Examples of ex-students of the College that made it in the Military are Rear Admiral Akinga A., Air Vice Marshall Usman F., Maj. Gen. Vintinabe., Navy Capt.

Ogbeche, O., Wing Commander Kanu, M., Lt. Col. David, W. & Lt. Commodore Agbu, A.I.

- ♦ Novo was the Entertainment Prefect in the College, 1999/2000 session.
- ♦ Today, many of them are Pastors and Imams in their respective places of worship.
- ♦ Abdu Buba M. 47yrs, Health Prefect of FGC, Wukari, 93/94 Session. He was interviewed on 11th June, 2022.
- ♦ Rev. Canon. B.O. Okafor (now 80+) was the first teacher to have reported to FGC, Wukari, in 1978, when the College was to take-off. He was interviewed on 27th May, 2022, at his residence in Kubwa, Abuja.
- ♦ Mr Josiah Gani (50+) was the Chairman of PTA, FGC Wukari, from 2016 to 2020. He was interviewed on 1st June, 2022, in Wukari.
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- ♦ *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State*, Vol.4, No1, 2003. P.34.
- ♦ He is a member of the 1990 set of the College.
- ♦ She is a member of the 1994 set of the College.
- ♦ During the 2018 anniversary, the Old Boys presented to the College, tables and benches to replace the old ones that were in use since the 1980s. These tables and benches were made in the colours of the various houses.
- ♦ See Adamu, D. *Issues in Tiv-Jukun Conflicts*. Jos: Target Publicity, 2002; Aluba, O. *Ethnic Conflicts and Citizenship Crises in the Central Region*. Ibadan: PEFs, 2006 and Agbu, A.D., Zhema, S. & Useni, B. *Jukun & Tiv: The 2019/2020 Conflict*. Jos: Jema Printers & Publishers, 2021.
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- ♦ Didenso, N.Y. is the Principal of FGC Wukari since 2018.
- ♦ Mr Josiah Gani (50+) was the Chairman of PTA, FGC Wukari, from 2016 to 2020. He was interviewed on 1st June, 2022, in Wukari.

Trends In Socio-Economic Developments In Ibaji Local Government Area in Kogi State, Up to 2012

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Abstract

Very few attempts have been made by historians to study the history of the peoples commonly found at the southwards portion of the Niger - Benue confluence region. The probable reason for this neglect includes their small population status in the Nigeria polity. Another factor is their lamentable situation of being outside the core confines of powerful states in the Niger-Delta region like the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo etc, which provided attractive land marks to students of history. As a result, the people that fall into this category like the Ibaji people who are the focus of this paper, are erroneously referred to as 'mini states' or 'stateless' societies, because among other reasons, they lack a centralized system of government and are thus neglected. It is against this that, Late Professor K.O. Dike advised that "... fervent efforts should be made to redress the situation by paying assertive attention and efforts to studying the areas considered as 'mini' or 'stateless' societies" which Ibaji land of Kogi State belonged. This paper therefore, brings to the fore the history of a riverine people (Ibaji) of Kogi State with specific focus on 2012 flooding and the challenges faced due to their location. This is done with the aim of providing an added knowledge about a people whose history has since been neglected. The methodology will be both primary and secondary sources, and will be descriptive and analytical.

Keyword: Riverine, flood, challenge, Ibaji, location.

Introduction:

Ibaji land lies south of Idah town in the Southernmost part of Kogi State. As a Local Government Area, it is strategically located bordering as many as three states; Delta in the South, Edo State and River Niger to the West, and in the East by Enugu and Anambra states. Ibaji is located in the Niger Valley with its Headquarters in the town of Onyedenga on the Niger River in the North West of the area at '6 53' 00," N 6 41' 0 0" E'. That is, longitude 7° and 10° East of the Greenwich Meridian, and Latitude 6° and 8° North of the Equator (Wikipedia). It covers an area of about 1,377 Km² and the 2006 population census gave her population as: 127,572 people. (National Population Commission of Nigeria Web). About 57 towns and villages make up Ibaji. These settlements are mostly in low land with abundant of streams, ponds and lakes all over the places. Ibaji has 10 political wards, and major towns include Ideka, Iyano, Onyedenga, Ayah, Unale amongst others (Joseph, 2020). In the eastern part of Ibaji are lakes such as Ibocho, Adun, Akpanyo, Abada, Ojila while in the Western part we have lake Ukpo, Ikako, Iyore, Oshimili and Ofe lakes (Egwemi, 1983). The people speak a dialect of the Igala language called *Olu*. This dialect differs a little from the Igala language, but they understand and speak Igala language fluently.


Migrations and Settlements

Like other communities in Nigeria, a lot of controversies surround Ibaji history of origin. There are several schools of thoughts. The settlements which were said to be in three phases began with the hunters and farmers who came to the forest zone of the Ibaji in search of games and fertile land for cultivation. In the second phase which represents another school of thought are those who believed that the inhabitants of Ibaji land today are off-strings of the defeated Igala soldiers who fought the Igala - Benin War of 1515 - 1516.

In this group is (Okwoli (2014) who stated that the defeated troops from numerous towns and villages in Igala were not allowed to enter Idah town, so they withdrew to the eastern bank of the River Niger, South of Idah. They called their new settlement Ibaji (people at the side of rivers). This is believed to be the second phase of the settlement. Those who opposed this version argued that the Ata Igala's warriors who lost the Benin War settled in Ekaperi in the present Edo State and Ebu in the present Delta State.

Contrary to this, Egwemi (1983), held the view that Ibaji people come from various part of Nigeria to settle there and that the majority of the settlers were of Igala origin who moved downward

MAP OF IBAJI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA



SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
 "GEOGRAPHY OF IBAJI" IN UGANE, A JOURNAL ON IBAJI LOCAL
 GOVERNMENT AREA IN KOGI STATE. VOLUM 1 (UNIVERSITY
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in search of better means of livelihood which Ibaji land provided in abundance. Along this line too, Ukwedeh (1976) traced the origin of early settlements in Ibaji land to 1450 AD. He stated that from oral histories the first group does not accept the Igala- Benin war as the cause of their migrations to Ibaji. Rather, they claim that their forefathers left the upper part of Igala land to their present habitat due to severe famine: that in order to look for a better livelihood, they set out in hunting bands towards the south which was an uninhabited bush. He stated further that from (1450-1530) AD the earliest settlements in South Western Ibaji District grew up around streams and lakes and that accounts for the present villages of Ayah, Iyano, Akuro, Ujeh, Iregu, Ijeh and Ikaka which developed out of one or the other of these ancient centers. They agreed that their forefathers One Ija / Onei Ija was forced to migrate southwards due to great famine and quarrel over hunting rights.

The third phase of settlement which represents another school of thought, traced their origin to 1860-1900 AD, and in the opinions of Ukwedeh (1976), it was a "period of the rise of fishing groups camps along the Niger which later developed into small villages of permanent settlers". Villages in this category that formed the core settlements according to him include: Odochalo, Adawo, Ojigbolo, Ineme, Abujaga, Onyednega etc. These people later settled down and began to farm.

In spite of these variants of traditions of origin, what becomes clear from all these is the fact that Ibaji is not made up wholly of Ata Igala soldiers who fought the Benin War. There were other migrants from Edo, Enugu, Anambra and Niger states. This is supported by Chief John Egwemi (2020) (the Onu Ejeh of Ibaji land and Chairman of the Ibaji Traditional Council of Ibaji Local Government Area). According to him, the Ibaji people came from different parts of Nigeria to settle in Ibaji land. Apeh (2014) stated that the earliest settlers of Igala origin were those who moved there from Idah for the fertile lands and the survivors of the 16th Century Benin War. However, it is generally believed by the people that majority of the early settlers were of Igala origin who moved into the area of what is now known as Ibaji land today in search of better means of survival.

Having settled, individuals and families of all the migrants (the hunters, farmers, fishermen as well as the remnants of the Ata Igala's soldiers from Benin War), acquired and owned land for themselves, both for residential purposes and farming. Such land eventually became their own. People who moved in later to settle on this land became their subject and had to pay land rent. This pattern of land ownership according to Apeh (2014) has generated problems in Ibaji because one village could be the owner of lands on which about five other villages settled.

Occupationally, Ibaji people engaged in hunting, farming and fishing. Having seen that the first settlers in Ibaji were hunters who migrated from other parts of Igala land in search of games and better livelihood, hunting therefore become their first occupation and means of sustenance of these settlers. This they carried out on a daily basis. As indicated by Akubor (2014) there were professional hunters who acquired their skills through rituals, techniques and by hunting in different environments under different conditions, as well as specializing in a particular variety of game. These games such as elephants, bush cows, leopards, antelopes, wild pigs amongst others, were exchanged in markets which in turn boost the economy of the people. However, there is a type of hunting called OKPA or Odo-Oju in which every able-bodied hunter went to the bush in groups for full-scale hunting. Sometimes this could be at the insistence of the king of the village. At the end of such a hunting exercise, all the games killed by individuals were brought together to the king's palace. After the king was given his own share, the remaining were shared family by family. With time, these hunters, seeing the fertility of the land, the hunters also settled down to farm on a large scale, side by side with hunting. Not until the 20th Century when forest depletion occurred due to famine, did hunting become a subsidiary and just a hobby for few people.

Farming:

Geographically, the bulk of Ibaji lies within the lower Niger and the Niger flood brings in great amount of alluvial soil annually, this keeps the land fertile for agricultural activities with bountiful harvest. The fertility of the soil in this area was a factor that aided the early settlers to settle. With the rich deposit of alluvial soil, people cultivated agricultural crops like yam, rice, maize, okra, potatoes, cassava and beans (Akubor 2014). Today, farming has become the major pre-occupation in Ibaji land such that a man/ family is respected by the quantity of farm produce harvested in a year. The two farming seasons in Ibaji are dry season and raining season. In the raining season crops like yam, rice and maize are planted in April and harvested in August and September. The cultivation of crops like beans, potatoes and cassava took place in the dry season. Ibaji practiced what is known as group forming (ALO) whereby every farmer engages the other farmers in his cultivation thereby having large the hectares of farms. In this exercise a kind of communal tilling, cutting of grasses and making molds or ridges are done. As many as five groups can be formed in a village based on age-grade, friends or relations. They moved from one person's farm to the other in rotation until all the member's farms are visited (Apeh, 2014). It is a useful system that ensure speedy and quantitative farm work. Yam, rice constituted a sort of cash crop for the people as every farmer engaged in it yearly. Yam is the pre-occupation of men while women engaged in rice production. It is important to say here that Ibaji produced large quantities of Yam

annually. A household can farm as much as 4,000 yam tubers or own as much as 10 hectares of rice farm.

In fact, Ibaji people are the highest Yam (food) producers in Kogi state and are reputed for the production of a special breed of Yam nicknamed "Onyekwe" because of its big size. The absence of good roads makes it impossible for vehicles to come in farm market to thrive. Their produce are not brought to Lokoja, the state capital for this reason. However, from the bank of the Niger River in a village called Odomomoh, a 20 minutes' boat ride get their farm produce to Edo state, her southern neighbor where most Ibaji crops especially yam and rice are sold and loaded into Lorries heading for Benin, Onitsha, Port Harcourt and Lagos.

Fishing:

The settlement of a group of fisher men along the river bank in Ibaji area in the 18th Century, marked the beginning of fishing. It was this group that founded the villages along the River Niger and made fishing an occupation on a full scale. So, there is a heavy fishing population along the coastal lines like the Ijaws in the Niger Delta. With time however, fishing went side by side with farming. On their way to the farm, farmers are said to roll out their nets or hooks in the river or ponds. On returning from the farm in the evening, the nets and hooks might have caught some fish which were then taken.

Fishing was important to the point that the months of January, February and March were the months of general fishing harvests, when in a professional manner men and young men in the village participated in the fishing harvests when fishes were caught in large quantity. For this season some ponds were exclusively reserved for fishing festival on the day for which only the king of the village announced. In this fishing harvest, two methods were used. The First method which is net throwing is used particularly for big ponds or lakes. The second method is boiling of water which is mostly used for small ponds, a very tedious method of fish harvest. Good to mention here that this type of fishing harvest is on the decline. Bush clearing for farm work causes erosion with great impact on the ponds.

Commercial Activities:

In Ibaji, there is the natural providence of river network in the area which has been of tremendous importance in the establishment of trade links in the adjoining communities. Mostly women engaged in buying and selling of food items either in their own village markets or neighboring markets. The few that engaged in trading on commercial basis deal on yam and rice. Men could sell their farm produce especially yam but they do not go

into full-time buying and selling. A few also raised live stocks but Ibaji has no rival in Kogi State when it comes to farming and Fishing.

Festivals:

Culture which embraces customs, beliefs, dances, arts and norms of a people distinguishes one community from another. In Ibaji tradition and culture, festivals and dances are very significant. Cultural festivals such as *Ulor*, *Okwute*, *Arotena* and *Eka-Oloji* are held to communicate with the ancestors to bring peace, progress and good harvest. They are so significant to the life of the people, *Eka-Oloji* in particular is the Yam festival, celebrated to give thanks to the gods for the year's harvest. *Abo-Okoché* festival is also celebrated to acknowledge the service of which farm implements such as hoes and cutlasses have rendered to the farmers in the year. These two festivals are held in the month of July and August. Festivals such as *Eka* and *Egwonyi* serves as holidays and joyous days or weeks to mark the end of their farming season in the year. The festivals bring the people in the villages/villages together to interact, thereby enhancing inter-group relations.

Masquerades are regarded as the representatives of the dead on earth, and so are highly revered in Ibaji land. It is solely men's affair in which only men and initiated boys took part. Dances in Ibaji involved men and women until the 1940s. Festivals, burials and age-grade gatherings were functions that attracted dances. *Echa* dance known in other parts of Igala land as *Iya-Oye* was the burial dance by women, while most male dance are masquerade performances. These dances are gradually fading away as traditional burials are being replaced by Christian burials. The young ones are equally not interested and so are not learning.

Good to note that cross-cultural influences have affected women dances in Ibaji. What is witnessed today is a mixture of Igbo (their neighbor) and Igala dances which is referred to as Ibaji women dance. The women dance Igbo steps with handkerchiefs singing in Igala language. This women dance known as "*e-kwo*" is performed during burials and festivals. Ibaji's difficult terrain prevented them from moving freely and frequently to other parts of Igala land leading to a gradual loss of regular contact with Idah and Igala land in general. Hence, their culture affinity with their Igbo neighbors where they learnt Igbo songs and dances.

Marriage:

In Ibaji and Igala land generally, a man is considered due for marriage between the age of 18 and 23 years. Searching for a wife is both the responsibility of the young man as well as his parents who gather

information about the attitude and character of the young ladies around. In this search for a suitable lady, good manners, family history and background are taken into consideration. After a successful search and discovery, the parents of the lady are contacted.

The first in the series of marriage ceremony began with what is called *Obi Ata Omonobule* (First Kolanut). The father of the young man presented "Kolanut" (2), a small keg of palm wine and a bottle of local gin to the father of the intended girl. This signifies formal request and knocking of the door. If the lady accepted the offer after being informed by her father, the next stage follows which is called *Ote-Okolo* (Introduction). By *Ote-okolo* the entire family of the girl was formally notified by the parents of the young man. In this ceremony, the parents of the young man and his brothers presented 4 kolanuts and 2 kegs of palm wine or (nowadays) one carton of beer to the family of the lady. After this ceremony, the boy was free to visit his would-be in-law at any time. The latter could from now also send the young man on any errand or request his assistance on their farms. This assistance continues even after marriage, for according to Igala adage, working for or helping in-laws has no end (Apeh, 2014).

Next is the engagement which is called *Ugwa-Oya*. It is a ceremony characterized by eating and drinking, a time of negotiating the bride price. The family of the young man presented four or six kolanuts, two gourds of palm wine and schnapp bottle of local gin to their in-laws.

Ibaji differs from other parts of Igala land in terms of certain marital requirements. For instance, in other parts of Igala land, the young man marrying is expected to buy boxes, clothes, jewelries, shoes and bags for his would-be wife before engagement. This is not so in Ibaji. During engagement the parents of the girl provided food for the occasion, contrary to what obtains in other parts of Igala land. Similarly, in Ibaji the services of a go-between (*atogba-oya*) called *alarinna* in yoruba land is never employed as it is done in other parts of Igala land. The father of the young man or a relation takes care of the engagement ceremony. Finally, the day of the marriage ceremony is called *Oya ene*, it is marked with lot of merriments, eating and drinking. On this day the bride is gorgeously dressed and taken to the groom's house in company of her lady friends and relations. As it is customary for a mother to send her daughter to her husband's house with items such as clothes, pots, plates and other utensils, these items are carried by the bride's friends as she is being taken to her husband's house. Her arrival in the husband's house marked the peak of celebration. She could be kept in the house of the groom's parents for a month or more before being taken to her husband's house.

Governmental institutions:

Right from the time of settlement, Ibaji people had operated a monarchical system of government, that is a system of rulership by kings. Every village was and is still headed by a king known as *Onu* who is usually the oldest man in the royal family. He is a crowned, beaded king with ancestral staff of office. He ruled the village with the support of chiefs and elders (the *Odafes*, *Achimeres*, *Otons* etc). The king has the final authority over issues.

Next in the administrative hierarchy were the Council of Elders called (*Odafes* or *Okpallas*) in some villages. These sat with the king in decision making. Each Village is usually divided into clans (*Ofe* or *Olopu*) and families. The *Odafe* in each clan is usually the oldest man in that clan. All the *Odafe* from each clan constitute the council of elders. The number of clan heads depends on the number of clans in the village. A large village may have up to 15 clans. Some villages are divided into sections and each section has a clan head. This council meet regularly with the king either on market days or fortnightly as the king may deem fit. However, an emergency situation could necessitate an urgent meeting for urgent decisions. It is important to note that orders and directions flow top down since hierarchically, the village administration is vertical.

Another hierarchy of leadership directly under the king and parallel to the *Odafes* are the *Awuhi*, the *Achimere*, the *Otono*, the *Oji-okolobia* and the *Abokolobia*. They are not under the *Odafes*. Next are the Youths.

Information Dissemination

The *Odafes* have authorities only over their deputies and the Clan PRO (*oga*). The *Odafes* do not give directives to their subordinates at the village level. It is through these ones (*the oga*) that information are related to the family members. Messages from the clan heads' meetings are also communicated through the same process.

The king's instant information dissemination and creation of awareness on issues were done through the Town Crier. He, through the use of a big gong passed the message of the king to the people either in the evening or very early in the morning. The passing away of a king was announced using a wooden gong called "*Agidigbo*". This practice is common all over Ibaji Land.

Christianity and Education in Ibaji:

Like in most other communities in Nigeria, the foundation of education in Ibaji was laid by the missionaries. It is in this respect that one would closely examine missionary works in Ibaji land. Some people see religion as a limited set of personal believe of God and worship which can be

isolated from a person's general culture and can be changed without necessarily up setting that person's culture or his world view (Ajayi, 1956). Before the advent of Christianity in Ibaji land, the people had their own African traditional believe system. Their traditional religious system is that they believed in the existence of the Almighty God and also accepted the existence of His messengers as personified in the gods. As part of their traditional believe system, ancestral spirits are also invoked when the need arose to mediate between the living and the Almighty God. However, the messenger god was venerated and represented or symbolized by materials objects of diverse categories like carved woods, stories, trees, rivers etc.

The Advent of Christianity In Ibaji Land:

The advent of Christianity in Ibaji land became noticeable around the 1930s through two main sets of Christian missionaries. These were Qua Iboe Missionary and the Roman Catholic Mission (Enefola, 2005). According to Reverend Father D. Guerton (2020) in a discussion, one of the pioneer missionaries in Ibaji land, "Christianity came to Ibaji through Igbo land (due to Ibaji's proximity to Igbo land) from Aguleri." In the same vein Okwoli, (1971), in his book argues that "long before the pioneering missionaries reached Ibaji area, the people had had contacts with the missionaries in the southern part of Nigeria mainly Onitsha and Aguleri". At this point we shall briefly look at the histories of some important Christian missions in Ibaji land.

THE QUA-IBOE MISSIONARIES:

The Qua-Iboe missionaries came to Ibaji land in 1933 (Enefola, 2005). The initial emergence of Qua-Iboe was resisted by the people who saw this development as an erosion to their indigenous ways of life. Efforts by the mission to establish their presence in some Ibaji settlements like Onyedega, Iyaano, Echeno and Odeke were vehemently resisted by the locals. Among the first converts was Anagor Peter Oyaka of Unale village in 1934 (Enefola, 2005). At the initial period of the introduction of Christian missions in Ibaji land, the people were not receptive to the new and foreign religion. The people viewed it as foreign and equally termed it as an agent of destruction to their cultural norms and values. As a result of this perceived phobia by the populace, the natives collectively excommunicate Mr. Peter Oyaka and his followers from Unale village (Ojoma). Although, as we shall see later, the people subsequently became convinced due to their interactions with the missionaries that what Oyaka had brought to Unale village was of immense benefits

At the initial period of the Christian Missions in Ibaji land, the people were not quite receptive about that development. To demonstrate this was the give out the "evil forest" to the missionaries to build their

churches. According to an informant, (Charles, 2020), "... the evil forest was given to the missionaries thinking that the evil spirits would drive them, but as the spirits could not chased them away ... the villagers became divided in their thoughts". As a result of this development, the missionaries started receiving more converts. As a result of the people's enthusiasm about the new religion, the missionaries particularly the Qua-Iboe mission as from the 1940s began to open Qua Iboe Mission Primary Schools which made them to win more converts as the natives wanted their children and wards to be educated like the missionaries. On seeing the benefits of the school being established at Unale village, other indigenes began to send their children there to attend primary school. So primary schools spring up in many villages in the late 40s.

In a similar vein, in 1952, when Mr. Samuel Udekwe brought Qua-Iboe to the village of Iyano, the indigenes inhabiting the place rejected Christianity. The man was castigated by the natives and given all sorts of names. According to a relation of his, (Fuewi 2020) "... my brother was unfairly treated by the villagers and excommunicated". But this odd treatment on Udekwe and his followers did not last long, because the missionaries successfully convinced the people by bringing Qua-Iboe primary school to Iyano in 1952. Subsequently, the people accepted the missionaries mainly because they wanted their children to be educated through the schools established by the missionaries. Hence, Iyano became the second village in Ibaji land to accept Qua-Iboe missionaries. This development overtime spread to other villages in Ibaji land.

The Catholic Mission in Ibaji Land:

In order of chronology the Roman Catholic Mission came after Qua Iboe Mission in Ibaji land. The first Catholic priest to visit Ibaji according to Guertin (2020) was Reverend Father Anthony Konrath in April 1935. His coming into Ibaji land marked the genesis of the opening up of the Christian instruction schools in Ibaji land in places like Afa, Ayah and Odekpe. At Ayah in 1938, Father Konrath made the first baptism on three members of the Madukife's family of Ayah . Almost at the same time, there was the growing influx from Igboland into Ibaji land due to close proximity. Most of this Igbo people were traders who came into Ibaji land to trade and had earlier on accepted Christianity and were highly dedicated to their Christian faith. According to an informant, (Paul, 2020) "... these people (Igbo) committed themselves so much that they made visits to Idah Parish on every first Friday of the month for mass and blessing of the sacraments". This arrangement continued for many years before the appointment of Reverend Father Larose to work in Ibaji between 1952 and 1955. Accordingly, Reverend Larose built a mission house at Odomomoh, because of its central location and nearness to River Niger for easy water transportation. A lot of missionary work was

done in Ibaji land during this period by Reverend Father Larose. According to (Reverend Guertin, 2020) "Father Larose volunteered to work in Ibaji ... moving from village to village administering sacraments".

The Protestant and Pentecostal Churches In Ibaji Land:

As earlier on discussed, Qua Iboe mission was the first to come to Ibaji land in 1933. The Qua Iboe church missionaries did a lot of evangelization in Ibaji land. The Pentecostal activities began at Odeke in the late 1940s, when Odeke people rejected the Catholic primary school and requested for the Native Authority Primary School. This was due to the high school fees charged by the mission schools which was unaffordable by the people. The Odeke people's request was approved which led to the posting of some Igala Native Authority Teachers to Odeke. As a result, many Pentecostal churches started to come up and spread into Ibaji land.

The Pentecostal churches in Ibaji land multiplied mainly through the contacts of many Ibaji people with outsiders either through their working places or schools. Hence, when they come back home, they made efforts to introduce Pentecostalism among the locals. At the initial stage, the Ibaji elders particularly were not comfortable with this new and strange development. The elders held the view that this new religion and their doctrines were too negative to the orthodox religion. At the same time, the Ibaji youths took pleasure in receiving and belonging to this Pentecostal religion as it encouraged faith radicalism in the minds of the youths to the point of even opposing the very foundation of the orthodox churches. Examples of this Pentecostal churches are Deeper Life Church, Grace of God Mission, Gate of Salvation, Winners Church among others.

The Impact of Christianity In Ibaji Land:

The introduction of Christianity both the orthodox and Pentecostal missions have affected in no small measure almost every aspect of the social life of the Ibaji people. Like in most African societies, it is generally believed by the indigenes that Christianity has taken away from the Ibaji people their indigenous cultural values and its traditions, which to some extent is a truism. Hence, at this point we have to as a matter of necessity and objectivity view the impact of Christianity in Ibaji land. Here we shall consider the religious, educational and health impact of Christianity on the Ibaji people.

The Religious Impact:

The primary aim of the missionary in Ibaji land first and foremost is evangelism. This was done through the gradual process of preaching the gospel and the message of Christ to the people of Ibaji land, who were

hitherto deeply involved in the traditional believe system. Despite initial hostilities by the natives, Christianity gradually succeeded and got rooted among the Ibaji people. Infact, as of today there is no Ibaji village without at least a church. Although, not all the whole populace are Christians, but it is on record that, a large majority of Ibaji people profess Christianity as their only religion and mode of worship of God.

The introduction of Christianity in Ibaji land also gave birth to a new life in Christ and freedom from negative traditional beliefs that are repugnant to modern civilization. For example, human sacrifices, burying of dead pregnant women in evil forest etc., have been abolished as a result of the introduction of the Christian faith in Ibaji land.

The Social Impact:

The social impact of Christianity in Ibaji land cannot be over-emphasized. Christianity brought about a total change in the social life of the populace. The educational institutions brought by the missionaries opened up Ibaji land to western civilization. Christianity immensely changed the people's world view in their social lives. They now come to the realization that life did not end up in farming and fishing alone or restricted to traditional ways of doing things all in the name of culture. Rather Christianity widens the peoples' horizon and the understanding that no community is an Island on its own, rather Christianity widened their world view and the need for social interaction and cross breeding of ideas with other people.

More importantly is that, the materials and visible needs of the people are to some reasonable extent enhanced by the missionaries. By this, we mean the sick, needy, the abandoned, the orphans and the helpless found a ready welcoming hands and solace in the missionaries. Many villages through the efforts of the missionaries were able to get boreholes and locally generated electricity. Also the importance of health facilities offered by the missionaries can not be over emphasized.

The Moral Impact:

In most traditional African societies, the native held tenaciously to their tradition and moral systems before the advent of Christianity and the western civilization that was a regolith of that development. With the introduction of Christianity to Ibaji land, different morals based religious instructions came into existence in Ibaji land. There were many cultural practices of the Ibaji people that Christianity was able to abolished. For instance, the institution of slavery, one inheriting father's wives and capital punishment meted on accused for violating the community's norms which of course were repugnant to modern civilization were stopped. In a similar manner, a clan member having sexual interaction

with opposite sex, stealing which attracted death by stoning were all stopped. Many masquerades, festivals are now abandoned.

The Education Impact:

The greatest contribution of the missionaries to the people of Ibaji land is education in the western sense. According to an informant, (Ekele, 2020) "... no single aspect of the missionary activities has attracted as much attention in the history of Ibaji land as education". He continued, the western education that was brought by the missionaries was the most vital instrument of change in the Ibaji society. By this, Ibaji land became transformed. By 1939 through the efforts of Reverend Father Konrath, nine Ibaji villages had many junior primary schools. The senior primary schools (class five, six and seven) came up in the mid-fifties with Unale taking the lead. The first senior primary school under the Qua Iboe Mission (QIB) began in Unale in 1956 while Odomomoh senior primary school under the Roman Catholic Mission (RCM) took off in 1957, and the Igala Native Authority primary school began in Odeke in 1962. Products of these primary schools who performed excellently well attended colleges in the northern region of Nigeria. There was no college in Ibaji land until 1976 when Government Secondary School Onyedega was established by the Benue State Government. This formed the spring board for many Ibaji young boys and girls to be educated. Through these missionary schools, the first set of Ibaji elites emerged. These include Professor William Nuhu Ogala, Professor Simon Okwute, Professor Joseph Ukwedeh, Reverend Father Dominic Arome, Dr. Anago .S. Peters, Engineer Mrs Mary Akiode, Dr.Danjo Eguche, Mr Samuel Ata and a host of others (Apeh, 2014). Most of these people occupied important positions in Nigeria today.

Location challenges and management:

A very significant aspect of Ibaji history that cannot be ignored is the challenge arising from her location. Many major cities, towns and villages are situated near riverine and fault lines in Nigeria and our place of focus Ibaji is one of such. According to research carried out by (Adejoh et al 2019), 50.4% of the buildings in Ibaji are approximately less than 5 minutes' walk from the river; 12.8% are about 5-10 minutes' walk from the river; where as 36.80% of the buildings in Ibaji are between 10-15 Minutes' walk from the river. On the whole, majority of the buildings (73.3%) are within 5 Minutes' walk from the river. So, like creek dwellers in the western delta, this makes Ibaji people and their belongings very vulnerable in events of flooding.

Ibaji and 2012 Flooding:

Flooding in the opinion of Abam (2006) is a large volume of water which arises and occupy the stream channels and its flood plains in a time too short to prevent damage to economic activities including homes and infrastructure. Nwafor (2006) sees flooding as a natural hazard like drought and desertification which occur as an extreme hydrological (run off). Flooding is the most common environmental hazards in Nigeria and it causes devastation and significant loss. Folorunsho and Awosika, (2001); Ologunorisa, (2004) cited in Adejoh (2019) indicates that flooding occurs in Nigeria in 3 main patterns: Coastal flooding, River Flooding and Urban flooding. Coastal flooding occurs in the low-lying belt of mangrove and fresh water swamps along the coast. River flooding occurs in the flood plains of the large rivers, while sudden short- live flush floods are associated with rivers in the inland areas where sudden heavy rains can change them into destructive torrents within a short period. Urban flooding on the other hand occurs in towns, on flat low-lying terrain especially where little or no provision had been made for surface drainage or where existing drainage have been blocked with municipal waste, refuse and eroded soil sediments. Ibaji is a victim of River Flooding.

With focus on 2012 flooding, it was a national disaster that affected 14 states in Nigeria. These states are; Cross-River, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Benue, Anambra, Imo, Edo, Niger, Taraba, Jigawa, Plateau and Kogi State. In all these states, death, destruction of homes, public buildings roads, bridges, public utilities, crops, livestock and farms worth Millions of Naira were reportedly lost.

Of all these states mentioned above, Kogi State was the worst hit particularly the state capital Lokoja and Ibaji land, where about 500,000 people were said to have been dislodged from their homes (Adejoh, 2019). Of the two (Lokoja and Ibaji) the most affected was Ibaji, it was almost completely submerged, because it's a low land with most part of the area having a general elevation of about 35 meters above the sea level. This is why the area is prone to flooding between July and October every year.

The impact of the 2012 flooding in Ibaji was so severe. Farms, livestock and other businesses suffered loss to the tune of 68.4% and 31.6% experienced loss of family members (Adejoh, 2019).

Managing the flooding menace that almost wiped Ibaji away was a herculean task because of the urgency involved. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has been the prime disaster management institution whose duty is to harmonize important stakeholders towards efficient disaster control. In line with this, Daramola et. al (2016) stated that governments at National and Sub-National levels are the ones

responsible for handling issues related to National disasters. NEMA at national level and its corresponding agencies at the Sub-National levels identified as State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and Local Government Emergency Management Agency (LEMA) manage natural menaces. They were on ground in Ibaji land for rescue tasks, delivery of resources and reposition of disaster-stricken persons. These efforts however, have been that of reactive support rather than being proactive on preventive strategies. They waited for disaster to happen before taking safe measures to avert such hazardous events as flooding.

For instance, Ibaji people's opinion about the cause of the flooding revealed that among other things there was a dearth of knowledge and information on flooding among the communities residing along the river ways. So, efforts at preparedness for eventuality have been very poor. This is why Okwoli (2014) cited in Adejoh (2019) has encouraged a more logical, self-motivated, flexible and proactive system proficient of averting hazards events and mitigate as well. As the people of Ibaji counted their losses in 2012, a Non-governmental organization (Civil Society Coalition For Poverty Eradication CISCOPe) came to their support. This organization was able to rally financial support from international organizations like European Union and the International Rescue Committee. Over 16, 400 households in Ibaji Local Government were supported by the NGO with improved farm seeds, water pumps for dry season irrigation farming. A lot of awareness were also created by them on environmental disaster issues.

Conclusion

Generally, riverine communities have their peculiar challenges and Ibaji is no exception. This work has explored the area of study and discovered that Ibaji's location is both a blessing and otherwise. The yearly flood leaves behind a good alluvial soil that greatly enriches the fertility of the land, making Ibaji highly productive agriculturally. Her closeness to Igbo land and accessibility by River Niger exposed her to early missionary activities and educational benefits compared to other parts of Igala land. On the other hand, Ibaji's peculiar geographical terrain distanced her from other Igala people making her lose some Igala traits. This notwithstanding, the fact remains that Ibaji are of Igala stock. Similarly, her location opened her up to yearly devastating flood like the 2012 flood that almost wiped Ibaji away. As a matter of urgency, there should be a responsive safe measure that guides against any eventualities so that the nation does not wake up and discover that Ibaji communities are no more.

Recommendations

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A Historical Account of The Emergence, Growth And Development of Donga Town, 1845-2021

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Abstract

Donga town is the Headquarters of Donga Local Government Area of Taraba State. Three major ethnic groups the Chamba, Ichen and Kpanzo, have engaged themselves in a tug of war over claims and counter claims over who founded the town. The posture adopted by these groups is seemingly associated with the eventual rise to prominence of the town. It is not arguable that the town passed through many phases of growth and development, with each phase being associated with particular events or factors that contributed in moving the town to the next level. This paper, therefore, attempts to give a historical account of the emergence, growth and development of Donga town to the status it attained in 2021. The paper gives a geographical narrative of the location of the town; the Chamba, Ichen and Kpanzo versions about the founders of Donga town and the district phases of development the town underwent to attain its status in 2021. The paper adopts a historical methodology for data collection and uses a multi-disciplinary approach for data analysis.

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Introduction

Donga town is an ancient headquarter of Donga Chiefdom founded on the authority of Usman Dan fodio through Yakubu Ibrahim of Bauchi around 1845 (Gimba, 26). This ancient city is today the Headquarters of Donga Local Government Area of Taraba State, which was created by the Gen. Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida administration on 29th August, 1991. The town is located in the southern part of Taraba State, between latitude 7°43 North of the Equator and latitude 10°00 East of the Meridian (Bako, 18)

Donga town is inhabited by Chamba, Ichen, Kpazo, and Jahun since its establishment 1845. The population of the town received a boost by the activities of the Royal Niger Company in 1885, the arrival of the missionaries in 1907 and, later, by the colonial administration. These factors attracted other people like Hausa, Etolu other than the earlier mentioned groups who began to settle in Donga town. Similarly other Chamba clans, Gargea and Gayam migrated and settled in Donga town. These Chamba bear their clan names as mark of identity. In similar vein other Ichen clans, Ndesin, Nukunya, Gankwewere attracted to Donga bearing the clan name as ethnic name. The dominant language of intercourse is Jukun which is spoken by almost everyone in the town. Hausa is also spoken in the area.

Suitably situated by the bank of River Donga, the town is provided with abundant water for domestic and other uses as such as fishing, farming both during the raining and dry seasons. Among the crops that produce well in the area are rice, maize Guinea corn, Sugar cane, Yam etc. These provide enough harvest for domestic and commercial purposes. In other words, they constitute the sources of sustenance and revenue for the people including government.

A History of The Founding and Establishment of Donga Town (Claims and Counter claims)

The history of the establishment of Donga town has become more interesting in recent times. This is because some ethnic groups have

began to claim over the foundation of the town. Some of these groups have claimed to have arrived in what become Donga town at the same time with the Chamba (Sama). Some even claim to have arrived in Donga before Chamba (Sama) the Chambaclan believed to have established Donga town. This give three versions of the foundation of Donga town namely, Chamba, Ichen and Kpanzo versions of discus below.

i. ChambaSama Version

Most researchers on the history of Donga depend on information's provided by C.k. Meek and Muhammadu Sambo for their in-depth understanding of the history of the area. The Chamba version states that after the death of Loya Garbosa, the leader of Sama clan, his son Shimbura being the eldest son, was preferred to succeed him as their leader. However, Shimbura being immature at the time requested Nya Pyemishena from the Kola clan who was among their raiding group to hold brief for him in trust the leadership of the Sama clan his father's inheritance, until he (Shimbura) was matured enough to takeover (Garbosa,14). Pyemishena accepted the offer and took the title of Gar Kola and gave Shimbura the title of *Tigye*. Garkola led his clan, the Kola, and Samaclan to a new settlement at Gankwe. Suddenly, Shinbura and Nya Pyemishema relationship became strained as a result of the suspicion that Shimbura may kill Garkola Nya Pyemishena and take back his father's inheritance.

The version continues that, to avoid fighting each, otherShimbura and his followers sneaked out from Gankwe in the night. But unknown to him he left behind his son, Nubumga, who later on joined him at a new place called Zenowa south-west of present Donga in Ussa Local Government Area of Taraba state. It was at "Zenowa that Shimbura was crowned king and he took the title Garkie. Garkie Shimbura eventually abandoned Zenowa, which he had previously walled, and headed from west to the north of the area raiding along the way until he reached "Arufu where he camped for a while before moving North wards to Ganako" (Meek, 330), little west ward to Ibi, situated at the bank of the Benue river.

The version further stated that at Ganako, Garkie informed his son, Nubumga that he had grown old and weak and could no longer continue moving from place to place. Consequently, he chose to have a permanent abode. He then instructed his son to go and find a place where they would make a permanent home so that they would stop wandering. Nubumga responded that, he heard it from traders how "Shehu Sakkwato was giving flags to people and anyone who collected the flag became important, and if his town was a village, it would grow into a city" (Garbosa, 18). On his approval, Nubumga took off for Sokoto but made a stopover at Bauchi during the reign of Ibrahim, the son of Yakubu I

(1847-1879). In Bauchi, Nubumga was told that Ibrahim was on his way to a battle known as *Tabulla* (Garbosa, 19). Without hesitation, Nubumga went and met Ibrahim. Ibrahim asked Nubumga of his mission and he replied that his intentions were three: to go to Sokoto and obtain a jihad flag, to greet Ibrahim (that is, present a gift to him), and to obtain the permission of Ibrahim to stop over before proceeding to Sokoto (Meek, 331). Ibrahim asked Nubumga to go and rest since he must have become tired from the long journey he had embarked on. But Nubumga refused and joined forces with Ibrahim in the battle of Tabulla where Nubumga was injured three times.

After, the battle of Tabulla, Ibrahim described Nubumga as a gallant soldier and told him not to go to Sokoto any longer. That he (Ibrahim) would give him the Jihad flag in his capacity as the representative of the Shehu in Bauchi. Ibrahim then called one of his commanders that had a troop from Jahunawa ward named BardeKarijo, and asked him to take his troops and assist Nubumga in a series of wars until Nubumga established a place of his own. Nubumga, in addition to the troops, was given 30 horses (Meek, 331).

The version goes further that on receiving the flag and the authority to establish his own territory, Nubumga and his followers together with the Jahun warriors left Bauchi and came to Dinya at Ganako and narrated to his father all that took place in Bauchi. From there Nubumga, his father, the Jahun warriors and all the people agreed to move towards the east close to the Kola clan whom they had left at Gankwe. Nubumga's intention was to revenge for what his kinsmen did to him and his father at Gankwe, and to attack Jibu under Lamido Kuso (Hamman, 139)

Nubumga and his father, together with the people then crossed the River Benue reaching Jibu for the attack where they met some Jahun people among the Jibu troops who already got the information that Nubumga had collected the jihad flag from Ibrahim of Bauchi and among his people were their kinsmen. So, at night, they sneaked to Nubumga and immediately changed their loyalty from Lamido Kuso to Nubumga and together they attacked Jibu killing Lamido Kuso in 1853 (Hamman, 139) from there they proceeded to where Donga is situated today.

When Nubumga and his father, Garkie, together with the people arrived close to their kinsmen, the father who was too old wanted no more wars but peace, therefore, he wanted to settle amongst the Kola people in a walled town. But Nubumga refused living amongst them on the pretext that the population was too large, so he, with the people and his father, moved to few places south of the Kola clan and camped there. Not too long, in Nubumga's camp; there was shortage of food and this compelled his followers into stealing the crops of the Kola people. Those caught by

Kola people were either killed or enslaved. Among those killed was one of the leading men in Nubumga's camp, a Hausa man from Kano named Muhammadu Dogo; was caught by Kola people and killed (Garbosa, 22) In fact, Muhammadu Dogo was very instrumental in the successes registered in Nubumga's camp right from Zenowa in present day Takum local government area, he also was responsible for guiding the Chamba to Bauchi. The killing of Dogo triggered off the war that Nubumga had in mind against the Kola people. The Chamba version concluded that, Kola deserted their town and founded Suntai, while Nubumga and his father, with their people, founded Donga town. The name Donga is derived from Donzomga (Meek, 333), coined after the death of Garkie.

ii. Ichen Bigwa Version

The history of the migrations of the Ichen into Donga town is scanty and mostly in oral form not until recently that a book was published stating clearly how Bigwa and Nukpo came to Donga with the Sama Chamba.

According to the Ichen version, the Bigwa clan of the Ichen claim that they were the first among the Ichen clans who met and came into friendship with the Sama clan of the Chamba while they were at a place known as Kwacikwa which was a hill settlement. It was at Kwacikwa that the Sama leader met with the Bigwa elders and both took an oath of trust and not to betray one another (Fwachabe, 11-12). It was from Kwacikwa hills area that both the Bigwa and the Sama together moved to establish a new settlement near Takum known as Zennua which they later left as a result of conflict with another Chamba clan the Dakka to Arufu in the present day Wukari Local Government Area.

The tradition maintains that at Arufu Sama, Bigwa group "met another Ichen clan, the Nukpo people, who came down from their hill before the Bigwa people" (Fwachabe, 13) Noticing their kinsmen the Bigwa, among the Sama clan of Chamba, the Nukpo were encouraged by their presence and agreed to go with them to find a permanent abode. The Ichen tradition concludes that together, the Sama, Bigwa and Nukpo continued until they reached "Ganako near Ibi where they settled for a while after which they continued wandering until they arrived at Nyankwala, in present day Wukari Local Government Area. Lastly, from Nyankwala they entered to a place which is now called Donga" (Fwachabe, 13).

iii. Kpanzo (Jukun) version

It seems very difficult for the Kpanzo in Donga to tell exactly when they migrated into Donga. All they can remember is that they arrived Donga immediately after they left Kwararrafa and settled at an area in Donga near a stream, *Zape Tsokwa*, named after their leader, Tsokwa. Another source says that the Kpanzo were in Donga long before the Chamba and

their party arrived in the area. Infact, the Kpanzo tradition maintains that they settled near a lake called *Kita-a'ufinka*, which is in Donga town (Danjuma& Adamu, Dec.22)

Another Kpanzo claim over Donga town has it that they:

.... followed different route from the Ichen and arrived Donga after the Chamba Sama, Nukpo and Bigwa had founded Donga and settled" They occupied a large area in Donga town because of their population. The area that they settled Stretched from Zape Tsokwa northward to the small hill north of Zape Tsokwa, eastward near Zape Boje and westward near to the present Abakwariga ward (Fwachabe, 16)

As earlier on stated it's very difficult to say exactly about the Kpanzo place in the history of the establishment of Donga town even Sama did not say anything about them other than their coming through the Zape Tsokwa.

iv. Analysis of who established Donga town

Most of the writers about Donga history, particularly Donga town give the history of migrations of the Sama clan and their exploit before going to Bauchi, from where they came back to Donga in company of their new allies the Jahun. None of the writers neither mentioned the Bigwa who claimed relationship from Kwachikwa hills nor the Nukpo who they claimed to have met at Arufu.

The Kpanzo themselves did not have enough both oral and written evidence as to their claim over Donga town. Looking at the composition of Donga town at the early arrival period of Europeans, the representatives of the Royal Niger Company, Mr. D. McIntosh, signed a treaty as British Vice Consul and with Mr W. Wallance as a witness with the chief of Donga, Gargbenyi I, in 1885 (Fremantle, 41), who was the absolute ruler of Donga town and its environs.

Also, The Intelligence Report on the Donga District of Wukari Division on the 17th July, 1935, states that:

...So complete was the domination of the chief of Donga at the time of the arrival of the British that his over lordship over his Kentu (Ichen)Subjects was at once recognised by the administration; nor until recently has it ever been called in question (Intelligence Report 1935, No26)

it is important to note that even though there are groups that claim to have at the same time with the Chamba(Sama), non-claim to have

equal status with them, with the exception of the Jahun that at a particular time have their Chief, war commander infact with a standing army in Donga have never claim ownership of Donga town. (Gimba, 2016, 45)

What is worthy of note is the name Donga, given to the town in contention. When asked question regarding who named the town, the Ichen Bigwa, Nukpo and Kpanzo could no remember. According to Sama the name of the town was chosen to honour Nubunga Donzomga. The tradition maintains that until the death of Doo Shimbura, no suitable name was given to refer to the newly established town. But after the death of Doo Shimbura the elders came together to choose a suitable name for the town. They selected among the many suggestions the name Don(zom)ga (Program of Installation, 1993), omitting the "Zom", hence, the town is named" Donga".

Worthy of note too is another claim by other Ichengroups who are not of Donga town. The groups maintain that the word Donga isIchen in origin and so clam that the town was established by their kinsmen, Bigwa and Nukpo. According to them the word Donga meansDongara, meaning, good morning or dawn of the day. But the fact remains that the Sama led a party of ethnic people to Donga and established a chiefdom as confirmed by other writers.

Therefore, all claims put forth by both Ichen and the Kpanzo regarding the founding of Donga, they could not give any evidence of either establishing a chiefdom or even the native name of Donga town. Hence, the Chamba of Sama clan provide a historical antecedence of how Donga town was founded and from whom the town got it name "Donzomga" who played a leading role to the establishment of the town.

Colonial period and its Impact on Donga

The arrival of the Europeans in Donga area was in two phases. They first phases wasn. the party was received in Donga town by the Chamba chief Gargbenyi I, who signed a treaty with them, with "Mr. D. McIntosh representing the British Vice Consul, and Mr. Williams Wallace, representing the Royal Niger Company Charter Limited in 1885" (Fremantle, 41). The Company went into business immediately, designating Donga town as the center of the collection of goods using the river Donga for onward transportation to Ibi the headquarters of the Company in the Benue Valley.

It is worthy of note that the Royal Niger Company Charter came to an end on January 1st, 1900, and the British colonial government assumed complete administration of the Nigerian area. In Donga, the British found that the ground was already set for them to rule the area through Chief

Gargbenyi I. It was reported for instance, that “so complete was the domination of the Chief of Donga in the area at the time of the arrival of the British” (Intelligence Report, 12) such that it was very easy to rule the area through the Chief. With the exception of Suntai, the surrounding villages, knowing that the Europeans were the guests of the chief of Donga, accepted them without resistance. This made it possible for the Europeans to make a considerable impact in Donga

The second phase of the Europeans in Donga was the arrival of the missionaries. It is important to note that missionary activities in the Benue Valley began in 1904 when the British High Commissioner granted permission to the Sudan United Mission (SUM) to come to Wase, in present day Plateau state of Nigeria, to start a station (Akoga, 81). It was an inter-denominational missionary team was led by Dr. H.K.N. Kumm, John Burt and Lowry Maxwell with the aim of evangelizing the Sudan. By 1905, two missionaries travelled to Wukari, that is only thirty-six kilometers away from Donga (Edga, 13-14). These missionaries could not enter Donga immediately since at that time Donga could only be reached through the river Donga because there was no motorable road until January 19th, 1907, when Rev. Maxwell and others (Bahago, 13), entered and established a mission station in Donga, becoming the second mission station in present day Taraba State. The mission station became important because Donga people, including the chiefs, accepted the European missionaries and their religion. Therefore, an organized church in the entire history of the Sudan United Mission (SUM) was started in Donga town in 1917, with twelve communicants (Bahago, 16)

The signing of treaty by Chief Bileya Nubumga Gargbanyi I had significant impact on the political and economic status of Donga. First and foremost, Gargbenyi I surrendered his territory and a pledge to protect the Europeans and their properties as well as not to enter into agreement with any foreign national. He also agreed to end slave raid, slavery and slave trade in his domain.

Sixteen years after the death of Bileya Nubumga *Gargbanyi* I, the political status of Donga changed for the better. By 1911, when Wanga N. Dozomga was selected by the kingmakers to be the Gara Donga, his name was forwarded to the Resident for approval. “Wanga N. Dozomga was the first Gara Donga who received a staff of office from the Europeans to serve as third class chief” (Garbosa, 125)

In 1913, within two years of his reign, the status of Donga was upgraded once again. This was in the area of land-mass and population. Donga Chieftdom and District was merged with Suntai district with Donga town as the headquarters (Reassessment Report). But it is interesting to know that before the coming of the Europeans, Suntai had never been subject

to Donga Chieftdom. Their chiefs were of equal status. But with the merger in 1913, Suntai became subject to the Chief of Donga. This means that all the outlying villages that were formerly under Suntai District were placed under the *Gara* Donga.

The act of bringing Suntai under Donga by the Europeans for administrative convenience, not minding the implications, gave Donga the privilege of controlling territories which formerly were not under her. This thereby increased the powers of the *Gara*. Within three years of the merger, "Treasury offices were approved for four Districts of which Donga town was among" (Garbosa, 130)

To reduce crime and to administer justice on civil matters, the colonial administration introduced an Alkali court of D grade in Donga town in December, 1906. After ten years of its existence the court was replaced with a Native court. The Native Court had the *Gara* as president in 1916.

With the establishment of the Court, the need to have a local lock up arose, hence, a Native Gaol was opened and, in fact, there were few convicts to be locked up. However, the Resident of that time was optimistic that the number would increase. In his report, "the daily average number of prisoners for the period 1st January to 30th June, 1917, was 3 people (NAK, 1917).

Before the coming of the Europeans to Donga town, the economic life of the people was subsistence in nature. But the strategic position of Donga town by the bank of the river Donga made her favourably disposed to the European Trading Company the Royal Niger Company. Economically, therefore, fortune of Donga town really changed with the coming of the Royal Niger Company. The town became a collection depot of all merchandise that the Company needed. The only possible access to the Kentu area was through Donga town. Therefore, all goods such as kola nuts, beniseed, and rubber, among others, had to be brought to Donga town by head portorage for onward transportation by water to Ibi. This marked the beginning of Friday as weekly market day in Donga town.

The trade route within Donga District during the colonial period started from Kentu and passed through Tissa to Donga, and from Donga it passed through Bantaji to Ibi. The other route was from Gaiama to Kwossa, then from Bantaji to Ibi (NAK, 1918) This, no doubt, contributed to the increase in the revenue base of Donga. As shown in the annual report of the Chiefs for the year 1921, the total general tax collected during the year was four hundred and eighteen pounds, four shillings, six pence (£418.4s.6p). And in the same report the total collection of revenue from others, including Donga, Wukari, Takum, of Ibi Division Native Treasury for 1920 was £1729.1s.9p (NAK, 1920)

The implication of the foregoing developments was that Donga became a town and District in less than 35 years of her contact with the Europeans. It also marked a significant improvement of her population, and revenue to an extent that its share was the highest among the other Districts. This height achieved by Donga District was synonymous with the enlargement of Donga by the merger of Suntai District to Donga District in 1913 which brought the trade route from Gaiama, through Kwossa, to Bantaji under Donga. Her position as the administrative headquarters of the District, as well as mission station positioned her as centre through which the Christian religion spread to other villages outside Donga. Economic development contributed in making Donga a cosmopolitan District in the Benue Valley region.

Modern Donga

As a District headquarters, Donga town began to see the benefit of colonial administration in areas such as health facilities with a dispensary built with a bunt bricks and iron corrugated roof in 1936. In 1975 (Shimbura, 01-2023), a primary health center was established. The Primary facilities was subsequent upgraded to Cottage hospital in 1993 and takeover of it by the Taraba state government. Later in 2006 the Cottage Hospital was upgraded to the status of First Referral Hospital with a resident doctors and nurses (Adiku, 01-2023).

The biggest boost to the growth and development of Donga town population and other dimensions when its political status of the area was changed from a District to a Local Government Area on the August 27, 1991, by the then Gen. Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida led military regime and with Donga town designated as the Local Government Headquarters. This political development orchestrated the presence of the State in Donga by the citing of offices of various ministries and parastatals in Donga town such as Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of youth Development, Area and Magistrate Courts and NEPA among others. Offices at Federal Departments were also located in Donga town such as National Population Commission, Independent Electoral Commission, Police Division to mention few. Some of the staff of these unit of federal and State Ministries, Departments and parastatals posted to Donga decided to permanently settle in Donga town with their families even after retirement.

Consequently upon the forgoing developments, Donga town was thrown open for development, especially as from the year 2000. Among the key development were the award of road construction project from Rafin-Kada to Donga and a bridge across river Donga by federal government. This development brought to an end the use canoe and ferry for crossing the river which had for years impeded development of Donga town. Among

other effects, these projects have contributed a lot in boosting socio-economic activities in the town. The project was completed in the year 2007. It is also envisage the road project awarded from Donga town to Mararraban-Baissa in the year 2021, if completed will further expand the scope of accessibility to Donga from places like Bali and Kurmi Local Governments areas to mention but these two towns.

Donga town also gained significant status as a result of the progress of its position as a upliftment of her Traditional institution. For instance, from the status of District Headquarter with District Head, later in the year 1936 the chieftdom was upgraded to having a Third Class Chief (Garbosa, 125). In 1983, the status of the Chieftdom was upgraded to having a second class Chief during the reign of Gara Garshina Danjuma by the then Governor of Gongola State Abubakar Barde / Wilberforce Jutta administration (Gimba, 2003, 50). And in the year 2006, the status of Donga traditional institution was finally upgraded to a First Class status by the administration of Jolly T. Nyame, the then Governor of Taraba State (Shimbura, 01-2023) These catalogue of progressive developments in the status of the Donga Traditional Institution has helped in no small measure in promoting the socio-political image of Donga town, especially that it became the headquarters of a First class Chieftdom in the State.

Conclusion

Donga town is situated in a very economically advantageous environment. This has attracted many ethnic groups who migrated to the place to benefit from the advantages offered by the town.

Due to the eventual growth of the town to prominence, the indigenous groups in the area, The Chamba, Ichen, Kpanzo, in particular, have engaged in a tug of war over claim and counter claims of ownership over Donga town. Each of these groups has versions of stories that try to claim their legitimacy over the foundation of Donga town.

It is interesting to note as the paper asserts that Donga town passed through many phases to arrive at its present status. Many factors accounted for this development, prominent which are: the upgrading of Donga from District to Local Government Headquarters; the upgrade of District Head, Third Class Chief, Second Class chief and finally First Class status; the construction of the Rafin-Kada-Donga road and the building of bridge across Donga river, among many factors.

The forgoing factors attracted many developmental projects to Donga town, which attracted large population to the town, with its attendants' effects such as the expansion of the town and supply of socio-economic facilities to the town. It is, indeed, repeating the obvious to say that without the aforementioned developments Donga town would not have

attained its present status, which have made groups in the area to indulge in a tug of war to claim ownership over the town. But no matter the endless tug of war, the town has passed through diverse phases of development which has inspired the purpose for this paper

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Oral Interview

Bunkaya V. Shimbura, Age 53 years; Occupation, Civil Servant; place of
Interview, Jalingo; January, 2023

Suleiman Adiku, Age 52 years; Occupation, Civil Servant; place of
Interview, Donga; March, 2023

UtenDanjuma Age 56 years; Occupation, Civil Servant; place of Interview,
Jalingo; March, 2023

Rethinking Banditry Invasion and Food Security In Post Democratic Nigeria (2015-2022)

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Abstract

This paper investigates the connection between banditry invasion and food security, highlighting the issues of criminal groups in creating their governance structures. The invasion of bandits in attacking farmers and engaging in cattle rustling may thus be attributed to food insecurity in the country. Using the qualitative research method, data were derived from secondary sources like articles, academic publications, newspapers, and reports from government bulletins. The use of situational action theory emphasizes the present nature and implication of banditry on food security in Nigeria. While indication revealed that the country is characterized by bad governance, weak legitimacy, protracted conflict, and poor leadership, make citizens vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups, traffickers, and other criminal elements. The study recommends and concludes that the federal government and other stakeholders should deploy more police in the affected locality; ensure they are better supported; improve local ties to gather better intelligence, and respond speedily to early warnings and distress calls. In addition, it should begin to disarm armed groups, including ethnic militias and vigilantes in the affected states, and closely watch all borders to curb the inflow of firearms to enhance human and food security.

Keywords: Bandit, Situational action theory, National security, Food security, Nigeria

Introduction

Insecurity in Nigeria is a habitual phenomenon that threatens the nicely-being of its people. The multipronged happenings constitute a bane to development and result in the proliferation of crime.¹ As a multifaceted predicament, insecurity assumes various dimensions in specific geopolitical areas. A surge in cybercrime, armed theft, kidnapping, domestic crime, extrajudicial killings, herder-farmer clashes, ritual killings, and cattle rustle curses the South West. The South East is a site for ritual killings, industrial crime, secessionist agitation, kidnapping, herder-farmer clashes, assaults with the aid of unknown shooters, and banditry.² The South was threatened by militancy, kidnapping, and environmental agitation. The North East has been problem with a humanitarian disaster lasting over a decade due to the Boko Haram terrorist and the Islamic State in West Africa Province. Also, the North West is enmeshed in illegal mining, ethnoreligious killings, and banditry. Consequently, it is an axiom that insecurity in the country has assumed a disproportionate geopolitical stance and has claimed many lives, substantial damage, and a lack of property.³

In the context of the security above problems, banditry has previously come to the fore with increased activities in the country's northwest region, particularly in Zamfara, Sokoto, Niger, Kaduna, Kastina, and Kebbi states.⁴ Banditry refers to 'a kind of crime that is composed of kidnapping, armed robbery, murder, rape, cattle-rustling, and the exploitation of environmental resources.⁵ Some factors that have led to the rise and persistence of banditry in Nigeria are under-governed spaces, a weak security apparatus, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, socioeconomic conditions such as poverty and unemployment, cattle rustling, and illegal mining activities in the North West.

Nigeria, also known as the African giant due to its large population and economy, has traditionally prospered in the agricultural sector. Agriculture, the lifeline of Nigeria's economy, contributes to one-third of Nigeria's GDP, with more than 80% of Nigerians being smallholders and 33% of the land producing more than 90% of domestic production.⁶ However, despite the significant contributions of this sector to economic stability and employment, the rise of shootouts, terrorism, militants, and kidnappings has led to higher food prices and increased reliance on imports.

Food security has become a problem of global concern in recent times. Nigeria, with her hugely endowed natural and human resources, is not spared. The Nigerian food crisis is a product of insecurity due to the invasion of bandits and clashes between Fulani herdsman and farmers.⁷

Nigeria's situation on food security is highly precarious and pernicious as a significant percentage of the Nigerian population is left with only the bilious taste of poverty. Based on report from Olateju,⁸

Lessons from the past from conflict zones indicate that by the time food insecurity becomes famine, it is often too late. Nigeria is at a tipping point, where millions in the North and now the South-West are coping with emergency levels of food insecurity.

This lamentation persists till today in Nigeria. Given these criteria and scenarios, Nigeria can be considered food insecure in the present circumstance. Many farming communities cannot farm without encountering herders with guns standing between them and their ancestral lands. The kidnapping and fear of Fulani herders feels like a slow war in which the weapon of choice is to cut people off from their main source of survival.

The price spike between June 2020 and June 2021 alone could push another six million Nigerians into poverty, disproportionately affecting urban areas. This underscores the need for short-term action to support well-being.⁹ This is achieved bearing in mind that information on the motivating factors of crime provides insights and capacity answers. Furthermore, the available literature largely fails to characterize the phenomenon safely and tends to offer indistinct answers. Due to this, this paper will examine the rethinking of the banditry invasion and its implication on food security in post-democratic Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

Situational Action Theory (SAT)

SAT is a concept of crime advanced in 2004 by Per-Olof Wikström. It tries to explain what moves human beings to motion, including crime, by incorporating ecological, criminological, sociological, and behavioural sciences. *Crime* is a movement that violates the law and results from the interplay between a person's exposure to criminogenic DNA and the propensity for illegal activity. This is, a character's time in an unsupervised or poorly governed space and stage of the strength of mind determine the prevalence of crime. SAT posits that crime is motivated with the aid of an individual's morality and the triumphing situation. People are answerable for their moves. However, the causes of their movements are situational. Therefore, an act of crime is a desire made after considering diverse alternative eventualities and stimuli offered by using a selected situation. Thus, a crime is committed when it is

perceived as a worthwhile and appropriate alternative, given the winning scenario, and when someone fails to apply ethical restraint.¹⁰

The situational stance superior by way of SAT rests on four major factors:

1. The man or woman (psychological makeup, reveal in).
2. The placing (the environment and character is uncovered).
3. The situation (selections as a result of interplay with the placing).
4. Movement (the individual's behaviour).

SAT illustrates that elements that result in crime are the same for anyone, regardless of age and criminal profession level. The concept argues that people's propensity to commit crimes is one-of-a-kind, just as environments vary.¹¹ The placing a character unearths themselves determines whether against the law could be devoted or now not. For instance, a person who struggles due to multidimensional poverty and finds themselves in an environment without guardianship but with specific escape alternatives and resources is likely to commit the crime. Crime incidence, consequently, is the interaction between an individual's crime propensity and the placing's criminogenic incentive. Due to a robust moral rectitude and government authority, an individual with a low crime propensity may be less liable to criminogenic incentives. In contrast, a person with an excessive crime commitment is less likely to fight against crime inducement.¹²

Meanwhile, SAT proposes the following key basic assumptions:

1. People are essentially rule-guided creatures. They specific their desires and reply to friction in the context of rule-guided picks; Social order is based totally on shared behavior policies. Patterns in human behaviour are primarily based on rule-guided workouts;

2. People are the supply of their movements. People perceive, select, and execute their actions; the causes of action are situational. A character's specific belief of action options, the method of desire, and execution of the motion are brought about and guided via the relevant entries from the character-surroundings interplay; Crimes are moral moves. Crimes are actions that wreck guidelines of conduct (stated in regulation) about what's the proper or wrong thing to do in a specific circumstance.¹³

3. SAT explains different crimes starting from theft to terrorism. SAT highlights the critical troubles of vulnerability, exposure, and emergence in explaining radicalization and terror. The character needs to be exposed to crime-supportive moral contexts to broaden crime propensity. A setting that induces crime has to be present and the individual in everyday contact with it; the character needs to be sensitive to the effect of the crime-supportive setting they arrive into contact with.¹⁴

4. When implemented to banditry in Nigeria, SAT expounds on the interplay between character, setting, situation, and motion. The person

(particularly with a low crime propensity) is inspired with the aid of the problem to recollect crime as a worthwhile exchange to realize the preferred outcome. Because the person is a product of their society, they're possibly to join society's norms.

Following Wikström's postulations, crime outcomes from an interplay between someone and the surroundings.¹⁵ Therefore, in a society characterized by criminogenic inducement, the individual becomes prone to crime. The state of affairs and settings accordingly inspire an individual's movement. The mental enjoyment is because of multidimensional poverty, exclusion, unemployment, marginalization, inequality, and displacement coupled with the winning condition inside the putting. Inclusive of underneath-ruled areas, unlawful mining sports, the influx of tiny hands and light guns, and poorly equipped security equipment engenders a poor scenario that inspires deleterious motion (banditry). Put otherwise, the increase in banditry in Nigeria is because of the interactions amongst folks who are victims of unfavorable socioeconomic situations within the setting. The putting is characterized by way of ordinary social malaise. The negative selections result from interplay with the placing, resulting in criminal motion.¹⁶

Banditry Invasion and Food Security in Nigeria: A Discourse

Banditry Invasion:

Smith and Bagu,¹⁷ are focused with this new issue in banditry when they agreed that most of the bandits are members of criminal, often young adults from farming and herding areas who have left their vicinity and have internalized new values and action of robbing individuals on the highways and rustling cattle for personal profit, and both the agriculture and herdsman societies are also victims of this criminality. The Centre for Democracy and Development,¹⁸ supported the above assertion when it reported that the bandits had increased their penchant for criminality from highway robbery and rustling to looting, laying seize on local business places, and killing unarmed innocent Nigerians.

Banditry invasion also drives herders' south.¹⁹ Over the last decade, cattle rustling has grown in scale and organization in several northern states where large bandit groups operate with mounting audacity.²⁰ While this occurs throughout the north, the main theatres have been the Kamuku forest in Kaduna, Falgore forest in Kano, Dansadau forest in Zamfara, and Davin Rugu forest stretching through Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara states. Cattle theft reportedly also has been a major source of funding for Boko Haram in the northeast.²²

The loss is hard to estimate: many thefts, especially those occurring in remote villages or forests with a limited state security presence, go

unreported. One report estimated that in 2013 more than 64,750 cattle were stolen and at least 2,991 herders killed in states across the north-central zone. From 2011 to 2015, bandits, cattle rustlers, and other criminals killed 1,135 people in Zamfara state alone, according to the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC).²³

The Humanitarian,²⁴ (2018), also mentioned that the first study of banditry was documented around 1901, and the incidence was said to have occurred in areas between Western Hausaland and the divide of the Republic of Niger. Via the mentioned incident, it was reported that over 12,000 strong cattle laden with assorted grains were attacked, and 210 merchants were killed. However, the disturbing development is discovered more by Egwu²⁵ when he stated that rural criminals have moved from their primitive stage to a more complex and complicated pattern of criminality. Little wonder Bagu and Smith²⁶ submitted that “gangs of criminals, often youth from farming and herding communities, have taken advantage of the growing insecurity in the country to launch their attacks on villages and communities to loot, engage in highway robberies, cattle rustling and killings for personal gains”.

Food Security:

Food insecurity and hunger are forerunners to nutritional, health, human and economic development problems. They connote deprivation of basic necessities of life. As such, food security has been considered as a universal indicator of households' and individuals' personal well - being the consequences of hunger and malnutrition are adversely affecting the livelihood and well-being of a massive number of people and inhibiting the development of many developing countries.²⁷

More than 800 million people have too little to eat to meet their daily energy needs. Most of the world's hungry people live in rural areas and depend on the consumption and sale of natural products for both their income and food. It tends to be concentrated among the landless or among farmers whose plots are too small to provide for their needs. For young children, lack of food can be perilous since it retards their physical and mental development and threatens their survival. Over 150 million children under five years of age in the developing world are underweight. In sub - Saharan Africa, the number of underweight children increased from 29 million to 37 million between 1990 and 2003.²⁸

A report released by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2021 ranked Nigeria among the top three countries where acute hunger and food insecurity are set to worsen.²⁹ Unprecedented heightened anxiety has left agricultural communities behind and hampered cultivation. Al Jazeera's Ahmed Idris has kidnapped "the fastest growing Nigeria", especially in the less governed areas of northwestern Nigeria. We call it a company.

He was kidnapped in 2021 alone.³⁰ As a result; many farmers have abandoned their farmlands, fled their communities, relocated to urban areas, or taken shelter in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. Many have become unemployed and can no longer care for their families, and in some cases they have resorted to criminality, leading to a vicious cycle of poverty and insecurity.

These disruptions have hurt agricultural supply and led to inflated agricultural produce prices. At a national level, since July 2020, staples such as beans and tomatoes have seen a 253% and 123% surge in prices, respectively. In July 2020, a measure of beans (called Mudu) sold for 73 cents (N305.48), but by July 2021, it was selling for \$2.16 (N900). The prices of other commodities, like bread, onions, and cassava flour, have also risen exponentially. Borno State, once the country's largest wheat producer, producing 30% of Nigeria's wheat, has more than 400 hectares in this region and elsewhere due to the activities of the rebels commonly known as Boko Haram. Wheat is cultivated. It was brought into stagnation in the northeastern part of the country.

As a result, Borno State now contributes minimally to the nation's 420,000 tones of annual wheat production, leading to an increase in wheat imports to the country, from \$2.4 million in the first quarter of 2020 to \$6.2 million in the corresponding quarter of 2021. In 2021, the armed conflict between Boko Haram insurgents and Nigeria's security forces forced farmer Ismaila Mohammed out of Konduga LGA (Local Government Area) located about 25 km to the southeast of Maiduguri, to an IDP camp in Maiduguri, Borno State. Mohammed, age 47, remembers his thriving wheat farm with nostalgia, recalling thriving harvests that would yield over 250 bags of wheat annually with proceeds that would allow him to maintain a reasonable standard of living and give alms while catering for his family.³¹

In Katsina State, located in the North-West of the country, kidnapping has taken center stage and disrupted agricultural activities. Many farmers have been kidnapped for ransom, and some have been killed on their farmlands.

In some instances, bandits have "struck deals" with farmers, "allowing" them to pay levies to continue farming on their lands. In cases where bandits have reneged, farmers have experienced attacks and where they have survived, they have been forced to flee their farms. In 2021, in Kaduna State, in the North-West region of the country, eight farmers in Buruku and Udawa villages of Chikun LGA were attacked on their farmlands and eventually killed. This forced many farmers to abandon their farms and communities due to fear. One resident lamented, "We can no longer go to our farms because the bandit's attack at will."

Similarly, in the South-Western States of Osun, Oyo, and Ekiti, the rise in kidnapping has led to limited availability of labor for agricultural activities, as residents are no longer willing to engage in farming for fear

of being abducted. As a result, there has been an unprecedented spike in the price of food items. Amidst these overlapping challenges, residents have advocated for strategies that simultaneously address food security and national security, as there has been a direct correlation between the criminal situation in the farmlands and rural communities and the food security of the country's more than 200 million people.

Nigeria's Federal Government, State governments, and the military have been urged to tackle the menace of banditry and kidnappings by synergizing with local vigilantes knowledgeable of the hinterlands and terrains where bandits and terrorists operate. In this regard, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), consisting of local groups of volunteers, has worked with Nigerian security forces in the fight against Boko Haram to provide security for internally displaced populations. In January 2022, the Nigerian government began designating bandit gangs as 'terrorists' to curb violence by imposing harsher penalties under The Terrorism Prevention Act.³²

Causes of Banditry Invasion in Post Democratic Nigeria

The prevalence of under-governed, where the government's control is ineffective and limited, is a major factor giving rise to banditry.³³ Such areas are characterized by bad governance, weak legitimacy, long conflict, and poor leadership, which make citizens vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist sets, traffickers, and other criminal people. Such areas are not generally mostly devoid of the government's power but are governed badly poorly and differently from larger communities. These poorly controlled territories are plagued by bandits and other criminal groups due to their remoteness, which allows for the perpetuation of an array of illegal business activities. It is not unpopular to find human trafficking, stealing, cattle rustling, and illegal mining in such communities. These areas are used to promote and maintain an illegal, informal business. Examples include large forests in Rumah/Kukar Jangarai, Kamuku, Balmo, Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, and Bauchi. Also, the Nigerian police are generally understaffed and badly equipped, leaving them unmatched in promoting security in under-governed spaces, a major factor that supports criminality in this region.

Under-governed angles coupled with the country's porous borders have increased the inflow of small arms and light weapons from the Sahel areas - thus increasing the chances for the crime. This is supported by vast forests, which allow the illegal arms trade to fester. It is further complicated by the socioeconomic status common in the North West, which leaves the youth vulnerable to recruitment for criminal activities. The socioeconomic stands include multidimensional poverty, widespread no jobs, deprivation, inequality, marginalization, exclusion, and lack of

access to basic amenities. Even though this is a country challenge, the North is particularly impacted. For example, Sokoto, Jigawa, and Zamfara states have poverty levels of 87.7%, 87%, and 74%, and respectively.³⁴ These conditions make the area even more susceptible to cases, including as a result of the operations of terrorist and, presently, banditry.

Another major factor that has increased the activities of banditry is the complex relationship between herders and farmers. Drought, desertification, climate change, cattle rustling, insurgency, and people growth have led to the ongoing mobility of herders. This mobility has seen pastoralists clash with farmers over farmland encroachment and crops' destruction. In extreme cases, these clashes have led to the wanton destruction of life and materials of both the farmers and pastoralists, thus joining in no small point to the level of insecurity in the country.³⁵

Another reason for banditry in Nigeria is the illegal mining operations in the North West region of the country. Illegal mining is popular in Niger, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Katsina states has triggered violent conflict over the management of minefields, leading to thousands of deaths. Due to the displacement led by the conflict, the region's people engage in banditry as an alternate means of survival.³⁶ Meanwhile, the high level of illegal activities has been attributed to poor governance, bad service delivery, poverty, and widespread no jobs in the geopolitical area, which makes the youth susceptible to involvement in the crime.

Effects of Banditry Invasion on Food Security in Contemporary Nigeria

Increase in Food Crisis

According to a report document from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), about 19.4 million people across Nigeria will face food insecurity between June and August 2022. The report, produced in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development FMARD and other stakeholders, analyzes serious food insecurity in the Sahel and West Africa. According to the report, the food crisis has affected Nigerians and FCTs in 21 states, including 416,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). As of May 2022, it was found that 385,000 internally displaced persons in 21 states and approximately 14.4 million people, including the FCT in Nigeria, were already facing a food crisis. March analysis includes Avia, Adamawa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Edo, Enugu, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Lagos, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto, Talba, Yobe, Zamfara, and Includes the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).³⁷

The killing of Farmers and Destruction of Farmland

This is one of the most devastating impacts of banditry in Nigeria, whereby the bandits killed farmers. Most families experience food insecurity when the head of the household is dead. These farmers are heads of households who are married with children, and their death adversely affects the other family members in terms of food supply. An example of the killing of farmers by bandits took place at Yargamji village of Batsari LGA, Kastina state, where on 6th July 2020, farmers were on the farm working after overnight rain, the bandits numbering over 200 were shot sporadically, killing 15 farmers and injuring several others.³⁸ On 10th September 2020, three farmers were also killed by bandits in Dandume LGA, one of the most rural areas in the state.³⁹ Most of the people killed by the bandits in the villages of the five LGAs sampled for the study are either farmers or cattle rearers whose death means their families and dependents suffered from food shortages at the family level. In some cases, the families of the deceased farmers or cattle rearers have no option but to move to internally displaced person camps where their source of food could be guaranteed for some time by the government.⁴⁰ With numerous large-scale attacks on Bandits that lasted for several hours, bandits engaged in burning local grain storage silos (called rumbu in Hausa). The resulting farmers preserved these grain elevators' food, which lasted for months, but bandits burned it. As a result, there needed to be more food among the villagers. Several cases of grain storage silos were attacked, and groceries were stolen. Bandits cause food shortages at home.⁴¹

Hunger Crisis

In 2021, FAO estimated that famine would hit 12.8 million Nigerians between June and August 2021. It is also said that rising food prices and high inflation, which may be associated with the recession, contributed to the hunger crisis. "The long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the loss of unemployment and household income due to evacuation due to conflict and armed robbery, as reflected in the critical livelihood strategies adopted by most households," was stated.

Cattle rustling across Northern Nigeria

Cattle theft has recently become a major crime in Nigeria, with the northern region being the hardest hit. In recent years, hate speech has caused numerous cattle to be stolen, killed, and injured. According to daily reports from the northern region, cattle thieves have contributed significantly to the increasing security challenges facing the Nigerian state, becoming a large corporation involving herders, large syndicates, and heavily armed bandits. There seems to be. However, despite the increasing theft of cattle and its impact on society, the situation has not yet been fully scientifically studied.⁴²

Suggestions for Curbing Banditry Invasion in Contemporary Nigeria

1. **Bolster security for farmers:** The Nigerian government needs to send security forces to areas affected by banditry and conflict-infected areas. Community partnership is needed to disarm criminal groups, fast response to curb conflict among herders-farmers and implement actions that will secure life and properties.
2. **Strengthen security arrangements for herders and farming communities, especially in the north-central zone:** this will need that authorities and security agencies to sustain advocacy against cattle rustling and village banditry; improve early-warning systems; maintain the operational readiness of rural-based police and other security units; encourage openness and collaboration with local authorities; and tighten manage of production, circulation, and handling of illicit firearms and ammunition, especially automatic rifles, including by building cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries' security forces.
3. **Development of Border Communities:** Arising from the strategic neglect of border communities in terms of socio-economic development, the border communities also provided sites for developing poorly managed forest reserves which provided cover and hideouts for the armed bandits. Therefore, the government should address the issues of unemployment, poverty, neglect of the border communities, and social injustice to improve the residents' socio-economic conditions and reduce the tendency to turn to crime as an alternative to survival.
4. Troops of Operation Sahel Sanity stationed in all affected and unaffected rural communities should strive to devise new strategies in confronting the bandits and ending banditry all over the country. This is important because the bandits still carry out attacks in the LGA despite the presence of the troops.
5. Local government councils should contact their House of Representatives members to assist the vigilante groups with operational materials and logistics to enable them to confront the bandits.
6. The Federal, State, and Local Governments, including the communities, should come together to discuss strategies to end banditry in Nigeria. This would enable IDPs to return to their homes and farmlands to end their dependence on food handouts from the government.
7. The State Government should work out a compensation plan to assist cattle owners whose cattle were rustled by the bandits, and such people currently have no livelihood. The compensation scheme should be in cash, or some number of cows, sheep, or goats can be given to them to start cattle rearing to mitigate their sufferings and lessen the traumatic experiences.⁴³

Conclusion

Escalating banditry invasion all over country is one of the most pressing food security challenges. This could potentially generate bloodshed even wider unless the federal government and all stakeholders make ending this menace a country priority. State governments also need to design

and implement steps to address the need to secure the agricultural sector.

Strengthening law enforcement, assisting local conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, and establishing and protecting farmlands would make a significant and immediate difference. In the longer term, the greater issues will be curbing the arms influx and, importantly, addressing the porous nature of the borders. Failure would lead to greater danger for a country already fighting other severe security challenges and, potentially, for the sustainable food security of Nigeria.

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Strategic Analysis of Small Arms and Light Weapons Migration In Conflict-Induced Displacement Area and Security In Nigeria

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Abstract

One of the actual obstacles to sustenance of stable peace and security in Nigeria is the existence and alarming rate in migration of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Small Arms and Light Weapons stand a principal source of eradication to human lives and properties and worsen inter-communal clashes, resulting to serious violence. The study examined the Strategic Analysis of Small Arms and Light Weapons Migration in Conflict-Induced Displacement and Security in Nigeria. The objective of this study is to know how Small Arms and Light Weapons affect conflict pattern and migration and also to assess and understand how Small Arms and Light Weapons worsen the problem of internal displacement in different parts of Nigeria. It also assessed the concerted efforts of the Nigerian government in combating the menace with a plan to proffer solutions on how to resolve the disheartening phenomenon.

The finding of the study is that the availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons has escalated conflicts and aided the activities of criminal elements across Nigeria. The study adopted Everett Lee's Theory of Migrations and Failed State Theory. The study recommended that there is need for the Federal, State and Local Government Areas in Nigeria to collaborate in solving the problem in addition to the imperative role of security agencies for sustenance of the nation's peace and security. The method is secondary with the use written documents such textbooks, journals, magazines, internet document for adequate analysis of the subject matter.

Keywords: Small Arms and Light Weapons, Migration, Conflict-Induced Displacement and Security

Introduction

Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation is acclaimed to be the major security challenge to people, societies and states globally, fueling insurgency, human trafficking and drugs, terrorism, organized crimes, internal insurrections and civil wars, posing obstacles to sustenance of stable peace and security. Many a times, little internal insurrection tends to escalate into larger civil wars and could destabilize a region (Kevin, 2007). This trend especially in Nigeria is attributed to the weakness and fragile nature of the state and her attendant failure to deliver good governance. Small arms and light weapons are often employed to forcefully displace civilians, prevent development activities, humanitarian assistance, peace-building and peace-keeping endeavours in all sense. At the end of conflicts, small arms and light weapons usually remain in the society, which may cause more violence since crisis can resume or conflicts erupt in neighbouring regions. Also in non-conflict environments, small arms may be used in criminal violence or may be used in suicides, accidents, homicides and others while they are sometimes the fundamental tools used by terrorists for societal annihilation (Holmes, 2014).

Circumstances, under which individuals decide whether or not to abandon their homes in the face of conflict. Most existing research on forced migration uses aggregate-level data to test individual-level behavior, arguing that people have a choice either to leave or stay even under highly adverse circumstances (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Edwards 2009; Melander and Öberg 2006, 2007; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007). This "choice-centered" view makes a significant contribution in laying a theoretical foundation for analyzing

forced migration. However, little is known at the individual level about why some people choose to stay while others choose to leave.

One-time Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in person of Lt. General T.Y Danjuma quoted in Falola and Okpeh Jnr (2008) when he argued that the ready availability of small and light weapons has escalated conflicts and aided the activities of criminal elements across the globe. Similarly, former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan informed that the death toll from small and light arms dwarf other weapon systems and now exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, (Akinwunmi, 2008). It is not the sole objective of this study to focus on the death toll resulting from the uses and abuses of these weapons, but to show how these weapons have escalated conflicts in Nigeria and how this tend constitute a part of the challenges of the Disarmament Demobilization Re-integration (DDR) process and security sector reform. You will also be exposed to how this brings about internal displacement of many people from their various settlements into emergency camps in various parts of Nigeria.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Small Arms and Light Weapons

Before going into the details of this study, it is important to define Small Arms. While there is no universally accepted definition of Small Arms, the term is commonly viewed as encompassing man-portable firearms and their ammunition primarily designed for individual use by military forces as lethal weapons. Small Arms in this context refer to weapons designed for personal use, (Okpeyi Jnr, 2008). These are self-loading guns and revolvers, pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifle and light machine guns. He describes light weapons as heavy machine-guns, hand-held under barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-air craft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-air craft missile systems and mortars of calibers of less than 100mm.

A typical list of Small Arms includes revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, and light machine-guns. Compared to complex major weapon systems, small arms are more widely produced and available, relatively easy to conceal, and require little maintenance, logistic sup-port, and training to operate. This explains why they are the commonest weapons for war parties especially during communal violent conflicts across Africa.

A huge number of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) now exist in private and public hands and there are at least 875 million firearms in the world (Small Arms Survey, 2007). At the same time, there exist more than

1,200 companies in 90 countries that produce small arms in the global world (Small Arms Survey, 2004). Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) have been reported to claim between 500, 000 and 750,000 lives annually and are a contributory factor to armed conflict, organized crimes, displacement of people and terrorism, thereby undermining peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable social and economic development (Geneva Declaration, 2011: 1). It is also responsible for fuelling crime and armed conflicts all over the world, resulting to terrorism and anarchy. Yemen, Kyrgyzstan, Ghana, Burundi, Sudan, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, Cote D'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea and others are some of the states that experience from this menace (Malhotra, 2011).

Weapons in circulation in Nigeria come from local fabrication, residue of guns used during the civil war, thefts from government armouries, smuggling, dishonest government-accredited importers, ethnic militias, insurgents from neighbouring countries, Fulani herdsmen and some multinational oil corporations operating in the oil-rich and crisis-plagued Niger Delta. The quantity of weapons used in the execution of these crimes usually results to wanton destruction of lives and property (Adejo, 2005). The Federal Government of Nigeria needs an urgent solution to examine the Effect of Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation and its threats to national security.

Supply of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria

As the saying goes that if there is no demand for a product, the supply dwindles with time; the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria follows this trend. According to various researches carried out on SALW in Nigeria two major sources have been identified. These sources are internal and external.

Internal Sources

i. The Civil War

Shortly after the Civil War in Nigeria (1967-1970), Small Arms and Light Weapons became common in circulation. This could be traced to failure of the DDR process initiated by the Federal Government after the civil war. This was as a result of the inability of the Federal Government to come out with a policy that would re-claim all the weapons produced for the purpose of the war. The General Yakubu Gowon's administration paid more attention to the surrender of the rebel forces. And since the Biafran soldiers were not properly rehabilitated, some of the arms were sold to migrants and criminals who began to use the weapons for robbery in the country. The seventies produced robbers like Oyenusi, (Akinwunmi 2008).

ii. Black Market

A correlation can be established between proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the incidence of poverty in the country. The eighties witnessed serious economic crisis in the country. It was the period in which the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was introduced by General Ibrahim Babangida's military administration. This was a policy that led to loss of jobs for many and a drastic fall in the value of Naira. SAP is a World Bank solution to Third World countries' economic crises. The SAP, according to the Babangida's military administration, was meant to run for two years, but was later extended when the government saw that it required more time to implement the reforms. The program included the liberalization of trade, devaluation of over-valued currency, privatization of public enterprises, and the reduction in the over-bloated public services.

However, the Program did not resolve the economic crisis in the country as anticipated by the military administration. Instead, it added to the misery of the masses that were retrenched from their places of work as a result of the collapse of many industries. Most of these industries collapsed because of the shortage in the supply of foreign exchange, leading to high costs of production and shortages of imported raw materials. Those industries that did not collapse had to retrench some of their staff in order to survive.

The cumulative effect of the imposition of the Structural Adjustment Program is the pauperization of the great majority of Nigerians. As mentioned above, the SAP created unemployment, because of this unemployment, many became involved in criminal activities which included illegal trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons. The trade became very lucrative and those involved sourced for these weapons internally from local blacksmiths. Among those arrested for illegal possession of fire-arms in the country were many blacksmiths. Also, many of the arrested armed robbers or criminals have confessed to getting the arms from this source, (Tamuno, 1991 and Akinwunmi, 2008).

External Sources

Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

Following the involvement of the Nigerian military in peace-keeping operations in the sub-region, many of the SALW came in wide circulation in the country. It is claimed that some discharged soldiers from war zones in Liberia and Sierra Leo had returned to the country with various types of munitions used in wartime, and sold the weapons in the country for money. Some weapons captured by the Police from criminals and militia members have been identified to these various peace mission exercises in the sub-region.

Also, Nigeria's borders are very porous which makes the flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons into the country relatively easy. Through these borders, many of the SALW have been smuggled into the country. Nigeria's customs and immigration officers have succeed in arresting and intercepting some of these smuggled arms. Besides these types, there are arms smuggled by big men and women in the society, (Akinwunmi 2008). Guns are hidden inside inflated spare tires of vehicles in some instances.

One may not have accurate statistics on the SALW in circulation in Nigeria but one fact that is incontrovertible is that the percentage is high. This is buttressed by the fact that in some cities in Nigeria, any of the weapons in the category above is referred to as "pure water". "Pure water" is sachet water sold in virtually all the nooks and crannies of the country. The fact that any of the SALW could be described as "pure water" testifies to their proliferation in the country.

Use of SALW in Conflicts

Nigeria has been divided into six geo-political zones. Although many ascribe the this division to the Constitutional Conference of late Head of State, General Sanni Abacha. Onwudiwe (2004) however, reveals that the idea of 3 North and 3 South as a zoning medel was first mooted by Aper Aku one time Governor of Borno 51 State. Since then, none of these zones has been spared of violent conflicts over the past decade ranging from ethnic to religious, resource control or communal conflicts. One feature of these violent conflicts of these has been the use of SALW.

The use of these SALW made these conflicts to be prolonged and lethal resulting in the deaths of thousands of people, especially the vulnerable ones in society, the destruction of properties; besides widespread internal displacement of many in the country. Cognizant of the fact that the objective of this study is not a discourse of all the conflicts that have taken place in the country; it will however focus on some major violent conflicts as case studies, which resulted in massive internal displacement, the emergence of refugee camps all over the country and intractable proliferation and spread of SALW.

Northern Nigeria

There are three geo-political zones in this region. These are the Northwest, Northeast, and North Central. As a result of the proximity to North Africa and the Fulani Jihad in the pre-colonial times, Islam became entrenched in the region, especially in the Northwest and the Northeast. Principally, the region has witnessed more religious conflicts than any of the regions in the Country. In the eighties, the Maitatsine crisis resulted in the death of thousands, which the government conservatively estimated to be over four thousand. The crisis also led to internal

displacements in the region. Many southerners, mostly Christians, fled the area to other peaceful Northern cities or to Southern towns or cities, (Akinwunmi 2008).

The late nineties witnessed the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and instrumentalisation of Shari'ah as a political weapon. This resulted in violent conflicts in most of the cities in the North, especially in Kaduna. During this period, there was free use of SALW by both Muslim and Christian groups. The involvement of SALW led to the death of many Nigerians and another massive internal displacement in the country. There were influxes of people to the Central zone and to the Southern region.

While religious conflicts are prevalent in the core North, the crises in the North Central zone is of another dimension. These crises took the form of ethno religious tensions and indigene settler disorder. The Azara crisis in Nasarawa State, the Jos crisis in Plateau State and the Jukun/Tiv crisis in Taraba State are examples of conflicts with ethnic coloration, (Akinwunmi, 2008). These crises witnessed the use of SALW in high proportion, to the extent that some settlements were virtually destroyed as witnessed in Jukun/Tiv crisis in 2001. It was in the same crisis that Tiv ethnic militias allegedly killed 16 soldiers. This led to the reprisal operations by the military leading to the destruction of several villages bordering Taraba state.

Southwestern Zone

The conflicts here are mostly communal in nature. The most protracted of the crises in this region were the Ife Modakeke crisis. The use of SALW in this conflict led to the destruction of many Ife and Modakeke settlements. The Federal Government had to intervene by imposing dusk to dawn curfews on the affected communities. The prevalence of SALW in the region could also be traced to surfacing of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC). The OPC, as was popularly known and called, emerged in the nineties with the sole objective of protecting the interest of the Yoruba. The OPC has been identified by the security forces as being responsible for the ethnic conflicts and tensions in the region. According to police accounts, the OPC has been responsible for about 60 per cent of the violence in Lagos alone. The group has engaged the Hausa as witnessed in 1999 at Ketu, Mile 12 market and in 2000 as witnessed in Shagamu. The group has also engaged other ethnic groups in the region. These groups include the Igbo and the Ijaw. The crisis with Ijaw had dire consequences in terms of the numbers of death and the people rendered homeless by the activities of the ethnic militias involved. In all of these conflicts, there was the free use of SALW which further worsened the violent conflicts.

South-Eastern Zone

Here, the crises can be described as ideological and resource-based conflicts. This is because they are caused by ethnic sentiments, reprisals and border disputes. For example, Hausa residents in this zone were attacked in response to the attacks and killings of the Igbo in the Northern crises. The Bakassi militias armed with SALW championed the attacks. The consequences were the massive migration of Hausa residents residing in the zone to their own zones. This zone has also witnessed a high incidence of criminal activities. Armed robbery attacks are almost becoming the order of the day. Sophisticated SALW were used and there are instances when the police had to watch helplessly, as the bandits operated without any challenge, because of the crude weapons at their disposal.

South-South Zone

The conflicts in this zone are of different dimensions. These include resource control conflicts between the restless youth of the zone (directly or indirectly supported by the elders) and the Federal Government. Youths in this zone are armed with SALW to the extent that the authority of the Federal Government is constantly challenged as oil pipelines are destroyed and oil workers, most especially foreigners, are randomly kidnapped and ransoms demanded from the government and multi-national companies operating there.

Apart from the conflicts arising from the agitations for resource control, the zone has been a hotbed of communal conflicts between the various ethnic groups in the area. Some of these include the Ijaw Itsekiri conflict, Ijaw and Yoruba conflict, and Urhobo Ijaw conflicts, etc. These incessant ethnic conflicts in the zone make the illegal trafficking in SALW to be lucrative. The availability of these weapons makes conflicts here to be especially deadly in nature. This poses a serious challenge to the process of DDR.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

The concept of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is comprehended differently from different perspectives and disciplines. Garba (2019) sees internally displaced persons as those who have been forced or obliged to flee or have cause to leave their homes or place of habitual residence to avoid the effect of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights, or natural or human-made disaster. These people, when they live within their state border, are referred to as internally displaced persons and if (they) cross an internationally recognized state border are called refugees. The concept of internally displaced person is further described as a person or groups of persons who, because of armed conflict, systematic violations of human rights, internal strife, or natural or man-made disasters have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly, to

another location but have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (Itumo & Nwaboshi, 2016). This has drawn a dichotomy between refugees and IDPs that, when displaced persons are within their border are referred to as an internally displaced person, but if they crossed an international border and falls under one of the relevant international legal instruments, are considered as refugees. Itumo and Nwaboshi (2016) further posit that, in armed conflict situations, IDPs like any other persons benefit from international humanitarian law and the legal protection of international human rights law. However, while they continue to benefit from all of the international human rights instruments and legal protection available to other persons, they are excluded from the specialized protection of international refugee law because they have not crossed an international border. Conversely, Alabi, (2016) termed internally displaced persons as those who have been forced to leave their homes and sources of livelihood but are still within the border of a country undergoing violent internal conflict.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are people who are forced to flee their homes and livelihoods but who remain within their country's border (Vincent & Sorenson, 2001). They are often referred to as refugees, although they do not fall within the legal definitions of a refugee (Abdulazeez, 2016). At the end of 2014, it was estimated there were 38.2 million IDPs worldwide, the highest level since 1989, the first year for which global statistics on IDPs were made available (Ajayi, 2016).

The UN Guiding Principles defined Internally Displaced Persons as:

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations or generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Approximately, about 200,000 to 500,000 are displaced in Nigeria in 2004, (Akinwunmi 2008). The figures include about 60,000 who fled their homes as a result of the unrest in Plateau State that led the Federal Government to declare a state of emergency in Plateau State.

Migration

Migration is the movement of either people or animals from one area to another. Look up in the trees, where you might see a Monarch butterfly make a stop on its migration to Mexico. Migration can be used for the journey from one place to another or for the act of movement. To go from one country, region, or place to another. To pass periodically from one region or climate to another, as certain birds, fishes, and animals: The

birds migrate southward in the winter. to shift, as from one system, mode of operation, or enterprise to another. It is the process or act of migrating, i.e. the movement from one region or place of habitat to another. It is when an individual or a group of animals move from their habitat to the new habitat.

Human migration is the movement of people from one place in the world to another. Human patterns of movement reflect the conditions of a changing world and impact the cultural landscapes of both the places people leave and the places they settle. Migration is defined as the movement of people over some distance (or at least from one "migration-defining area" to another) and from one "usual place of residence" to another.

The main reason for migration

People migrate for many different reasons. These reasons can be classified as economic, social, political or environmental: social migration - moving somewhere for a better quality of life or to be closer to family or friends. Political migration - moving to escape political persecution or war.

Conflict-Induced Displacement

Violent conflict causes millions of people to flee their homes every year. The resulting displacement crises not only create logistical and humanitarian nightmares, these crises threaten international security and risk the lives of displaced people, aid workers, and peacekeepers. Despite the dangers posed by conflict-induced displacement, scholars, policy makers and international organizations usually have only a partial understanding of these crises.

Conflict-induced displacement consists of two main factors:

- i. The violence that caused the displacement and
- ii. The characteristics of the resulting displacement crisis.

Many observers fail to disaggregate each factor; rather lumping all types of violence together or viewing displaced people as an undifferentiated mass. This paper demonstrates that disaggregation of both concepts, causes of conflict-induced displacement and characteristics of a crisis are necessary to understand fully the importance of displacement in international politics. The paper develops typologies to analyze those concepts and discusses the implications for future research on conflict-induced displacement.

Displacement

The displacement is simply the difference in the position of the two marks and is independent of the path taken when traveling between the two marks. The distance traveled, however, is the total length of the path taken between the two marks. Displacement is defined as the change in position of an object. It is represented as an arrow that points from the starting position to the final position. For example, If an object moves from A position to B, then the object's position changes. This change in position of an object is known as Displacement. Displacement (symbolized d or s), also called length or distance, is a one-dimensional quantity representing the separation between two defined points.

Human displacement

Human Displacement refers to the forced movement of people from their home, or country of origin. Displacement is also interchangeable with the term forced migration. Human Displacement can be a result of many different factors. Generally all forms of displacement fall under these three headlines.

Displacement Arising from the Use of SALW

The proliferation of SALW besides constituting a threat to DDR processes in Nigeria has also caused internal displacement in all the zones discussed above. Most people have moved out voluntarily or involuntarily from the affected areas. In the North where religious conflicts are prevalent, many southerners, who are mostly Christians, have moved in and settled in the Middle Belt or to their zones in the South. The northerners also affected in the crisis in the Northern zones have also migrated to the North as was the case in Lagos and some of the Eastern cities.

The various crises mentioned in this chapter have led to displacement of many Nigerians. This aptly falls within the definition of internal displacement as defined by the UN as revealed by Ibeanu, (1999).

Security

No society can have any significant development without effective security in place. The main purpose for the legitimacy and existence of a state is to ensure a safe and secured environment for life and property of its citizen and the absence of fear, oppression, poverty, anxiety and possible danger. There are divergent definitions of the term security based on the concern of the stakeholders.

A layman definition of security is the protection of life and property of a person and the society. To some, security can be defined as: An all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom,

peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; Enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; And inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing (see South Africa White Paper on Defense, 1996). Not only in terms of the internal security of the State, but also in terms of secure systems of Food, Health, Money and Trade (Tickner, 1994).

Achumba et al (2013), defined the concept of security as the establishment of precautionary measures for the protection of persons, property and information against criminal elements, persons and actions. These measures are designed to ensure people can move around for their daily business activities without any fear of any violent occurrence.

Types of Security

It is against this background that, it is pertinent to discuss various types of security, to stimulate our better understanding of the study.

- i. Food security: This underscores the strategic importance that self sustenance in food production has on the security of any nation.
- ii. Health Security: This involves safety against HIV-AIDS, Corona Virus (COVID-19) pandemics and other diseases like malaria that accounts for a very high mortality rate. It is part of government responsibilities to provide health security for its citizens, knowing the impact that good health condition(s) can have on the development of any country.
- iii. Physical Security: describes security measures that are designed to deny unauthorized access to facilities, equipment and resources and to protect personnel and property from damage or harm (such as espionage, theft, or terrorist attacks).
- iv. Economic Security: This can be described as a way of putting in place measures and strategies that will ensure that every individual in the state is not only entitled to employment but also has the right to a living wage.
- v. Environment Security: The concept of environment has begun to dominate international discourse. The issue of environmental pollutions has continued to attract attention among the individuals, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), nations as well as international organizations. Within the world

- vi. Personal Security: This is type of security which involves protecting every individual from any physical violence.
- vii. Community Security: This form of security creates the need to respect traditional relationships and social values of the people by protecting the people from losing such communitarian values.
- viii. Territorial Security: This denotes protecting the state against any internal and external aggression.
- ix. Human Security: Human security refers to the security of people and communities, as opposed to the security of States.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

However, the study is predicated within the confine of using an eclectic approach comprising; Everett Lee's and Failed State Theories respectively.

Everett Lee's Theory of Migration

Everett Lee in his Theory of Migration divides the factors that determine the decision to migrate and the process of migration into four categories:

- i. Factors associated with the area of origin. There are many factors that motivate to leave their place of origin to outside area. They are push factors.
- ii. Factors associated with the area of destination. There are very attractive forces at the area of destination to which the selection of 'selectivity' migrant is high. Such forces are found in metropolitan areas of a country. Pull factors are present in such areas.
- iii. Intervening Obstacles: There are intervening obstacles like distance and transportation which increase migrant selectivity of the area of destination. These obstacles have been lessened in modern times with technological advances. Cost of movements, ethnic barriers and personal factors as intervening obstacles.
- iv. Personal Factors: It is the personal factors on which the decision to migrate from the place of origin to the place of destination depends. It is an individual's perception of the pull and push forces which influence actual migration.

According to Lee, it is the personal factors such as age, sex, race, and education which along with the pull-push factors and intervening obstacles that determine migration. Further, there are sequential migrants such as children and wives of migrants who have little role in the decision to migrate. Lee concludes that migration is always selective and influenced by pull-push factors.

Failed State Theory

The term “failed state” is often used to describe a state perceived as having failed at some of essential responsibilities of a sovereign government. A failed state is one that has shattered social and political structures (Anyanwu, 2005). It is characterized by social, political and economic failure. Common characteristics of a failing state is when a central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory, non-provision of public utilities or services, widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations, and sharp economic decline (ibid). (Anyanwu, 2005) notes that failing states are invariably the product of a collapse of the power structures providing political supports for law and order, a process generally triggered and accompanied by anarchic forms of internal violence. It is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted; and experienced officials are killed or flee the country.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The major challenge in Nigeria today is the effect of Proliferation of Small Arms to people, societies and states globally, fuelling insurgency, human trafficking and drugs, terrorism, organized crimes, internal insurrections and civil wars, posing obstacles to sustenance of stable peace and security. Many a times, little internal insurrection tends to escalate into larger civil wars and could destabilize a region (Kevin, 2007:23). This trend especially in Nigeria is attributed to the weakness and fragile nature of the state and her attendant failure to deliver good governance.

Small Arms and Light Weapons are often employed to forcefully displace civilians, prevent development activities, humanitarian assistance, peace-building and peace-keeping endeavours in all sense. At the end of conflicts, small arms and light weapons usually remain in the society, which may cause more violence since crisis can resume or conflicts erupt in neighbouring regions. Also in non-conflict environments, small arms may be used in criminal violence or may be used in suicides, accidents, homicides and others while they are sometimes the fundamental tools used by terrorists for societal annihilation (Holmes, 2014).

METHODOLOGY

The method adopted in this study is content analysis, using both primary and secondary data. The secondary data employed include existing

literature on the topic such as books, journals, newspapers, magazines, conference papers, UN and ECOWAS publications, periodicals and other related documents. In the study, the internet was also consulted.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

- i. From the foregoing, this study has empirically presented how SALW affect conflicts intensity and internal displacement in Nigeria. Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world are equally faced with series of conflicts displacing about 20-22 million people out of which about 470,000 are from Nigeria, (Akinwunmi 2008).
- ii. The failing economy, insecurity, high rate of unemployment, poverty, failure of government to provide basic necessities of life and corruption stand as a cog in the wheel to appreciable efforts and policies at arresting the menace in the country.
- iii. The ready availability of small and light weapons has escalated conflicts and aided the activities of criminal elements across the globe.
- iv. Most of the Nigerian borders are porous, therefore, giving room for easy influx, movement and exit of arms, human trafficking and drugs.
- v. However, high level of corruption in Nigeria constitutes the various security risks bedeviling the state.
- vi. The present findings raised an additional important question for an extension of this study. When individuals choose to stay behind and not flee from conflict, what actions do they take to cope with their situation? What are the coping mechanisms at the disposal of individuals who chose to stay behind during civilian conflicts? This question has not yet been explored in the forced migration literature and is a subject for further research.

CONCLUSION

The rate of conflict reprisals in Nigeria is increasing the demand for this light and small arm as many communities who have suffered defeats from other communities prepare themselves by simply acquiring their arms in the name of self-protection. The role of these arms in fueling conflicts cannot be overstated. In recent years, internal conflicts and wars of liberation through the use of these deadly weapons have been a major factor in causing internal displacement around Africa.

What explains individuals' decisions to flee or not in the face of civil war? The empirical analysis confirms the importance of violence and threat,

but in addition, economic wealth and opportunity, as well as the costs associated with the loss of such opportunities, were found to be very important in predicting forced migration, as is an opportunity for flight. Social networks may play an important direct role in reducing risk, or an indirect role by reducing economic loss, and thereby reducing the likelihood of flight from villages where they are present. The results suggest that violent conflict is not the only factor affecting displacement decisions. Even when life is under extreme threat, multiple factors affect flight. These results, which provide a more nuanced test of the choice-centered approach to the study of forced migration, add significant value to our understanding of the causes of displacement. With more precise data measured at the individual level, we can conclude with a greater degree of confidence that in addition to actual human rights violations, perceived threat is an important factor explaining displacement. The study justified the touching effect of SALW on the pattern of conflicts and internal displacements in Nigeria. The study argues that the evidences of internal displacement and conflict intensity constitute a core of the challenges of DDR in Nigeria. This suggests that if DDR is to have any far-reaching effect, it must take into cognizance the effect of SALW on conflict pattern and intensity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- i. There is need for the Federal, State and Local Government in Nigeria to collaborate in solving the problem in addition to the imperative role of security agencies for sustenance of the nation's peace and security.
- ii. More electronic security equipments like CCTV should be placed in some places in Nigeria.
- iii. Government agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, Security operatives, and other critical stakeholders should overhaul the relief material distribution process through the strict monitoring of the distribution team to avoid misuse of authority, diversion of relief materials, segregation, harassment, gender bias, and other irregularities before, during and after distribution.
- iv. There is the need for proper coordination among NGOs and other humanitarian bodies to ensure items provided for IDPs (especially women and children) are not diverted. More so, those found to be culprits of such despicable acts should fully face the weight of the law.
- v. The government should erect a fully equipped designated area for IDPs in all states, as this will reduce

the rush IDPs often face which eventually creates security challenges in camps.

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Iran Nuclear Deal, Global Security And Exploring African Involvement: An Assessment

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Abstract

In a region where there are so much uncertainties, states will do all it can just to protect itself and to survive. Most countries in the Middle East, have devised ways to survive and or if possible have upper hand. One of the means by which states can achieve its goal is, to possess or have to access nuclear weapons. This paper will critically examine the intricacies and danger of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and the very infamous Iran nuclear deal and its consequences for the African states. Thus, with critical analysis of secondary data, the paper discovers that in a situation where acquisition of nuclear power would affect African states, these states or their continental body should be involved in the making of the Iran nuclear deal. However, the question also boils down to, which African state should be involve in such a deal? Is it Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, regional or a continental organization? This paper concludes that African countries should not be left out of the making of this deal, despite their weak scientific and industrial base.

Keywords: Africa, Iran Nuclear Deal, Global Security, JCPOA.

Introduction

According to the realist theory, states exist within an anarchic international system in which they are ultimately dependent on their own capabilities, or power, in a bid to further and or protect their national interests.^{lix} States will always go out of their way to realize whatever goal they set and to achieve sustainability in the international arena. One of the ways states seek to achieve this is to ensure their acquisition of

nuclear power. Thus, this paper seeks to examine the Iran nuclear deal and its implication for the African continent. It should be said that before delving into the subject matter, it is important to assess why a nation like Iran would make a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Several reasons have been given by scholars as to why a nation like Iran would make a decision to acquire nuclear power. To fully understand these reasons, one has to look at how it all started.

Iran's interest in anything nuclear began in the 1950s when it launched its nuclear programme on 5th march 1957 when Iran signed Atoms for Peace Programme with Eisenhower administration^{lx} and in 1970s when a West German conglomerate *Kraftwerk* Union of Siemens entered into an agreement with Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in which *Kraftwerk* Union partially designed and built Bushehr nuclear power plant for Iran. Also on November 10, 1974 a letter of intent (LOI) was written by Iranian Atomic Energy Organization to *Kraftwerk* Union. The final agreement was signed by IAEO and a Director of Siemens who signed on behalf of *Kraftwerk* Union. In this agreement, the West German company was to build an additional four new 1200 megawatt nuclear power stations in Iran over a period of ten years. The plants were to be built in two pairs, the first pair in Isfahan and the second in Markazi province, the target was that the first pair will become operational in 1984 while the second will come on stream after three years. As *Kraftwerk* Union was enjoying their construction activities in Iran, it also embarked on the building and construction of two additional small size nuclear power stations in Bushehr on the Persian Gulf.^{lxi} This interface between Germany and Iran did not escape the attention and interest of other European powers particularly France. A French consortium headed by *Creusot Loire* ironically also a subsidiary firm this time to *Framatone* signed an agreement and built two 900 megawatt nuclear plants along the Karun River south of Ahvaz in Khuzestan Province.^{lxii}

Having given a brief background to the extent of Iran's nuclear strength, it is expedient to explain the reasons given by scholars as to why Iran sought for the acquisition of nuclear power. One of the reasons is that Iran wants to defend itself against external threats; principally from the United States and her Western Allies who reneged from all the agreements they entered into after the 1979 revolution and instigated Saddam Hussein of Iraq to launch a brutal war against Iran. During this brutal war, thousands of Iranians perished and weapons deployed by Saddam included chemical weapons whose materials were supplied by the United States and West Germany. Saddam was assisted with key technology in his chemical weapon programme by Germany.^{lxiii}

Other threats come from the Sunni world, Israel and some Western powers. The Iranian government and the country's new power aristocrats realized that the United States and its Western allies were bent on a regime change and the destruction of the new Iranian Islamic system that they were not comfortable with. Hence, Iran also realized that nothing deters chemical weapon attacks like a nuclear weapon. According to Shahrām Chubin of the Carnegie Endowment, Tehran wanted to guard against future surprises analogous to Iraq's repeated use of chemical weapons.^{lxiv}

Another reason given was that Iran sees possession of nuclear weapons as something that would help tremendously in its struggle for influence in the Middle East region. Moreover, since it became an Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has continued to see the Middle East region as an outlet for its influence. Hence, being in possession of a nuclear weapon will further boost its influence and facilitate its dominance in the region.^{lxv}

Iran: An Overview

Being the second largest country in Western Asia with the population of about 86 million, Iran is home to one of the world's oldest civilizations.^{lxvi} Right from time immemorial to the modern period, Iran has been conquered by different civilizations. It should also be understood that, it was the conquest of Iran by the Muslims Arabs that led to Islamization of the territory.^{lxvii}

Up until the 19th century, Iran, which was then known as Persia, had one of the most powerful military in the world although, it has witnessed some considerable decline. The reason being that, a series of conflicts with the Russian Empire led to huge territorial losses.^{lxviii} At the onset of the 20th century, there were several changes within the Iranian society. These included a constitutional revolution, nationalization of fossil fuel which led to an Anglo-American coup in 1953. There was also a far-reaching series of reforms a decade later which resulted in aggressive modernization of Iran by the Shah, Mohammed Reza.^{lxix}

By the late 1970s, a revolution erupted in Iran caused by underlying issues that had permeated Iranian societies over the years. This revolution led to the establishment of a theocratic state with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the country's first supreme leader. Unlike the former leadership who espoused and promoted Western ideas and values, Khomeini was anti-West and his government received widespread criticism for its constraints and abuses against human right and civil liberties.^{lxx} Iran is also the pivot upon which Shiite Islam within the Middle East and around the globe revolves, contrasting sharply with the long-standing Arab and Sunni hegemony within the region. It should be added that since the revolution, Iran has been largely considered to be

the strongest adversary of Israel, US, the West and also of Saudi Arabia. Iran is also regarded as one of the major players in Middle Eastern politics, with its government being involved directly or indirectly in the playing field of the global and regional geo-politics of the area.

Persia and the World of Shiism

Prior to the 17th century, it was believed that Iran primarily espoused Sunni ideas. It was not until the Safavid dynasty came to power that they aggressively converted the Iranians into shiism and made Shiite Islam the country's official religion.^{lxxi} It should be noted that, tenets of Shiite Islam from the 17th century has had an important place in the Iranian state tradition, it has also impacted on the country's domestic and foreign policy. Also, based on the ideas of Shiite Islam, Iran does not see other states as the divine state except for the state established by Mohammed and Ali.^{lxxii}

After the Iranian revolution, an Islamic republic was established in Iran and since then, Iranian leaders have sought to harness Shiite claims to legitimacy in the Muslim society. From its attempts to export the Islamic revolution in the 1980s, Iran has devoted huge resources in constructing its diplomatic and religious infrastructure and expanding its religious outreach across the Shiite world, drawing on its position as a Shiite metropolis in demonstration of its growing soft power.^{lxxiii}

Iran has also translated this into its wider international diplomacy, by drawing on themes of fighting oppression in its effort to build links with the Global South and resist US and Western dominance in global affairs. This section of this paper focuses on the ways in which religious identity of the Iranian Shiite society influences the diplomacy of one of the world's pre-eminent theocracies, pointing out how religiously grounded notions of justice and resistance to oppression have influenced its foreign policy objectives and diplomatic reach.

Religion and Iran Foreign Policy: Notions of Justice and Oppression

Right from the period Iran was exposed to Islamic religion and over the centuries, Iran has continued to use specific historical and cultural features that allow religion to be part and parcel of its foreign policy repertoire. Iran's view on justice are informed by a particular idea of injustice arising from two points: first, the Iranian political Islam as an idea that draws on the religiophilosophical heritage of shiism and with it

the idea of rallying against injustice by state power; secondly, the position of Iran as a counter-hegemonic power that has often chafed against Western-defined ideologies in the international arena.^{lxxiv} Justice can therefore be seen as a continual thread that has been maintained since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, displaying an ongoing desire to maintain the heritage of the revolution as well as the continued importance of the supreme leader as the embodiment of revolutionary ideas who has final say in all matters that concerns the state.^{lxxv}

From the time shiism was introduced into Iran, the clergy have always had an enduring role in the affairs of the state. Iranian politics have been conjoined with the clergy since shiism became the official and state religion under the Safavid Empire in the 16th century. It should be said that prior to the Iranian revolution, a long-standing tradition of quietism of the clergy predominated until

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's rise to prominence; this was the leader who brought the clergy into politics in a much more activist sense. As such, politicization of religious events- such as the revolutionary interpretation of Hussein's death (the Prophet Mohammed's grandson and third Imam) is a relatively 20th century phenomenon; whose roots can be found in the writings of key scholars like Musa al-Sadir and Ali Shariati. Thus, for the establishment of the Islamic republic, religiously defined notions of justice became constitutionally rooted as a key part of Iran's worldview, which remains relevant in modern day.

The formation of the Islamic republic also institutionalized clerical rule, and with it, Khomeini's ideas on justice also became manifest in its international outlook. In the words of an Iranian political scientist, Homeira Moshirzadeh, justice can be seen as providing a "meta-discourse" that gives meaning to Iranian foreign policy in general. The fight against oppression is therefore a key in Khomeini's thought on justice, where he encourages an Islamic religion that shuns oppression and an Islam in which the ruler and the people from the lowest strata are equal before the law.^{lxxvi} He also emphasized the type of Islam whose standard bearers are the barefooted, oppressed and poor people of the world. It should be said that his emphasis on populist egalitarianism saw him bring into life the Qur'anic concept of the *mostazafin* (the oppressed), a term which went on to play a key role in the Iranian revolution. The idea of supporting the oppressed became important in

Khomeini's world view and was important in shaping Iran's subsequent foreign policy outlook.^{lxxvii} **Religious Identity in Foreign Policy and Diplomacy**

A foundational idea in the Iranian foreign policy is the notion of supporting the oppressed and seeking justice regardless of the different

political orientation of successive Iranian leadership. The reason for this, is because, justice had formed part of the Islamic Republic's constitutionally defined foreign policy objectives. Article 3:16 for example, describes the Islamic Republic as "...framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims and excessive support to the *mostzapin* of the world."^{lxxviii}

According to H.E. Chehabi and Hassan Mneimneh, there are three ways in which the Islamic Republic reflects this thinking within its foreign policy. These three ways are in concentric circles; support for the oppressed starts with an outer circle of Third World countries and liberation movements, a middle circle comprising the Muslim world, with Shia Muslims forming the inner circle. The ways in which this support is shown to the inner circle can be seen in its well- documented, recent strategic engagements, and in its religious and cultural diplomacy in the region, both of which are discussed in the following section. Also, the emphasis on fighting oppression manifests itself in an anti-hegemonic manner that seeks to challenge perceived U.S. imperialism in the Middle East and beyond. Thus, Iran is seen utilizing such a discourse in its cultivation of ties with other like-minded states and embarking on worthy causes in global politics, ranging from its support for Palestine to its close relations with Venezuela and in recent time its vocal support for the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States.^{lxxix}

Being a nation in the Middle East with the highest concentration of Shiite Muslims, Iran has continued to act as the protector of the Shiite adherents not just in the region but even globally, an key aspect of its foreign policy. This outlook, for example, has shaped Iran's recent military enterprise in Syria and Iraq alongside more conventionally understood national security concerns.

First, in terms of Iran's involvement in Iraq, while the primary concern was about ensuring that ISIS is far away from its borders, providing assistance to its co-religionists has also been an important consideration. With ISIS and other Sunni extremist groups in the region adopting a sectarian narrative that resulted in loss of lives of the Shiite, Iran felt duty bound to act in its very own "War on Terror."^{lxxxlxxxi}

As a result of the perceived existential threat to Iran from Sunni extremist groups operating in Syria and Iraq, Iran committed its Special Forces and military advisors to both countries. It should be added that Iran's involvement in these two conflicts has a strong geopolitical, strategic rationale in terms of protecting its national security. From the foregoing, it is clear that tenets and ideas of Shiite Islam have continued to determine the focus of Iranian domestic and foreign policy objectives.

Iranian Revolution and the Quest for Nuclear Arms

The Iranian revolution of 1979 was not a single event but a series of events which resulted in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and brought about the reign of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a leader of one of the factions in the revolution.^{lxxxii}

After the

1953 Iranian coup d'état, Pahlavi had allied with the United States and the Western Bloc to enable him rule more firmly as an authoritarian monarch. He relied heavily on support from the United States which provided him with the opportunity to hold on to power for another 26 years.^{lxxxiii} In 1963, Shah Mohammed Reza introduced some reforms which resulted in redistribution of wealth to Iran's working class, economic growth, rapid urbanization and deconstruction of Iran's feudal customs. It should be said that, these reforms were also known as the White Revolution and the

Iranian farmers and clergy expressed their dissatisfaction towards some of the reforms. In 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini, a religious leader in Iran who advocated against secularization under Reza, was arrested and exiled by the government. Amidst massive tensions between Khomeini and the Shah, demonstrations began in October 1977; these demonstrations metamorphosed into a campaign of civil resistance that included both secular and religious elements.^{lxxxiv} The protests rapidly intensified in 1978 and resulted to the burning of Rex Cinema, between August and December that year, strikes and demonstrations also paralyzed the country.²⁶

As a result of this paralysis, a revolution that finally crippled the Iranian government took place on 16th of January 1979. The Shah left Iran and went into exile, and as the last Persian monarch, he left his duties to a regency council. Ayatollah Khomeini who was living in France was invited back to Iran by the government; he returned to a cheering crowd of hundreds of thousands of Iranians. The royal reign collapsed shortly after. On 11th February, the revolutionary vanguards overwhelmed troops loyal to the Shah in armed street fighting, bringing Khomeini to official power.^{lxxxv} Iranian people voted in a national referendum to become an Islamic republic on April 1st 1979 and to formulate and approve a new theocratic republican constitution in which Khomeini became the supreme leader of the country in December 1979.

The Drive for Nuclear Power

The nuclear program of Iran is an ongoing scientific effort by Iran to research into nuclear technology that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Iran has several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that included three known uranium enrichment plants.^{lxxxvi} Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the United States and its western allies have continued to explore several means to slow down or limit the progress of Iran as it pertains to nuclear

power. It should be added that despite this, Iran has continued to claim that its interest in nuclear power is for peaceful means and not meant to contravene the regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Still, evidence suggests that Iran had been conducting research and experiments geared towards a nuclear weapon capability.

It is worthy of note that, Iran and some Shiite Islamic nations, in the midst of heavily populated Sunni Muslims, have over the years been persecuted and oppressed. They are always on the receiving end over a long period of time. Based on this backdrop, one may not be shocked why Iran, a country mainly dominated with Shiite Muslims, made the decision to embark on developing nuclear power. Prior to the Revolution of 1979, Iran was a nation friendly to the West, but however, the revolution, particularly the hostage crisis at the American embassy in Tehran, created a frosty relationship and a permanent strain on the diplomatic relations between the West and the newly established Islamic Republic thus, completely changing the way the European powers see Iran. The trust between the West and Iran did not only deteriorate but wane out as the west continued to explore ways to effect regime change in Iran. With the subsequent Iran-Iraq war and the deployment of chemical weapons in the battle field by Iraqi troops even against Iranian civilian populations with strong diplomatic support by the United States, Iranian protest at the UN could not achieve anything. Iran became interested in acquiring nuclear weapons as it felt it is important for its survival in the international scene.

Scholars have tried to advance the reason and explain the rationale behind the quest for building nuclear weapon by the Islamic Republic of Iran. First, there is the the identity politics; this rationale highlights patriotic pride of the Iranian people in their culture and religion (Shiite Islam). The quest for advanced knowledge and technology, like nuclear energy, become a national imperative, which many nations have developed. Hence, if other nations possess it, so must Iran, a nation which serves as beacon of light for other Shiite dominated countries in the region.^{lxxxvii} According to a renowned scholar, Iran's nuclear policy is motivated by its state's identity, anchored on the ideas of independence, justice and resistance.

Deterrence is another reason for a security-driven nuclear program of the Iranian government. Since the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis during the revolution, Iran became a pariah nation made possible not only by the West, but even by its neighbours. Another motivation for Iran's nuclear deterrence is Israel, which also possessed nuclear arsenal and demonstrated its willingness and confidence to attack Iran at will; same with the United States. Hence, the Iranian leadership felt the need

and compel by these circumstances to go nuclear in order to deter Israel and others from achieving their aim. As such, it could be argued that in a bid by Iran to remain secured amidst its enemies, nuclear power is the only weapon, in a way, capable of deterring other nations from violating its territorial integrity.³⁰

Having discussed these suppose rationale behind Iran's quest for nuclear power, it is important to delve into how neighbouring countries in the region perceive this quest. According to the New York Times' report in 2007, Iran's nuclear program had spurred interest in establishing nuclear power programs by a number of neighboring countries. These countries include Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt.^{lxxxviii} Many nations in the Middle East have publicly implored the United

States to order a military strike against Iran's nuclear program. In July 2010, the United Arab Emirates' ambassador to the United States, Yousef al-Otaiba, publicly announced support for a military strike against Iran's nuclear program, and said that the benefits of striking Iran's nuclear program would be greater than the short-term costs of such a strike. Noting that Iran had shown support to terrorist groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah, prior to her decision to seek for nuclear weapons, Al-Otaiba noted Iran would not show restraint if it did possess nuclear weapons. He also predicted that should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, a nuclear arms race would be ignited in the region.^{lxxxix} It should be said that not only U.A.E. feels threatened by a nuclear power Iran, countries like Israel, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, feel the same way.

Iran as the Nexus of Terrorism

It should be noted that Iran has been accused of showing support for terrorist or rebel groups in the Middle Eastern region. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world's most active state sponsors of terrorism. Since the revolution, Iran has continued to arm, train, fund, inspire, organize, and support dozens of violent groups.^{xc} Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, and the Philippines. A case in point was the hijacking crisis of TWA Flight 847 of June 1985. Iran offered to assist in the release of the passengers in return for sale of 508 TOW weapons. Israel supplied the weapons to Iran, its stock will be replenished by the United States while a Saudi national Adnan Kashoggi provided the \$5m dollar payment. With this, the last of the hostage Rev Benjamin Weir an American citizen was released in Beirut. This had inadvertently proved the complicity of the Iranian regime in global terrorism.^{xcii}

Central to the Iranian Revolution was the fight against all forms of oppression, an aspect which the Iranian government embedded in its foreign policy goal, an ambition that led Tehran to work with and support

a wide range of radical groups around the world. The clerical regime of the Islamic Republic viewed supporting revolutions overseas as a part of its revolutionary duty.

Therefore, to Iran's new leadership, supporting Islam meant supporting revolution. To them, aggressively promoting their revolution was the best way to ensure its survival. This is evident in Ayatollah Khomeini's declaration that "all the super powers and great powers have risen to destroy us. If we remain in an enclosed environment, we shall definitely face defeat".³⁵ After the revolution, Iran became active in working with Shiite Muslim movements around the world. As representatives of the world's largest Shiite nation, Iranian leaders feel a special affinity for the entire Shiite world. Also, in most countries in the Muslim world, Shiite Muslims has faced oppression and discrimination, and the revolution inspired them to take action and to look to

Tehran for support. Iran has thus backed Shiite groups in Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Yemen, Pakistan, Kuwait, etc.^{xcii}

It should be added that, to Iran, supporting subversive movements has become a way of weakening and destabilizing its neighbours as well as spreading its revolution and toppling what in the eyes of Iranian government were illegitimate regimes. Iran has continued to employ the services of different groups considered terrorists to achieve its goals. Although groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and other Palestinian groups (Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian- General Command), have been designated as terrorist groups by a number of countries and international bodies; however, Iran considers such groups to be "national liberation movements" with a right to self-defence in the face of Israeli military occupation.^{xciii}

The US State Department has also accused Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite militias of terrorism against US troops, and also accused Iran of cyber-terrorism, primarily through its Quds Force. This led the US to launch an attack that killed Iranian and Iraqi Generals Qassem Solaimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis respectively using attack drone on 3 Jan, 2020.^{xciv}

From this discourse, the research had deduced that Iranian nation have had its own fair share of enemies in the Middle East and in the West due to its activities after the Iranian Revolution. Most of the agreements Iran entered into with Western powers were breached after the revolution. There was the diplomatic blunder by the new leadership's inability to revert back to hitherto Persia. The name Iran is always viewed by Westerners as nazification of Iranian state because it originated from Germany during Hitler. Even though, it was Mohsen Rais, Iranian Ambassador to Germany, who on the March 15, 1935 that came up with the new name at the behest of German leadership.^{xcv} Iran came to be

perceived as a huge threat by many of its neighbours. From its interest in acquiring nuclear power and the support it has shown many terrorist groups, states wonder how Iran would behave should it be allowed to acquire nuclear power, nothing would stop it from selling or giving nuclear weapons to terrorist groups. The United States, Israel and other Great powers are left with two options in their bid to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon. It is either to launch a military strike on these Iranian nuclear facilities or to negotiate peacefully. These two options of war and peace will be discussed in the next sub topic.

Iran Nuclear Deal

Although the option of a military strike is still on the table, the possibilities for the military operations continue to pale behind peaceful negotiations. To strike at any of the facilities is like striking at the heart of Iranian nation the result of which could be catastrophic even though both the US and Israel have the military strength to do that. But can military strike be successfully accomplished? This is a matter for the pundits as Iranian nuclear facilities like that of the Israelis are shrouded in secrecy, highly protected and defended, in some cases buried underground.

Therefore, locating the exact position of all these facilities and taking on them militarily isn't going to be an easy venture considering the fact that the facilities are spread all across the length and breadth of country. For example, the new Bushehr nuclear power plant built by the Russians had started producing electricity in 2010 an indication it was for peaceful purposes as the Iranian leadership had always claimed; then the Arak Heavy Water Reactor is meant to produce weapon-grade plutonium; there is also the Natanz Enrichment facility which is partly underground consisting of two large Halls that are roughly 300,000 square feet each and is twenty three feet below the ground covered with several layers of concrete and metals and the walls of these Halls are two feet thick. It has almost 50,000 centrifuges and 10,000 spinning; the Isfahan nuclear technology center built in 2006, convert yellowcake to uranium hexafluoride; the Tehran nuclear research center is made up of labs for conducting nuclear research; Bandar-e'Abbas uranium production plant is meant for processing uranium ore; finally but newly discovered by Western Intelligence Agencies in 2009 is the Fordo Uranium Enrichment plant, built 300 feet underneath a mountain tunnel near a military complex. It is protected by air defence missiles and Iran revolutionary guards. Its existence came to public knowledge only when it was revealed to the world.^{xvii}

Therefore, it is almost impracticable for Israel to launch a surgical military strike on the facilities considering the hurdles and the repercussions. Assuming Israel is to strike militarily, it has to be from three directions north, central and southern flanks. To fly through the northern route, it jet will pass Syrian radar but flying over Turkey's air space will complicate issues between Istanbul and Tehran which may likely resulted into severing diplomatic ties between the two regional powers. To fly over Jordan air space through the central route will spell high political and operational risk. While flying over the southern route entails flying and violating Saudi, Iraqi and Kuwaiti air spaces with high political risk and medium security concern. These same scenarios apply to the United States. To avoid the ugly scenario, Global players came up with the option of peaceful negotiations so as to limit the growth of Iran's desire for nuclear power, efforts by these stakeholders ensure that an agreement was reach limiting Iran's nuclear power for only peaceful purpose. Meanwhile, none should be oblivious of the fact that, in 1974, Iran had signed a nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which it ratified in 1980.

The new Iran nuclear deal or the Iran deal is an agreement on Iranian nuclear program reached in Vienna on the 14th of July, 2015. This agreement was between Iran on one hand, China, France, Russia, the United States, Britain and Germany (P5+1) on the other. Also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), formal negotiations towards the Iran deal could be traced to the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim treaty signed between these world powers and Iran in November 2013. In 2015, an agreement was reached between Iran and the IAEA which was supposed to make it impossible for Iran to acquire nuclear (weapon) power.^{xcvii}

It should be added that proponents of the deal said it would help prevent a revival of Iran's nuclear weapons program and thereby reduce the likelihood of conflict between Iran and its regional rivals, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Also, under the terms of the deal, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open much of its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for the lifting of billions of dollars' worth of sanction.^{xcviii}

However, with the emergence of Donald Trump as the President, the United States withdrew from JCPOA in May 2018, pledging that he would re-negotiate a better deal. Trump left office without fulfilling this pledge, and as a result analysts have argued that Iran had moved closer to developing a nuclear weapon since the withdrawal.^{xcix} It goes without saying that the Iran deal met its untimely demise following the withdrawal of the United States, this gave Iran an impetus to continue with its enrichment programme as against IAEA protocol.

African Supposed Role in the Nuclear Deal

For decades, Iran and its proxy Hezbollah have tried to export their “revolutionary” ideology, in an attempt to establish Iranian hegemony in the Islamic world. After Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, its Presidential inauguration of February 4, 1980 was attended by like-minds across the Shiite world. People like El-Zakkzaky from Nigeria and Hassan Nasrallah from Lebanon also attended and were giving the task to spread Ayatollah Khomeini’s message of revolution in their respective countries. Iran and its Lebanese militant proxy group have built a mechanism which enables them to spread “revolutionary” ideology beyond Iran’s borders. Over time, Iran and Hezbollah have continued to deepen their control over Shiite Muslims and the Lebanese diaspora living in Africa, and even local non-Muslims who are fascinated by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution and ideology. Although Africa is not dominated by Shiite Muslims, Iran has sought to counter Western influence within Africa, and find common cause with elements opposed to colonialism who are seeking to chart more independent (course) path.^c

By taking advantage of the fragile political structure, weak security architecture, poor social cohesion in most African countries, globalization, and the support of the Lebanese diaspora, Iran and Hezbollah managed to construct criminal and arms struggling networks and recruit local operatives to their cause. The Quds Force trains, finances, and equips numerous separatist groups in Africa such as the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara, as well as provides training to Shiite organizations, including the Islamic Movement of Nigeria. Their operations include gathering of intelligence and bankrolling terrorist activities by proxy.

From the illustrated explanation, it is obvious that many nations are stakeholders in the Iran nuclear deal. This is because, should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, what stops it from giving it to rebel groups it sympathizes with in Africa? Hence, countries in Africa ought to be involved in drawing up and negotiating the nuclear deal. The question then is, which African nation or regional organization be involved in this deal? Is it Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, the regional bodies or the African Union?

In terms of Egypt, a nation that for centuries has been involved largely in Middle East politics and prominent and significant in the Arab world. With the several developments in Iran as it relates to Middle East politics, Egypt has tried not to pick side but has taken a conservative stance. Cairo has continue to favour what it interprets to be a predictable status quo in regional affairs, rather than taking risky moves that could result in a variety of unpredictable outcomes. However, this stance depends on negative effects of the development on Egypt. For example, following the

intervention of Iran in Syria, Cairo did not intervene in response, however, when Iran intervened in Libya, a nation on Egyptian border, the situation was somewhat different.

Thus, as it pertains to Iran's nuclear program, Cairo might well support US efforts to encourage Iran back to the JCPOA, as it sees in the agreement a process that avoids an escalation in tensions over regional matters. However, it should be noted that this does not mean that Cairo will be willing to engage in further actions to compel Iran if such efforts fail, despite the likely desire of its regional allies in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to do so.^{ci} From the foregoing, it can be deduced that Egypt is not likely to take a bold move in the deal issue. This is because its involvement would be seen as risky and can escalate tensions in the region.

Another country that ought to be involved in this nuclear deal should either be Ghana or Nigeria.

Ghana is even playing host to a Shiite Institute established by a Shiite *Alim* from Iran in person of Ayatollah Hussaini Tabataba'i, but Ghana, is a small nation whose influence may not even be felt in the West African sub-region let alone the whole continent. Nigeria on the other hand is a very big country with over 200 million people and has always been a hot bed of conflicts, wars and crisis and is adjudged to be the most populous country in Africa. However, its weakening economy, rising insecurity and violent conflicts have made it to lose some of its influence in the international scene but at the same time provided the country's leadership with the skills on how to manage violent crisis sometimes from even the Shiite adherents. It should be said that Nigeria could stand as the country to represent Africa in the nuclear deal considering the sizable number of

Shiite/Zazzaki followers in Nigeria who are ready and willing to give their lives to their course. This is also a proven fact that the activities of the Iranian government can have grave or serious consequences on Nigeria state. The Nigerian State like Germany should be invited to the negotiating table in order to understand nuances of the final agreement and contribute its ideas into the mechanism of implementation. More so, Nigeria has a huge deposit of uranium ore that can be mine by Iranian companies.

The African continental organization, the African Union, had expressed its concern at the decision of the United States government to singlehandedly withdraw from the July 2015 JCPOA on the Iran nuclear deal. From this, it could be deduced that, the organization does agree that Iran interest in nuclear deal be monitored.^{cii} Thus, with the Iranian's government recent shift towards African continent, should the AU not be

involved in the proceedings of the Iran nuclear deal? The question that would readily come to mind also is: does the AU have the machinery to engage in such deal? Does AU have the diplomatic clout for its voice to be respected in such international gathering? The answers to the last two questions are no. But the AU can also be invited just like the EU so that part of the resolution can incorporate none selling or mining of Uranium ore in any part of the African continent. Just like other continental body in the world, states comply with international agreement or violate them when it is in their interests to do so. Hence, there is no compulsion on the part of the African Union to make states obey whatever agreement it agrees to on behalf of the member states. But if such an agreement should be ratified by the member states they will abide by its provisions.

Conclusion

One constant thing among states is that they will do whatever it takes to survive and ensure stability in the international arena. Upon the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini to power after the Iranian revolution, a decision was made to discontinue the country's nuclear power program; only to restart it in 1980 after Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Iran in 1980. It should be said that this change was partly due to the need to deter against external threats and ensure the stability and survival of Iran among its so-called enemies, both home and abroad. Although efforts were made by states to stop Iran from acquiring this feat, she has continued to do so covertly. Also, Iran as a country has continued to expand its power and influence to other regions, including Africa. This involvement range from funding and getting involved in the activities of rebel groups in Africa. As such, states in Africa should not be left out of this discourse as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will have dire impacts on Africa. From the foregoing, the question that comes to mind is that should

Africa not be involved in this deal that will determine whether or not Iran gets to acquire weapons? In the same vein, even if Africa be involved, which state or organization within the region be involved in such deal?

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Nigerian Air Force Counter Insurgency Operations In North East Nigeria, 2009 - 2020: A Review

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Abstract

Insurgency, terrorism and guerilla warfare are a category of combat within contested environment between national forces against peer adversary. This paper is aimed at discussing and contributing to the historical reconstruction of the Nigerian Air Force as it is obligated by the moral necessity towards protecting Nigerian Citizens, her National assets in combating insurgency in the North East of Nigeria. More so, the paper x - rays a decade of challenges and successes of Air Force operations in protecting its personnel, the citizens of Nigeria and her combat fighting resources necessary for effective strategic operations in combating insurgency and terrorism. The paper historically reconstructs the contemporary and future roles and strategic value of Nigerian Air Force in the 21st century. The research is committed to reset the role of Nigerian Air Power with an in-depth gratitude to many academics and researchers who have made available intellectual capital for writing the history of the Nigerian Air Force.

Keywords: Nigerian Air Force, Counter -Insurgency

Introduction

The 21st century has, thus far, been characterized by a significant shift in the Nigerian Air Force responsibilities and an increased exposure of its resources to threats from terrorist, insurgents and separatist groups.

This point is emphasized by the North East insurgency which began July 2009 (Boko Haram)¹ and several others ongoing Air operations across Nigeria. This had made it pertinent to state that, potential opponents or non-state actors are less predictable, leveraging on the increased illicit movement of arms by non-state actors and the ease the development in communication technology has made arms delivery very swift in the North Eastern State's of Nigeria bordering three countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroun with porous land borders. The Nigerian Air Force's ability to strategies as Air Power requires protection from these threats at home and across its borders. Due to increased terror alerts and domestic threats, it is crucial for the Nigerian Air Force to take strong measures to protecting its personnel and national assets as part of a harmonious and integrated joint force. However, the internal battle against insurgency is very technical and complex for the air component (Air Force). Because Air war, in turn, is basically different from both land and sea warfare. Air Men have always recognized that the air planes ability to operate in the third dimension gives it the unique capability to strike all of an enemy's center of gravity (COG'S)². This exceptional Air strategy had proved unconducive in rare occasions as insurgent use innocent civilians as shields leading to collateral damages which had made air warfare more complex.

Methodology

This paper examined the origin and formation of Nigerian Air Force Bases as an arm of the Nigerian armed forces. Historical analysis is a technique adopted by the study to build a chronological table on the historical evolution of Nigerian Air Force units as it corresponds with commands across Nigeria. It describes the balance of order in practice, policies and as a structural explanation of how the Nigerian Air Force strategically operates.

Conceptual Framework

The Nigerian Air Force is a professional organization with rigid bureaucratic structure charged with strategic practice. Therefore, it is best to adopt Strategic theory to analyze and close on the gap between strategy and tact in this paper. Strategic theory is an approach which prides itself with simple preparatory strategic questions on tactics, such as; "How can the aim of counter insurgency be achieved? What operational guide rule can be deployed to help attain success? Where it fails, what happens? Theories are designed template to resolving identified gaps. Therefore, strategy does not exist during execution; it remains an intellectual activity until its conversion from policy into action. In the spheres of the application of theory it is opined that, "in

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theory there is no difference between theory and practice while in practice there is".³

Historical Background of Nigerian Air Force

The acknowledgement of Nigerian independence led to the formation of the Nigerian Armed Forces. A large number of Nigerian colony was held together by the West African Frontier Force and its constabularies before independence in 1960. Nigeria has more than 200 million people making up its population. The geographical land mass making up Nigerian 36 States and capital were all made at different times, so also are the Nigerian Armed Forces.

The Nigerian Army and Navy sprout out from the West African Frontier Force and constabularies. Remarkably, Nigerian Air Force was formed in 1964 by an ACT set up by a representative government of parliament. In order to trace the historical foundation of Nigerian Air Force, significance and challenges in counter insurgency, it is necessary to cite that, the birth of Air Power was doubly traumatic because it occurred in concert with World War I .That war smashed empires, spawned dictatorships caused the deaths of at least 10 million people, and had a profound effect on the conduct of war.⁴ Fifty years after World War I and the birth of Air Power, Nigeria went into a bilateral contractual agreement with the government of West Germany on April 19, 1963 to establish, equip, train and nurture the young Air Force.⁵ The German Air Force Assistance Group (GAFAG) was assigned this responsibility.⁶ The central reason for these was that, Air superiority had become the cornerstone of modern battlefield. Crucially, the Nigerian Air Force Act designated various roles for the Nigerian Air Force:

1. To achieve a full complement of the military defense system of the Federal Republic of Nigeria both in the air and on the ground too.
2. Ensure fast and versatile mobility of the Armed Forces.
3. To provide close support for the ground based and sea born Forces in all phases of operations to ensure the territorial integrity of United Nigeria.
4. To give the country the deserved prestige invaluable on international matters⁷. Meanwhile, military capability is the totality of the physical attributes of power: that is land, natural resources, population, money

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industry, government, armed forces, transportation and communications network and so forth.⁸ Air Power, control and sustain all the above mentioned. Finally, the central reason for establishing Nigerian Air Force emanated from unsatisfactory difficulties encountered when she was called upon to participate in two foreign military peace keeping missions (1960 in the Congo and 1964 in Tangayika).⁹ Nigeria suffered logistic collapse and delays in airlifting her troops and equipment by foreign Air Forces has close these gaps in its professional practice and keeps identifying other broader needs of the Nations Aerospace community and acting appropriately to see to these needs .

Interestingly, Nigerian Air Force had learned much from the tactical and even operational errors in its foreign mission in the early 60's in Congo and Tangayika. The strategic and political lessons learnt had given the Nigerian Air Force the wisdom of some little hindsight and foresight pertaining to restructuring the Nigerian Air Force critically for combat operational readiness and success. It is plausible to note that in any armed defence national wing, changes in quantities also technically translate to changes in quality also. The Nigerian Air Force as both an offensive and defensive instrument has expanded in its defense assets into seven (7) commands and eighty-nine (89) units. These commands are:

- (1) Direct Reporting Unit
- (2) Tactical Air Command
- (3) Special Operations Command
- (4) Mobility Command
- (5) Air Training Command
- (6) Ground Training Command
- (7) Logistics Command

It is necessary to state that each of this command has agile units by its nature underneath them with unit commanders. This commands and units underneath them are not only for offensive purpose but also tactical strategic weapons handling for stabilizing. The Direct Report Unit (DRU) as a command has twenty-six (26) units with its mother unit, 101 PAF Abuja. The Tactical Air Command has seventeen (17) Units underneath it, amongst its seventeen unit is 35 BSG Makurdi. The Special Operations Command has nine (9) Units underneath it. Amongst its unit is the FOB Katsina. The Mobility Command has seven (7) units under it with 237 BSG Minna. The Air Training Command has fifteen (15), units under its command. The IHFS is a unit under its command. The Ground Training Command has eight (8) units with RTC Kaduna as one of its unit. Logistic Command has seven (7) units with 405 CAD Makurdi amongst them. The

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expansion of the structure and air assets is to strategically help attain Nigerian Air Force airpower doctrine. A better resourced and structured Air Force would readily combat or at least fight their way through, all kind of air defense assets by less resource foes such as the armed bandits, terrorist and insurgent battles ongoing in some parts of Nigeria.

ABBREVIATION

PAF	PRESIDENTIAL AIR FLEET
BSG	BASE SERVICE GROUP
FOB	FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASE
IHFS	INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTER FLYING SCHOOL
RTC	REGIMENT TRAINING CENTRE
CAD	CENTRAL ARMAMENT DEPOT

Source: Air House, Nigerian Air Force, Abuja.

Perils and Pitfalls of Insurgency In The Northeast of Nigeria

Insurgency had made the Northeast seem like an under governed political space in the democratic polity of Nigeria. This is due to heavily armed military presence amongst the civilian population across the region. The fact are not much in dispute any longer, that the Boko Haram insurgency began in July, 2009, when the militant Islamist and jihadist rebel group (Boko Haram), started an armed rebellion against the government of Nigeria.¹⁰ At the beginning of the crisis there were divergent attitudes and opinions on the cause of the conflict. The answers given are beyond serious contention. Eleven years within the scope of this study, historical analogy of insurgency in the Northeast has shown that people think and argue by historical analogy, whether or not the analogies are apt on the cause of the long insurgency in the Northeast. There is a popular narrative that, “the conflict is taking place within the context of long standing issues of religious violence between Nigeria’s Muslim and Christian communities, and the insurgents’ ultimate aim is to establish an Islamic state in the region”.¹¹ This pitfalls overtime had snowballed into a peril that threatens the sanctity of life, properties and military assets of civilians, soldiers and the territorial integrity of the border states of Northeast Nigeria. Northeast Nigeria insurgency has killed almost 350,000 people.¹²

Nigerian Air Force Role In Counter Insurgency And Challenges

The domain of the Nigerian Air Force is professionally airpower. Its expert tactical and operational duties and assessment is guided by the

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Nigerian Air Force Doctrine. It is a toolkit which defines how Nigerian Air Force as an instrument of National Defense can apply its power. The Nigerian Air Force draws its usefulness within its roles and duties by which it is strategically trained and deployed for. Nigerian Air Force has been a work in progress since its inception. Its core mandate is defending the airspace of Nigeria and provide the enabling air assets in orbital space and cyberspace to enable sister services access favourable air situation in their respective areas of operation. The Nigerian Air Force is an arm of the armed forces with its duties synchronized in the Nigerian armed forces. Which are: To adhere to the constitution, protect the territorial integrity of Nigeria, defend Nigeria from all form of external aggression, to protect the country's borders and restore order whenever it is needed in cases of insurrection.

The Nigerian Air Force is the Air Power of the Department of Defense (DOD) of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell, defines Air Power as the ability to do something in or through the air, and as the air covers the whole world, aircraft are able to go anywhere on the planet".¹³ The motto of the Nigerian Air Force is; "Willing Able Ready" (WAR), aptly defines its role as a military wing of the Armed Forces. The Nigerian Air Force sole responsibility is to fight and win its nations wars.

Successes and Challenges of Nigerian Air Force in Counter-Insurgency

The success of the Nigerian Air Force has been naturally tested by and evaluated by her operational experience in counter-insurgency. The Nigerian Air Force have been actively involved in counter insurgency operations in the Northeast of Nigeria since the regions wake to terror threats from Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP). Since her counter insurgency operations in the Northeast, Nigerian Air Force has retained sufficient Air Superiority both in airlifting of troops, weapons, humanitarian relief aid materials and medical supplies. Judging the successes of Nigerian Air Force in counter-insurgency is a prudent reality under special operations. The Nigerian Air Force flown about 1950 hours in an operation between January and December in the Northeast and Northwest regions to tackle banditry and insurgency.¹⁴

Experience in historical assessment of the success of Nigerian Air Force counter-insurgency, practically prove its air operational capabilities in its ability to contest aerial passage in ground-base air defenses. The Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Amao, highlights that the Nigerian Air Force conducted about 3,700 missions in counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast as well as operations against bandits in the Northwest in 2021

alone.¹⁵ This is a clear reality in the ascension of Nigerian Air Force doctrine from tactical through the operational to the strategic which is the only process to judge NAF uniqueness, strategic challenges and successes.

It is well to reiterate that the Nigerian Air Force has an elite command organizational structure. This enhances service and operational accountability in understanding aerial domain of air defense. To explain the aforementioned context literally better. It is necessary to note that every armed service in Nigeria is dedicated to a single geography but yet have a domain of strategic concern. The Nigerian Air Force leadership, since the appointment of its 21st Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal I. O Amao on January 26, 2021 had not err in usurping the office of the Chief of Air Staff for extravagant claims for strategic primacy over other sister armed forces group in Nigeria. This has proven the mettle of the Nigerian Air Force leadership and command structure. Significantly it has improved the role of Nigerian National Defence on the fight against terrorism and counter-insurgency. This historical fact is evident in joint military operation on counter-insurgency in Nigeria. It is well to recall that the Air Component of Operation Hadarin Daji on July 5, 2022 killed 42 terrorists near Zakka and Umadan villages in Safana local government area of Katsina State.¹⁶ Nigerian Air Force is one of the largest in Africa, consisting of about 18,000 personnel and aircraft including 9 Chengdu F-7s, 12 Dassault Dornier Alpha Jets, three JF-17 Thunder Block II and 12 Super Tucano Aircraft, 24M-346 FAs on order, Helicopter Gunships, Armed attack Drones, and Military transport Aircraft.¹⁷ The Nigerian Air Force counter insurgency operations in the Northeast comes with disturbing challenges in putting to an end insurgency because it is an asymmetric warfare, insurgents and militias differ significantly because of their status as unlawful combatants. They use human shields to impede air strikes and combat operations. Which is a direct violation of the prohibition on the use of human shields as reiterated in Article 28 of the fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, which again prohibits the use of civilians “to render certain points or areas immune from military operations”.¹⁸ This is one factor that had become a challenge to Nigerian Air Force Combat Air operations against insurgency. More so, marvelous are the technological invention of Combat Operational Air Craft, it is highly sourced for by Countries across the world and there are more demands than supply, keeping interested countries on queue when contract is agreed on for supply.

It need hardly be said that, amongst the enduring factor militating against NAF effectiveness in counter-insurgency operations is the clear fact that Nigerian Air Force cannot be perfectly able to occupy and control territory from the air alone. This argument essentially reflects

aerial dimension to national security which is core to professionalism in air power.

In turn the fact that counter-insurgency is an asymmetric war and its terrestrial domain of battle is on land is dynamic to the air wing of the armed forces. Because there must be synchronization of command and operational strategy against insurgents. Armed forces are specialized for each geographical domain, Air Forces are different from armies in its operational roles and language of command, virtually in all respects except in a war situation where they are unified along a singular purpose. These points go some way in emphasizing administrative bottlenecks in joint military operation against insurgency that strains the professional attribute of the Nigerian Air Force such as speed, mobility, precision and flexibility in structure of command.

Conclusion

What this paper intend to achieve is emphasize the importance of past records of the Nigerian Air Force and the influence of Air Force History to its operational success. In the word of Alfred Thayer Mahan, history of Air Power “provides the lion’s share of the candidate evidence from which theory, doctrine, and material decisions in the present derive most of their authority.”¹⁹ Therefore, Nigerian Air Force must remain focus to attaining its Air Power objectives by investing more on balanced readiness, force structure and modernization to attaining and maintaining Air Force superiority.

Strategic theory exists to sustain strategic practice. Nigerian Air Force must remain practically dynamic in its Air operations during Air raid on insurgence using civilians as human shield to minimize collateral damage by making smart choices and investing in more advance military Air Craft like, Boeing E-3 Sentry, 20B-2 Air Craft, F-22 Air Craft, F-15Cs with AIM-9 X-Missile to maintain precision and Air Superiority. Air theorist would disagree less that Air Power is intrinsically strategic, that is the apt utilization of time and space which is easily achievable with improved or hybrid aircraft technology systems.

Air Force is an elite organization which requires tact, high level intellectual stability and strategic operational precision. This conception is driven on the notion that every Air Man should be an innovator and should be integral to the continuous development process of the Nigerian Air Force. Consequently, as Levy corroborated this claims when he puts it that, the military is “the most efficient type of organization for combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum level of stability and control.”²⁰

Recommendations

Contrary to dominant wisdom that offensive air power has unlimited strength in modern warfare, its usefulness is complex in counter-insurgency warfare. Strategic strike by Nigerian Air Force have limited use in a counter-insurgency warfare environment. In order to effectively avoid collateral damage from insurgents who use civilians as human shields from air strikes. Considering imprecise targeting of insurgents in developing civilian communities often undermine the support from local population of the nation on whose behalf the counter-insurgency operation is been conducted. Insurgents groups have learnt to adopt to air threats by deliberately making air strike operations and targeting more difficult through the use of camouflage, concealment amongst civilian population and deception. Man portable threats with adapted tactics are making the operating environment more dangerous and limiting to counter-insurgency air power.²¹

The Nigerian Air Force must employ interdiction as an approach for counter-insurgency. The objective of interdiction is to disrupt the enemy before he engages you by hitting his concentrations of force and material, and disrupting his lines of communication.²² This is an approach best applied to larger counter-insurgency campaign like the concentration of insurgent groups in wild forest areas.

Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), best give meaning for the course and success in counter-insurgency warfare on land. It does not just have a great future in counter-insurgency warfare but could be flown without accommodating people on board. Even if it is shot down by terrorist or insurgent groups, the fact that no lives is lost does not limit the support for counter-insurgency campaigns. It is an air craft machine with advanced sensors, communications suites and precision weaponry that can be stationed for extended period of time in the air over an environment with suspicion of insurgent groups. Quality of machine and person is key in all category of aerial warfare. When quality of air machine and persons is low, it obviously makes strategic performance nosedives in a deadly spiral.

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Museum As A Factor In National Development

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Abstract

The Museum is an Institution dedicated to preserving and interpreting the cultural and national heritage of humanity. Museums have been founded for a variety of purposes: to serve as recreational facilities, scholarly avenue, educational resources, to contribute to the quality of life of the areas where they are situated, to attract tourism to a particular region, to promote civic pride or nationalistic endeavours; or even to transmit overtly ideological concepts. Given such a variety of purposes, museums reveal remarkable diversity in form, content and even function. Despite such diversity, they are bound by a common goal: the preservation and interpretation of society's cultural and natural heritage. The museum holds in trust the irreplaceable treasures and heirlooms represent the collective heritage, the soul and identity of a nation. A museum therefore is an organized and permanent non-profit making institution, essentially educational or aesthetic in purpose, with professional staff which owns and utilizes tangible objects, cares for them and exhibits them to the public on some regular schedule, hence relevant to the development of the entire country.

Introduction

Nigeria is a country with varieties of cultural, natural, tangible and intangible heritage and human resources. All communities in Nigeria are endowed with these resources in one form or the other which could be assessed to improve the livelihood of the people, generate income, and provide skills, entrepreneurship and employment, while many countries have developed their heritage resources for economic benefit, thereby contributing greatly to national revenues but in Nigeria the exploration of oil, mining activities and other allied industries have shifted the focus away from heritage.¹

Although, many institutions were established to promote heritage but its management has not been given the required attention due to lack of adequate funding and other processes.

In view of dwindling resources and the need to refocus the economy in order to ensure sustainability, it becomes imperative to engage other stakeholders and partners in the management of heritage. This new initiative therefore should be the prerogative of the National Commission for Museums and Monuments. In accordance with the mandate and the recourse to open a new vista of operation, the Commission must explore the opportunities of being the oldest parastatal in the cultural sector and its visibility across Nigeria. Sustainable economics development is the clarion call all over the world while benefits beyond borders are key vectors of this development and social cohesion among stakeholders and shareholders. It is therefore important for the Museums to explore the new frontiers to make it relevant for today and the future.²

MUSEUMS AS A FACTOR IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Museums as a factor in National Development is a concept that has an ivory tower touch which sounds elegant and very professional. This topic was borne out of the recognition of the role the Museum plays in the cultural, scientific, social, economic and technological development of many Nations both developed and underdeveloped.

Throughout the world, Museums have been used as instrument to intensify communion and understanding among people.

The purpose of this focus is based on our conviction that through this means, we will be creating public awareness of one of the tourist potentials of Nigeria. It is also my intention to high-light the role of Museums in nation building. Further more, to elucidate on why our cultural heritage should be preserved and protected. At this juncture, it is academically imperative to define the key words "Museums and Developments".

Museum is a permanent non profit making institution at the service of the community and its development, open to the public which collects the material evidence of man and his environments conserves it, does research into it, and provides information on it for purpose of study, education and pleasure (N.J.N. VahSpandouk p.16).³

Further to the acceptance of this definition at international level by the ICOM, the body also recognized that the following comply with the above definition:-

- (a) National, archa-cological and ethnographic monuments and sites of a Museum nature for their acquisition, conservation and communication activities.
- (b) Conservation institutes and exhibition galleries permanently maintained by libraries and archival centre.

- (c) Institute displaying live specimen such as botanic and zoological gardens, aquaria vivra etc.
- (d) Science centre planetaria and nature reserves; furthermore, the definition specifies the functions of a Museum in the National development.

Development is a process of economic and socio-cultural advancement which enables people to realize their potentials, build self-confidence and lead lives of dignity and fulfillment. It is a process which if sincerely implemented, frees people from evils of wants, ignorance, squalor and exploitation. In general, it is a movement away from economic, social or political injustice and oppression.⁴

However, for the movement to be genuine and productive, it must spring from within the society that is developing. Development, therefore, implies growing self-reliance both individually and collectively. Meaningful national development requires the full utilization of the nations own resources, both human and material to meet its own needs. In other words development has to be designed to capture what the people themselves wish to be their socio-economic and political interest.

According to Dr. Lester B. Pearson, "Development is the process by which a state reaches the position where it can provide for its own growth without relying on special arrangements for the transfer of resources from other and richer countries".⁵

At the core of this kind of development is the effort to increase productivity and make it more efficient. It therefore means participation of people in the determination of their environment. It also means, the opportunity for people to choose and to use their resources to the maximum capacity.

Nigeria now ranks very low in the global human development index. The average Nigerian has been affected by run-away inflation and large sections of the middle and low income groups have seen their living conditions deteriorate. Women, youth, children and the disadvantaged are most hit. Unemployment is on the increase with attendant disaffection and social discontent among the youth who are increasingly facing reduced opportunities. That a large section of the population is being excluded from the benefits of prosperity and progress that economic growth generates makes it imperative for us to rethink our development strategies and pursue a more human centred development of paradigm that will make poverty eradication, job creation, empowerment of people, particularly women, as well as environment sustainability its focus.

There is tangible cause therefore for hope and optimism and it would be totally wrong to throw our arms in the air in a frenzy of pessimism. Museum method and process is likely to be long and difficult but the direction is clear. Africa is moving forward and Nigerians have a leadership role to play in this march.

The development of Nigeria is the responsibility of Nigerians. Nigerians must find Nigerian solutions to their problem which take into account their unique culture and circumstances.

It is the opinion of the Museum professionals that development can only be achieved through a process of self-reliance and sustainable growth as well as participation of the people acting in their own interest. Its main objective should be to eliminate poverty, provide productive employment, satisfy the basic human needs and ensure social integration within a regenerated and sustainable policy and physical enabling environment.

Following the above submission, one can now ask if the Museum has a role to play in the development process of the country. The answer to this question is for us to flash our minds to the sustainable Human Development which places people at the centre of the development debate.

It depicts a vision of development of people by the people and for the people in a wholesome manner to enlarge people's choices and capabilities through the programme of the Museums as it is embedded in their functions viz: collection, preservation, conservation, documentation, research and education as well as enjoyment.

MUSEUMS AND THE MILITARY

For many people, a visit to a military history museum is the one of the main ways that a person will learn about war, aside from its importance in the education.

Development in all human activities is a function of security and a function of military set up.

Military power and proficiency is also a function of weapons and welfare. In museum therefore, ancient technology and military warfare, weapons are kept, preserved and adaptable. Military skills can be deduced and understood from such repositories.

Ancient military history of war and weapons are one of the main functions of the museum and understand the past of man in his security architecture.

Aba war museum for instance, is one of the major museums in Nigeria. Its functions - is to preserve and keep the weapons used during the war especially ancient Ibo traditional technology used during the war. (ii) To

learn more on how to develop such weapons to global standard (iii) To remind us of the effectiveness of local technology (iv) The relevance is also seen in the Ojukwu Bunker ie. The underground operations for perfect security against sophisticated weapons.

Ownership - The ownership of Aba war Museum is Ministry of Defence and the Museum. While funding is jointly by the military and the museum⁶.

The relevance therefore is that it reminds us of how effective our technology can be used and to see physical observation of the objects. This tallies with whatever the military are learning in the school on military warfare and the application of traditional technology.

Other museum have conservation of such objects of weapons and therefore kept in their galleries such as arrows, bowl, war music, war drums, charms, knives, anti-poison herbs, Bulletproof iron ware, etc all these tells us about why museum is relevant to security of the nation.

In the ancient time, apart from mass destruction, weapon or war, our ancient father or fore bears developed sophisticated defence system in the various large cities in form of defensive perimeter store walls. In such store walls, they have security gates to control movement of men and animals (entrance and exit). A notable example is Benin ancient city wall and Kano ancient city walls.⁷

In 1903, the British military i.e West African frontier force WAFF had to destroy ancient Kano wall, before they could conquer the city, captured the emir, deposed and banished him to Lokoja. such city walls are heritage centres kept and preserved by museum and recognized by UNESCO as an important heritage centres on such walls, security surveillance are mounted to monitor the advancement of enemies into such cities while the gates were protected. The replica of such walls are in Jos Museum (MOTNA) i.e Museum of Traditional Architecture.

Apart from weapons, museums keep records of defence system and security watch and methods by our ancient fore fathers. Also, caves that were used by our fathers to keep such important objects of domestic and military utilities during wars were preserved as heritage centers as part of defence mechanisms such carves are invisible to external invaders. Therefore, there is a symbiotic relationship between war, museum and traditional technology of warfare ie. Museum is the eye opener to the past of war system.⁸

MUSEUM COLLECTIONS

Collection is the first function of a museum. This appears historical and remains the predominant reason for a museum's existence. Museum collection implies acquisition of material objects into the Museum through purchase, seizure, donation, bequeath, field work and expeditions, exchange, loan or excavation. Museums are generally judged by their collections as well as their collecting policy. There are two methods of acquisition, namely, direct or indirect acquisition. The former is better in that it involves scientifically conducted research missions.⁹

Museum collect material objects not for curiosity but because they believe that objects are important and evocative survivals of human heritage and human conditions. Museum thus carefully preserve their holding so as to transmit important information to the present generations and prosperity. They, therefore collect to fulfill three basic needs (1) Preservation (2) Research and Presentation, (BonnteBurham pp. 104-105). In the Museum the collections are based on the following categories and could be regarded as

- (a) Basic needs collection, shelter, comfort, and agricultural collections.
- (b) Religious collections, Aesthetic and ceremonial collections. Museum, collections therefore, are agents of development. Its educational values has no bounds. It is also a source of inspiration for technological development and nation building.¹⁰

A visit to the Museum will give a complete and explicit impression as actual. Museum have come to be accepted as the most reliable institution created by man to store off as long as possible the deterioration and loss of objects treasured for their cultural and developmental values. They seem therefore to have acquired a reputation that bankers have in relation to the security and safety of money and thus it is the best known store house for objects and artifacts which are the most tangible aspects of culture. Most of the developmental ideal that may be transmitted through other agencies are sometimes embodied in the objects stored in the Museum. The fact that Museum preserve objects and passed them on from one generation to another gives them a developmental significance, they are then the most reliable and acceptable institution created by modern society to preserve such materials.

Museum collection have greater developmental appeal to the people who know the ideas behind the objects on display. To such people, the museum objects is not only a thing of beauty for admiration and entertainment or objects, that simply remind people of their humble beginning and to which a reunion with an elusive past can be sought by

them. The sight of such developmental objects involves the same ideas that led to their creation and use.

The National Commission for Museum and Monuments is the largest institution which is concerned with the cultural heritage of Nigeria. It has worked relentlessly to collect and survey the antiquities of Nigeria through archaeological and ethnographical researches.

The interpretation of Nigerian cultural properties and its display in its highest conception has increased both government and public interest in its heritage and therefore the Commission has through collection succeeded in placing Nigeria's cultural heritage in its proper perspective and this enables Nigerians to appreciate the contribution of our forefathers towards the march to development as well as national building.¹¹

Museum is a reference centre where factual information are presented in a vivid and pleasing form. These facts are obtained through the employment of field offices to carry out research on material culture. Information collected are made available to other research fellow in need of them.

The Commission fulfills an important task in guiding the cultural heritage of Nigeria's past and using its activities within the framework of the national policy and philosophy.

The Commission helps to create a better understanding among the various ethnic groups in bringing history to life and making it comprehensible for better interpretation of our pre-history, for the sake of future generation and development.

The Museum always proceeds from the known to the unknown, sometimes step by step and sometimes by imaginative exhilaration lapses as opportunities arise. Without exception, everything a museum does is educational, even when this is not intentional. The standard of display of exhibits, the quality of thoughts that goes into arrangements, the friendliness and sincerity of the personnel who serve the public all these are potentials influence for good and are as such part of education. One of the functions of the Museum is to provide direct educational services to the public. This is the first step in national development. In Functional Museum, lectures talk and guided lectures are mainly carried out by superior officers. Schools invited by the Museum may be taken round the collections and gain special lessons either by the Curator or any other competent Museum Officer.

It is also the concern of the Museum to educate and guide lecturer on how to handle adult parties stimulate curiosity in the hope of encouraging at least some of their hearer to take a new interest in natural history, arts

and craft, technological development processes, film industry and tourism. Radio programmes on cultural heritage is educative to the public and it is sometimes organized by Museum authorities, as well as the sponsorship of arts clubs, theatre, play and holiday programmes, art clubs for kids, but also Museum society for the adult, all these are process of national development.

Museum presents their specimen to the public in a condition as closely and approximately, to the original appearance as possible. This involves varying degrees of restoration on one hand and the introduction of such conditions as well prevent deterioration on the other.¹²

When this materials are displayed in a gallery where a guide is employed for this purpose, the public can then make a successful tour of the gallery with the satisfaction.

It will take the joint effort of us all to move Nigeria in the direction of lasting change. The National Commission for Museums and Monuments is willing to join hands with other stakeholders to mobilize and direct our collective efforts in pursuit of this vision.

The starting point is to mobilize internal resources for development.

Our present school's system needs more to be desired in this direction. The school curriculum should be reverted to the usual status quo to emphasize the need of arranging geographical and socio-cultural executions to the Museums and Monuments.

Museums have meaningful functions in several ways in relation to political and socio structure, religion, education and economic structure of any society. In this circumstances therefore, it could be assumed that Museum serve as a factor for national development.

In other words, the Museum is not a dead or dying concept or institution, but a living one. Since it is living, it means that it is adjustable and adaptable to circumstances of place and time.

One would be looking at the theme within the context of ethnological (community) which may be sociological and ecological (Natural environment in which man-in-society live and moves and has his being). Then, there is also the professional or special interest group.

The kind of Museum which has a professional or interest group as its context and community in the sense we use here would be a Museum that collects, preserves exhibits and studies Artifact, and relics that tells story of evolution and decline, the mode of function or operation, the importance and relevance of professional or interest group. Good examples would be Museums established around life, and work of the

military e.g Aba Museum, farms, royalty and titled men, textile workers, agriculturists, architecture, education and educationists, medical practice, smiting and iron work e.t.c. when, on the other hand we are talking of a Museum in ethnological context or community, we are referring to a Museum established to preserve, display and study the cultural heritage of a village, village group, clan or ethnic group of the miscellaneous aggregating of peoples and cultures known as an urban town or city such as Abuja, Jos or Calabar. Here, no preferential attention is given to cultural heritage of any particular profession or business interest group or class. A Museum of this kind properly conceived and properly run would take into account not only the human and sociological domination of the life of the community but also the natural or ecological context in which the people and their sociological context matrix exist.¹³

One can now, within the context of common interest which binds between the Museum and the society began to appreciate its utilitarian and contributions towards the development of the society. The society therefore, is seen as an active partner in the life and work of the Museum and thus builds up experiential and institutional capacities for developments.

In addition, through such co-operation and participation in the affairs of the Museum, the community will gain new perspectives of the value and functions of its cultural heritage and thus a wider perspective of its history and of that fact that its past is not dead and gone but continues to exist in its present. The Museum, also in a way, helps to create more and new jobs for the youths of this society, thereby contributing to the security of its cultural property against thieves and heedless iconoclasts.¹¹

However, when a Museum is integrated with the society or context in which it exists and that context is ethnological one, that means a permanent and continuing nexus between it and those who are repositories of the authentic evidence relating to its holdings.

It means work of comprehensive documentation can become an on-going process of stretching from one generation to generation. since cultural artifacts are multi-vocal, speaking with many voices – political, economic, religions, environmental, scientific, technological and others. These means there are more promising prospect of recovering a larger canvas of the past and understanding it. It also offers more people the opportunity to contribute to others recovery the farmer, the trader, the sculptor, the verbal artist, the autocrat, the peasant, the warrior, the pacifist and so on can each on their own carry out a reading of a particular artifact and thus contribute to the gaining of a wider

perspective of the past. Also the elderly, the youth, the women, the privileged and under-privileged, etc. can contribute to this effort.

The Museum belongs to the educational sub-system which is concerned with generating and propagating knowledge and information among the people with a view to raising their consciousness and empowering and enriching their lives. At this juncture, two things need to be emphasized. The first is the relationship between our health and how we treat and manage refuse. Our people's awareness of this close critical nexus between health and environment is at its most primitive which explains their utter lack of discipline when it comes to obeying the regulations that should guide their activities in this area.

For the most part they remain attached to that old view which invariably linked disease with the activities of evil men and evil entities rather than with the contamination of much of what they eat and drink and the air they breath through improper management of their refuse and other forms of waste.

The Museum can through seminars, symposia, lectures and publications, help to inculcate a better informed attitude and behaviour towards the environment among the people.

CONCLUSION

Through exhibitions the Museum can aid the quick actualization of the much desired peace among the various ethnic groups in the country. For example, the Museum can organize community based mobile exhibition among the people that make up the area. There should however be a balance in aesthetics among the exhibits such that the collection from one ethnic group would not be seen as superior to others. Backed by an aggressive awareness campaign, such as exhibition will raise the consciousness of the people towards appreciating the culture of their fellow brothers, thus, achieving unity in diversity. It is our belief that the above among others would provide valid views about the roles which Museum play towards the growth and development of the society.

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Interrogating the Relevance of Military History in Building Strategic Leadership in the Fourth Republic Nigeria

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Abstract

The discipline of military history is a branch of historical writing that systematically studies a nation's military activities and technology such as warfare, campaigns, intelligence gathering, tactics and strategies, military-civil relations, among others. Thus, the knowledge of military history is pivotal to building strategic leadership in any nation. Post-independence Nigeria is plagued with huge leadership gap, laden with unhealthy ethno-religious competition and rivalries, mediocrity and other variegated issues that borders on national question. Thus, in a bid to overcome leadership challenge in a heterogeneous society, it is expedient that the knowledge of the past particularly its military history is required as it would help in building transformational leadership. Against this backdrop, the paper attempt to examine the relevance of military history in building strategic leadership in Nigeria. The paper adopts qualitative descriptive method of research using secondary sources. The paper concludes that knowledge of military history has an intrinsic value that could build strategic leadership to manage heterogeneous and complex society like Nigeria.

Keywords: Military, History, Nation Building, Strategic leadership and Intrinsic Value

Introduction

The relevance of military history in building strategic leadership in any nation cannot be overemphasized. The discipline of military history is a branch of historical writing that systematically studies a nation's military activities and technology in the past, and the changes that had occurred over a period of time. Such military activities include state formation, warfare, campaigns, intelligence gathering, tactics and strategies, humanitarian services to victims of violent conflict, military-civil relations, among others. Of significant importance in military history is the lesson that accompanies military activities, which is useful to the warriors, commanders/leaders and the society in general. For instance,

the lesson learnt from the battlefields by the surviving commanders, warriors/troops and leaders alike would help them not to repeat past mistakes but rather improve their tactics and techniques in subsequent battles.

Considering the present state of many nations in Africa, Nigeria inclusive, there is no gainsaying that there exist leadership question; this has birthed ethno-religious rivalry, corruption, communal clashes, economic crisis, high rate of poverty, political violence civil strife, agitation for secession, insecurity, among others. All the aforementioned have not only been clogs in the wheels of nation building but set the continent backward. The return to democratic governance in the twenty-first century by many African nations re-enact hope of strategic leadership through credible election, but this hope is dashed due to election violence, absence of good governance and resurgence of military coups.

Recent socio-economic and political developments in Africa demands strategic leadership in order to overcome barrage of the challenges and transformation. Strategic leadership is the ability of a leader to influence the people in order to accomplish the set goals of the organization or the society. In doing this successfully, Chammers opines that the leader must have possessed certain qualities such as good character, courage, prudence, and discipline,^{ciii} among others. While these attributes may be innate or acquired over a period of time, knowledge of the past particularly the military history is also very critical for strategic leadership. Knowledge of military history has an intrinsic value that could build strategic leadership to manage complex society. In fact, as stated by Gbor, military history is an indispensable tool that anchors past military operations, institutional development and activities to the present.^{civ} Thus, military history is one of the veritable tools for any leader because it provides a historical understanding of war and society. This historical understanding would help the leaders and the society not to repeat the mistakes of the past

Ironically, many societies and leaders have neglected the relevance of military history in governance as lessons from the past have been thrown to the dustbin. The overall consequence of such neglect is weighty on the society negatively. In contemporary world, many nations are plagued majorly with absence of good governance and conflicts, thus, this has resulted largely in huge security crises and violent attacks in which the military has assumed important role as peacekeepers and peace builders. The quest for strategic leadership becomes imperative to overcoming the aforementioned challenges that threatened and has continued to threaten the existence of mankind globally. The study of military history by modern military professionals is critical to the development of skills directly applicable on the battlefields of today and the future.

It is in this regard that the paper seeks to examine the relevance of military history in building strategic leadership in Nigeria given the socio-economic and political challenges in the country. The paper is organized into six subthemes or sections: Section one introduces the subject matter of military history and strategic leadership, section two addresses conceptual issues relating to military and leadership, while section three treats perspectives to military history as an academic field of study. Section four discusses the intrinsic value of military history to strategic leadership, while chapter five interrogates the challenges and prospects. Section six concludes the study.

Conceptualization: Military and Leadership

The wider usage of the terms 'military' and 'leadership' require conceptualization of these two terms. This has become imperative so as to provide in-depth contextual understanding of the terms in this study. The usage of 'military' in public domain could be referred to as an organization which comprises the army, the navy and the air force, saddled with the responsibility of maintaining the territorial integrity of a nation.^{cv} They are specifically trained in the use of lethal weapons to deter enemy. It is in this regard that they engage in war, deter belligerent and also assist the police in internal security. In Nigeria, the military is also called armed forces; the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably depending on the circumstances and personality. Ekoko sees the military as the soldiers, army or armed forces. To him, they exist not just to fight wars but, perhaps more importantly, to ensure that wars never break out.^{cvi} In other words, they perform a deterrent role. The military could also mean a career or profession; that is those rigidly trained in the use of lethal weapons for battles. For instance, taking a cue from the above, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended clearly defines the nature and character of its military as an institution made up of the army, the navy and the air force. It is saddled majorly with the responsibilities of protecting territorial integrity against external aggression. This is contained in section 217 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution which states that:

There shall be armed forces for the Federation which shall consist of an army, a Navy, an Air Force and such other branches of the armed forces of the Federation as may be established by an act of the National Assembly.^{cvi}

Section 217 of the same Constitution proceeds to state the specific duties and responsibilities of the armed forces to include the following:

- (a) defending Nigeria from external aggression;
- (b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air;

- (c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National assembly; and
- (d) performing any other duties as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.^{cviii}

Interestingly, a cursory study of the nature and character of most of the armed forces globally, it is safe to affirm that the military or armed forces perform a similar duty which is protection of territorial integrity as revealed in the constitution of Nigeria.

The subject matter of leadership has created a plethora of publications, research and debate and it has become a key issue in both the public and private sectors. The concept continues to be a subject matter for debate with no universally accepted definition. Several researchers have given meaning to the term in accordance to their disciplinary bias, hence, there exist avalanche of its definition.

Tangban & Audu cited Stogdill, who defined leadership as the process or act of influencing the activities of an organised group in its efforts towards goal setting and goal achievement.^{cix} In the same vein, Tangban & Audu also cited Bryman, who notes that a leader either in an organization or nation has a unique role in steering members of that organization or nation towards a specified goal achievement of enhanced performance in terms of increased profitability or development for an improved standard of living.^{cx}

Ntagu & Onuorah holds the view that leadership is a body of people who lead and direct the activities of a group towards a shared goal.^{cxii} To Ntagu & Onuorah, leadership is the ability to lead, direct and organise a group. In a similar vein, while citing Gardener, Ntagu and Onuoha provide further explanation when they defined leadership as the process of persuasion or by which an individual induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers.^{cxiii} According to Chammars, leadership is a process of social influence by which a person influences others to accomplish an objective and directs the organization in a way that makes it more cohesive and coherent. To him, a leader is expected to demonstrate qualities which embrace but not limited to good character, vision, tact, courage and prudence.^{cxiii}

In the context of this study, military is defined as an institution trained in the art of war. It comprises of the army, the navy and the air force; while leadership means the ability of leader to influence the people or organised group in order to accomplish set goals of an organisation or

society. And as such, a strategic leadership is needed in every aspect of the society be it social, political, military, economic or religion.

Perspectives to Military History as an Academic Field of Study in Nigeria

The discipline of History was among the earliest fields of study in Nigerian universities. The discipline of history concerns itself with the study and analysis of events in the past in relation to the present. The growing numbers of scholars in History has widened the scope and specialisation of the discipline, hence, there are plethora of its branches which include political history, economic history, social history, diplomatic history, cultural history, military history, gender studies; peace and conflict studies, among others.

According to Umoh, military history is a distinct field within the overall discipline of history.^{cxiv} Military history is as old as the history of warfare but in Nigeria, the study of military history evolved in the post-colonial period. It was S.C. Ukpabi that pioneered and professionalised the study of military history in Nigeria. He traced Nigeria military history to the mid-19th Century when the colonial army was formed.^{cxv} Since then, it has only gained wider acceptability as a field of study in the military institutions and academics, though yet to be recognised at the conventional university system. Among the eminent scholars who have made useful contributions to the development of military history in Nigeria include S. C. Ukpabi, C. N. Ubah, J. W.T. Gbor, V. A. Eliawu, A.A. Lipede, C.C.C. Osakwe and host of others. The teaching and research works of these scholars have no doubt brought interesting and wider perspectives in this field of study. Of very important are the broad dimensions the works of Ukpabi, Ubah, Gbor and Osakwe introduced in the field.

S. C. Ukpabi sees military history as a branch of history that deal with warfare but not in isolation with the society. In many of his works, he holds the view that war was a central factor in human activities for thousands of years. According to him, the branch of study known as military history is that which explores how man has used armed conflict to accomplish "his political, economic and societal goal."^{cxvi} He also dwells on the colonial formation of the military particularly the Nigerian army and their major campaigns. He contends that the Nigerian army served the interests of the colonialists as an instrument of coercion used to suppress many Nigerian societies. In one of his works, he argued that poor organization of the colonial army was majorly responsible for military's bad image up to the period of independence.^{cxvii} Ukpabi as the pioneer Nigerian scholar in the field of military history laid the foundation as most of his works challenged Eurocentric views up to the period of the Nigerian civil war.

C. N. Ubah is another scholar who advanced the discipline of military history. He sees military history is a distinct subfield of history capable of responding to societal military requirements.^{cxviii} He argues further that military history is the war dimension of society's experience' and war is an aspect of society's relations with other societies. Ubah share similar view with S.C. Ukpabi, when he posit that war arises because of the changing relations of numerous variables-economic, social, cultural, technological etc.^{cxix} In his view, military history is the comprehensive understanding of the relations between armed forces and society upon which war history rests. Ubah is of the opinion that truly certified military history to go beyond the narration and explanation of episodic violence. He dwell on aspect of asymmetry warfare, technology determinism in warfare and the interaction of war with the society.^{cxx} Like Keegan in the *Face of Battle*, Ubah believed that military history should be studied in width, depth and context. To study in width means to observe events comparatively over a long period of time in order to observe change. To study in depth involves wide reading of sources to deduce real experiences and avoid any generalisation. Context involves treating the subject as a reflection of social forces and not autonomously. Ubah contends that military history should not be saddled with the responsibility of only studying the use of armed forces during war time, but also in 'peacetime' or non-war periods.

Ubah submits that military history should not be isolated from, but rather linked to, its parent discipline-history. The discipline of history emphasizes objective analysis and critical thinking, rigorous research skills, an understanding of the particular sources used by historians, a high standard of writing ability, historiographical sensibilities and historical habits of mind. It is in that respect that military historian can use the discipline of history in an imaginative way by inculcating a method of historical-mindedness in the academic study of war.^{cxxi}

Gbor, a military historian and military personnel sees military history as an indispensable tool that anchors past military operations, institutional development and activities to the present. To him, the connection with the facts of the past enables the Generals and government officials to make informed decisions on military and defence matters. The factual understanding of the past leads to the formulation of the principle of war, military tactics, military and defence policy, and above all, the development of military strategy and doctrine. Military history, according to him was inevitable for several reasons. Among which include new approach to military by academic military historians, changing nature of war due to modern technology,^{cxxii} just to mention a few areas.

Chukwuma Osakwe's perspective in military history centres on modern military warfare, strategy and tactics.^{cxxiii} His thought was greatly influenced by the new dimension to fighting terrorism and insurgency which has taken centre stage in international system. To him, terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare are the popular nomenclature used by non-state actors to destabilize legitimate government all over the world.^{cxxiv} The non-state actors largely engaged in asymmetry warfare, which makes it difficult for the conventional military to subdue. Osakwe holds the view that advance technology for intelligence gathering, critical thinking and complex military operations such as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operation would subdue the non-state actors.^{cxxv}

The perspectives of these scholars have broadened the scope of military history in Nigeria thus making it very critical and relevant in the global security studies. Wambu & Ehimatie summarize the objectives and interest of military history in Nigeria through the ages as follows:

- i. Why wars happen
- ii. Examining the changes in attitude of various peoples in various ages of warfare
- iii. Analysing the interaction between the military, warfare and society
- iv. Examine the consequences of militarizing the societies
- v. Investigating the dynamics of warfare
- vi. Examining the philosophy of war and its effect on society
- vii. Examining the development and improvement of armies and military art.^{cxxvi}

Given the above, it is safe to assert that military history is concerned primarily about the soldier and society. It cares about how the army or other arms of the military is organized, administered and maintained. It studies strategy, tactics, communication theory, doctrine, politics, economics, geopolitics and principles of war.

Intrinsic Value of Military History to Strategic Leadership

There is no gainsaying that the study of military history is very significant in the quest for a strategic leadership particularly in overcoming security threats. It has been firmly established that military history is not only the narration of war and biography or memoir of the commanders, but the study of human activities (social, economic and political) that culminated to war. Below are the relevance of military history in the building of strategic leadership in Nigeria.

For many centuries in Africa, military warfare has led to the formation of many empires, kingdoms and states. In fact, in Southern Africa and Yorubaland, warfare has led to emergence of new settlements particularly refugee camps that later metamorphosed to towns and cities. Also, warfare has produced warlords, energetic and visionary leaders,

who administered their territories using military might before the incursion of European imperialists. Buttressing the above, Shaibu while quoting Ukpabi states that, "Nation have been destroyed or built up and expanded through war"^{cxvii} In this case, it is safe to assert that the whole process of warfare which culminated weapons development, emergence of leaders, states formation and expansion, and their subsequent collapse forms part of military history, in which lesson could be learnt - not only by the leaders but the society at large.

Given the above, military history does not only provide a blueprint or a roadmap, but it also provides a context that helps equip leaders to make informed decisions. For instance, military history's utility value extends to matters of policy and strategy. Knowledge of a people's military past enhances adequate strategic choices by the policy makers. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo and Gen. Ibrahim Babangida made use of this knowledge during their reigns as military heads of state in Nigeria.

Secondly, military history is a human preservation recipe. It informs its beneficiaries about dangers of particular wars and benefits of others through reflecting over the past. Similarly, it offers clues on prospects of military advancement and or dynamics in technological attainments on which rests the decision on whether to embark on a particular war or desist. This is related to the role of military history in giving impetus for specific wars or serving as deterrent to others.

Thirdly, military history is a veritable instrument of peaceful coexistence if improperly handled or reconstructed. The gory images of war in the past can make people to toe the line of caution knowingly well that the repercussion of war is destruction. The gory images of deaths in past wars can also be a cause of war because it can serve as a stimulator for successive generations to engage in a retaliatory war. In the case of the Nigerian Civil War, it has been argued that the quest for vengeance was partly the inciting factor for the formation of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) in South East Nigeria.^{cxviii} Decades after the war, successive governments have not been able put in place all inclusive policies and actions to heal the wounds. Strategic leadership would have discouraged sectionalism and other actions capable of leading to civil strife.

In addition, military history has often served as stimulators for technological improvements particularly in weapons, tactics and strategies. During the Nigerian Civil War, there were indigenous efforts at self-sustenance and self-defence by the South Easterners when they manufactured *Ogbunigwe* and other weapons. *Ogbunigwe* was a Biafran bomb produced to massively destroy the enemy while fighting for self-preservation.^{cxix} Wherever strategic leadership exist, this would

encourage successive generations to improve on such technological advancement. It will not only promote economic growth through employment generation but stimulate technological advancement.

Furthermore, military history in Nigeria has served the purposes of national integration or nation building. Many military history scholars have reconstructed our national history to paint a heroic nationalistic image of the nation's soldiers whose bravery and sacrifices have played major roles in an effort to remain a united nation particularly during the Nigeria Civil war and ethno-religious war. That is the major reason why the Nigerian government and the military celebrate the fallen heroes every year. Military history gives a sophisticated understanding of the role of the military and war in history. At other times, the military historian emphasizes or sometimes exaggerates the roles of heroic soldiers of the past. This may serve as a bonding force for the present and future generations. Wambu & Ehimatie added that military history probes the mentality and psychology of war captains and generals, thereby determining their impacts on events.^{xxxx} The knowledge of past battles helps leaders to understand their responsibilities. In particular, they will appreciate the importance of discipline and the need to build confident and cohesive teams that are resilient to the debilitating effects of combat trauma and the corrosive effects of persistent danger.

Although there are clear practical applications of the study of war and warfare, such as understanding the fundamentals of combined arms operations, the purpose of studying war through the lens of history would be to make leaders wise forever

Military History and Strategic Leadership: Challenges and Prospects

The non-specialisation of military history as a field of study in the Nigerian conventional universities is one of the challenges. The non-availability of military history as a branch of history in the conventional universities may partly be due to misconception of the field to mean the study of warfare and relic of war alone, and partly because of its newness in history. There are many branches of history in the Nigerian conventional universities which include Economic, Social, Cultural, and Political History. Military History has only gained wider recognition in the military institutions and defence academies. The study of military history is imperative in the face of the country's security challenges. To this end, courses that borders on military complex operation in war, military theory and doctrine, humanitarian crises, peacekeeping operation and peace building, counter- insurgency and counter-terrorism can be studied not only by the military personnel alone but others who may be interested.

Another challenge to military history is the limited numbers of Military Historians. Only the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna and undertake military history courses and programmes both at degree and postgraduate levels. Lately, the Nigerian Army University, Biu has joined NDA in the study of military history. Though, some Military personnel and security experts have picked interest in the field, but that has not filled the huge gap of scholars in the field, because they are not trained as professional military historian. In addition to this, there is dearth of literature in military history.

In spite of the challenges, there are a number of prospects to military history and strategic leadership. In fact, for purposeful leadership, lessons of history cannot be overemphasized. The knowledge of military history particularly military relations among various groups will assist in the building of strong ties in the country.

The knowledge of military history will equip leaders to take informed decisions on matter of defence and security. Also, understanding of the societal ills through the lens of military history would help leaders to avoid past mistakes. It is also important to state that there is continuous changing dynamics of armed conflict; knowledge of the changing character of warfare would no doubt spur the military to acquire advance military technology and be trained in intelligence gathering to solve mirage of security problems. That will help the military to be offensive instead of being defensive.

Conclusion

The study examined the relevance of the military history in building strategic leadership for nation building. The discipline of military history as a distinct academic field is the art and science of historical reconstruction of military activities as it affects the society. In Nigeria, it is an evolving field, taught in the military institutions and academies but, yet to take its roots in the conventional universities. Eminent scholars in the field have justified its importance and proved that it is beyond mere military affairs. No doubt, knowledge in the field of military history is a veritable and indispensable tool to the leaders, military personnel and policy makers particularly on matters that border on defence and security. Besides, military history is vital to nation building in a heterogeneous society like Nigeria where the quest for national integration is in the front burner. A well-researched military history will project the nation's image among the committee of nations. The government and policy makers should strive hard to seeing that the study of military history is not limited to military institutions and academies but should firmly be introduced in the nation's conventional universities to train strategic leaders needed for the transformation of Nigeria.

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Security Threat In Nigeria, Response And Challenges, 2013-2022: A Review

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Abstract

Since Nigeria restored her political peace in 1999, her democratic competence towards guaranteeing internal security has been characterized by unpredictable glitches. The kill chain of security threat has become shorter. Innocent civilian lives are frequently under threat, attack and immense evil march across several state of Nigeria. However, there is always room for improvement. Therefore, this paper would not hasten into the perilous realm of strategic judgment on Nigeria's national security. But it highlights the seven broad categorization of types and causes of security threat which shed lights on the trigger factors responsible for security threats in Nigeria. This paper gives an analytical review of the history of insecurity in the wake of security threats in Nigeria, its challenges and strategic response under her democracy.

Keywords: Security Threat, challenges, Response

Introduction

Nigeria's National Security is in a decade of decisions. The struggle against security threat in Nigeria seems to be at a stalemate, but there is hope for the future of Nigeria's National Security with careful and strategic review of Nigeria's security challenges and response. Nonetheless, the aforementioned statement necessitates a rethinking of what historically and theoretically constitutes National Security. In this sense, National Security has been described as the ability of a State to cater for the protection and defence of its citizenry.¹ Nigeria's National Security is overwhelmed by heat of diverse complexity of security threats from long-standing and persistent poverty to ethnic profiling and violence, kidnapping, climate change, health pandemics, trafficking, terrorism and fluctuating economic growth and financial downturns. This are defining features of Nigeria's security threats and challenges for over two decades and half of Nigeria's return to democratic rule.

This paper is designed to make clear the challenges and threats to the National Security of Nigeria, and to help build awareness of the

challenges and threats that exist on human security. Howbeit, some of its observation can be of use to decision makers who are at the helm of decision making for maintaining Nigerian National Security. More so pass for superior historical scholarship in the academia.

Methodology of Study

The domain of this paper is National Security, carefully reviewed from three interlocking perspectives: security threat, challenges and response. Historical analysis is used as a toolkit to help chronologically shape the disparate secondary materials of ideas and security conundrums, useful for providing propositions and enduring analysis. History is a crucial subject in providing man's holistic education. Historical analysis as a theoretical method is a problem solving theory that helps explain the past, predict the future and provide a good basis for political action. This approach begins with propositions by formulating a set of research questions such as; what is security threat? What constitutes threat to the national security of Nigeria? and what are the different types of threat and its challenges in Nigeria? This provides a systematic study for interpreting types of security threats and challenges.


Concept of Security Threat


A systemic response to the questions, on what is security threat? What are the security threats in Nigeria? Are strategic reality for understanding the concept of security threat in Nigeria. Clearly, it is often not out of place for a sound idea to be eroded by extravagant emotions or down played by expectations born of unschooled understanding of the concept. Without contextualization it would be unsatisfactory to give an objective description of security threat and challenges in Nigeria.

While there are many definitions of security threat, the core of the better among them for this paper, defines security threat as anything that threatens the physical well being of the population or jeopardizes the stability of a nation's economy or institutions is considered a national security threat.

One must hasten to note, however, that National Security is saddled with the responsibilities of the interconnectedness of both security threats and responses.

They key to victory in response to security threat is to act more quickly, both mentally and physically, than one's opponent. Boyd expressed this concept in a cyclical process he called the "observe-orient-decide-act" (OODA) loop (see figure below).





An understanding of the challenges of National Security is a mixed blessing for understanding the high point of victory against security threat in its operational reality. A tactical “grammar” of challenge as illustrated through the model of National Security, presented by Marian Cieślarczyk is recognized as the situation or information which is not discovered on time and if swiftly selected arranged activities are not identified, arranged, accompanied in the right place and time, with the involvement of adequate capacity may turn into a ‘threat’.² One can slice and dice for wider precision the above concept based on its impact to the country’s interest and objectives on National Security.

To be empirically rigorous, security threat in Nigeria are negative situations that genuinely oblige the diversion of the country’s scarce resources into geostrategic environment with no positive result but high risk on life of citizens and national asset. In this context, security threat is an amalgam of all actions of non-state actors and saboteurs which deliberately orchestrate the failure of Nigeria’s national security interest in fulfilling the following:

- (i) The provision of security and welfare of its citizens
- (ii) The preservation of the sovereignty and defense of the country’s territorial integrity
- (iii) The maintenance of peace and sustained democracy
- (iv) The provision of stable economic growth and
- (v) Guaranteeing social justice.

Security threat, mishandled strategically, operationally and tactically challenges a nation’s leadership and disrupts its well-being.

Challenges of Security Threat And Strategic Response In Nigeria

The understanding of pragmatic relations between security threat and response, it is necessary to categories national security threat and causes in Nigeria.

Figure B: Types And Causes Of Security In Nigeria

TYPES OF SECURITY	CAUSES OF SECURITY THREAT	STATISTICAL FACTS
Economic Security	Unemployment, underemployment and persistent poverty.	The upward surge in security threats directly affects foreign direct investment and widen the gap of unemployment. As investments are redirected to places with lower insecurity threats. Statistical record estimated that, 60percent of Nigerian youths population are either unemployed or under employed. ³
Food Security	Hunger, famine, depletion of food and animal species and hike in food prices.	17 million people in Nigeria currently at risk of food insecurity. The food scarcity and nutrition situation across Nigeria is deeply concerning. ⁴ there are two principle reasons; continued conflicts in North East state of Nigeria, farmer/herder crises in the middle belt (Benue) and climate change.
Health Security	Pandemic (covid-19), inefficient health care system, poor hygiene, malnutrition and other deadly infectious	Given that perfection is not easily achievable in response to pandemic

	diseases.	preparedness. Nigeria has recorded several disease outbreaks in the last 10years with imported cases of Ebola in 2014, annual outbreak of Lassa fever, yellow fever, cerebrospinal meningitis, cholera, measles and recently covid-19. ⁵
Environmental Security	Resource curse, bunkering, pollution and natural disasters (flood)	The messy perennial flood, erosion, desertification and drought are common challenges of insecurity. In 2022, flood displaced 1.4million Nigerians, killed over 603 people and injured more than 2400 persons, damaging about 82, 035 houses and degrading over 332, 327 hectares of land across Nigeria. ⁶
Personal Security	Forced labour migration (sex trafficking), kidnapping, banditry, terrorism, physical violence,	In the circumstances of search for good life overseas, it has become a common place for several Nigerians experiencing personal insecurity. A total of 1, 076 victims of persons

		trafficking in Nigeria was registered in 2014 and by 2018 the number of people who were victims of human trafficking significantly increased. ⁷
Community Security	Ethnic profiling, inter-ethnic boundary rivalry, religious extremism	Polarization along ethnic and religious divide has heightened the challenges of community security. The south fact is the upsurge of militant groups across Nigeria, the movement of the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the South-South, Boko haram/Is wap in the North-East and the eastern security network (ESN) and the indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-East.
Political Security	Voter suppression, political thuggery, post election violence, human rights abuse, fake news and cyber bullying.	There is no doubt that Nigerians return to democratic rule has not been able to completely arrest bloody political chaos which has led to the assassination of key political figures such as Chief Bola

		Ige, Funsho Williams, Harry Marshal and Dikibo. These are agile alert of political insecurity.
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Source: Reviewed UNDP Human Development Report of 1994.

These are dynamic causes and trigger factors of security threats in Nigeria. Some statistics can serve well to convey the ubiquity of security threat in Nigeria. Nigeria's 2011 general election received high commendation amongst electoral observers in the management of the electoral process. It is ironic that, post election violence claimed 800 lives over three days in Northern Nigeria and displaced 65,000 people, making the elections the most violent in Nigeria's history.⁸ Just about everything that the Nigerian National Security Strategy did or attempted in strengthening security through international partnerships particularly in the Multi National Joint Task Force in collaboration with Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit, the reorganization of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Operation codenamed "Lafiya Dole", Nigeria's National Security is yet to enthrall citizens by assuring their safety and allaying their fears. An International Human Rights Organization under the aegis of Centre for Democracy and Development said at least 60,000 persons have been killed in 18 Northern States of Nigeria in the last ten years due to insecurity.⁹

Historically, it will be a cardinal error to review security threats and the gap in strategic response of Nigeria's National Security with a teleological view. National security threats in Nigeria are basically caused by man or group of persons using violence which indirectly causes threat. It is a super-organic threats and not sub-organic threats, resulting from natural forces, such as earthquakes and storms.¹⁰

The point to be emphasized here is that, Security Threat and Violence in Nigeria is fuelled by political violence, marginalization, corruption, herders/farmers clashes, land dispute, religious extremism and ethnic profiling created by radical changes in the polity which had almost been the routine from one decade to the next.

It is difficult to contextualize causes of security threats in Nigeria without appearing to demote its effects and responses. Security Threats in Northeast Nigeria is primarily terrorism. Between 2011 and 2022, Boko Haram a terrorist group was responsible for thousands of deaths in the fringes of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger due to its geographical location.¹¹ It is a long sea of sand and desert strip serving as a convenient

logistic base for illicit movement of small weapons. Borno is by far the most threatened state, in that; Boko Haram has caused over 35,000 deaths in this area.¹²

Environmental Hazards, is indeed one of the defining cause of security threat in Nigeria. The basic causes of such threats are geographical, demographic and socio-cultural threats. All these have direct linkages to human survival and along the process create environmental degradation resulting to threats to social well being and life. Nigeria practices less of green house farming, therefore solely dependent on the land (environment) for its survival. This over dependence on the land has heightened tension which had created farmer-herder crisis and inter ethnic boundary rivalries, which in the long run affected food production and supply. Between 2018 and 2020, on average 21.4 percent of population in Nigeria experienced hunger.¹³ These is largely caused by increasing growth in population and decline in food production attributed to farmers-herders crisis and boundary disputes along the green agricultural belt regions of Nigeria.

Conclusion

In summary, security threat is a challenge to national security. Security threat has a very real and direct impact on human rights with devastating consequences. An international human right group; Centre for Democracy and Development revealed an approximate number of people killed in the South-Eastern region within 2011-2021 as follows: 50 persons were killed in 2011; 92 in 2012; 68 in 2013; 22 in 2014; 50 in 2015; 225 in 2016; 325 people 2017; 160 in people in 2018. In 2019 the figure stood at 114; 110 in 2020 and; settled at 647 in 2021, which is 1,863.¹⁴ To be crystal clear, security threat is the biggest challenge to Nigeria because it has lingered for a while. Interestingly, giving the hindsight-foresight and experience of a Nigerian Military Chief, General Tukur Buratai, he states, "there is likelihood of terrorism persisting in Nigeria for another 20 years...all must cooperate to contain the lingering insecurity. Let there be collective action and responsibility."¹⁵

There is probably some merit in the argument that many Nigerians are unhealthily over impressed by their speculations that security is an all affairs of the national security of Nigeria and victory must be delivered alone by our armed forces and other sister security organizations. Security is a collective responsibility; there must be synergy, information gathering and sharing by our civil society and national security.

Radical strategic changes are required for combating security threat in the 21st century. We no longer need national security and defence structures constrained by current paradigm. We need well informed, strategic and a national security trained to think outside the box.

The dynamics of security threats requires huge budget to counter. Nigeria security organization must learn the art of making smart choices within an austere budget environment in order to meet up and sustain technological superiority in national security.

To sum up, Nigeria must revisit and reevaluate how defense budget and state security vote are directed. In order to balance our spending on the security structure, its readiness and improvement, there must be equity in Nigeria's security institution if the war against security threat must be won.

Recommendations

There is a scant room for doubt that the world is on the fast lane of technological transformation. Therefore, it deserves leadership that either catches up or a step ahead of the transformation. Advance leadership prowess is required from all units of governance by its leaders to create an environment where every citizen can excel and be their best in their desired areas of passion without ethnic or religious prejudices. There must be a deliberate tactical revolution on Nigeria's national security that must be precise in protecting life and property through kinetic effectiveness and ability to carry out its duties professionally with little if any human loss, only facilities, material assets and not civilians nor security operatives.

The health of a nation is the wealth of the nation. Nigeria must standardize its health institutions to meet international best practices. Nigeria must be up to speed in closing on the gap in international health regulation of 2015 (IHR) by training of dedicated technical health officers across International Health Regulation in its ministries department and agencies (MDA's) on the importance of the existing guiding policies. The Federal Republic of Nigeria must give accent to Nigerian public health act bill of 2013.

However, the readily and quality of all the above mentioned must seat easily on a qualitative knowledge production. There must be a good education reform from the base to the apex of Nigeria research and academic institution. A country can only be as developed as its research and educational system. Our school curriculum must be regularly reviewed to reflect and provide solutions to contemporary realities. Our schools must train its student how to make smart choices in this fast dynamic world; student must be mentored on accountability and how to be productive within an austere budget environment. Because knowledge is meant to be an organized combination of ideas, rule, procedure and information.

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Explaining Internal Security Crisis in Nigeria: Factors and Nature 1960-2019

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Abstract

This article is a discussion of security Challenges and its cause factors in Nigeria from 1960 to 2019, with the aim and conscious effort to investigating with the use of relevant sources that the climate change; failure of democracy, ethnocentrism in particular are major factors to the issues of internal violence, terrorism in the nation. Democracy in general sense is used to describe a system of government in which the ultimate power or sovereignty rest with the people among others. Because the final decision in a democratic setting is believed to rest with the people, it is expected that sovereign power welded by the majority should translate to good governance that will better the lots of the people. Climate Change as a major factor is not only limited to Nigeria but the globe at large. Scholars since independence have focused on corruption, mismanagement and religion bigotry as the ordeal without taking time to study the root of these cankerworms. Ethnocentrism encompasses the whole idea of racism; and evidently, it has become a curse to Nigeria aspiration towards peace, unity and development. To this end, this article emphasized

the cardinal of insecurity as Ethnocentrism, Climate Change and Failure of Democracy.

Keywords: Democracy, Ethnocentrism, Climate-change, Security, Crisis and Insecurity

Introduction

Generally, it is most accepted that, any meaningful attempt at understanding democracy proceed from the ancient definition of democracy as peoples' rule. The Greek words demos and kratia mean people and rule or authority respectively. Therefore, democracy refers to "rule by the people". Abraham Lincoln gave what has been the most prominent definition of democracy in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania as government of the people, by the people, for the people". Belief of Abraham Lincoln on equality of all men motivated this definition. By this definition, people are seen as subject and object of democracy. This definition of democracy by Lincoln stresses the principle of equality since all men are supposedly created equal. Thus, a democratic State is often said to be one wherein the citizens have equal access to justice, job, power, privilege, etc.

Democracy is built on the "equality of citizens, the freedom to associate with one another for the realization of their ideals and the defence and promotion of her interests; and the freedom of these citizens to choose between the different political platforms of various political parties and candidates and see to the actualization of the platforms, they have voted their choices Win"¹⁴ The most interesting things about democracy are:

1. It provides a platform for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair election
2. It creates forum for active participation of the people, , as citizens in politics arid civic life
3. Protection of human rights of all citizens and
4. A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.

The Earth's climate has changed throughout the history of man. In the last 650,000 years, there have been seven cycles of glacial movement and retreat coupled with the abrupt end of the last ice age about 7,000 years

¹⁴Beetham, D. (1994) "Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit," in D. Beetham (ed) *Defining and Measuring Democracy*. London: Sage Publications

ago which marked the beginning of the modern climate era and of human civilization and development. Majority of these climate changes are credited to very small disparities in Earth's orbit that change the amount of solar energy that is received on the planet (NASA, 2017). The recent warming tendency is of particular significance because most of it is very probable human induced and proceeding at a rate that is unparalleled in the past 1,300 years.¹⁵

In a speech to graduates of the US coastguard academy (New London, Connecticut, 20th May 2015:), Barack Obama states:

Rising seas are already swallowing low-lying islands, from Bangladesh to Pacific islands ... Globally, we could see a rise in climate refugees. And I guarantee you the coastguard will have to respond. Elsewhere, more intense droughts will exacerbate shortages of water and food, increase competition for resources, and create the potential for mass migrations and new tensions. All of which is why the Pentagon calls climate change a "threat multiplier." Understand, climate change did not cause the conflicts we see around the world. Yet what we also know is that severe drought helped to create the instability in Nigeria that was exploited by the terrorist group Boko Haram. It's now believed that drought and crop failures and high food prices helped fuel the early unrest in Syria, which descended into civil war in the heart of the Middle East.

In this speech, Obama draws connections between climate changes, drought and desertification, and the outbreak of conflict. He illustrates carefully the causal chains connecting these phenomena: a drought, agricultural depletions, large-scale migration, political unrest, and insecurity in the northern Nigeria. Drought is also linked, in a different context, to the growth of insecurity in Nigeria. Obama is clear that climate change is not a direct cause of the conflicts: 'Understand, climate change did not cause the conflicts we see around the world'. He does suggest that climate change is related (through complex, indirect causal pathways - a 'threat multiplier' effect) to political violence and conflict, but is categorical that climate change is not a direct cause. It could be that he does not want to suggest that climate change is causing conflicts because of its implications for the culpability of political actors for the conflicts (e.g. ISIS and Asad's government). He is thus being cautious

¹⁵Akande, A. et al., (2017). Geospatial Analysis of Extreme Weather Events in Nigeria (1985- 2015) Using Self-Organizing Maps. *Advances in Meteorology*.
<https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/8576150>

about the extent to which he draws causal links between climate change, civil war, and outbreaks of violence.¹⁶

The dawn of the 21st century, no doubt, brought in its wake new challenges of incorporating the diverse ethnic groups into a stable and nationalistic community; redressing of economic injustice and the chronic problems of corruption and issues of development. These challenges have become more confronting for Nigeria to bear especially with increase threat to its internal security. Several scholars of various imports had adduced the fundamental reason to ethnicity.¹⁷

Climate Change as a Catalyst to Insecurity

Nigeria has a tropical climate with two precipitation regimes: low precipitation in the North (shortgrass and marginal savanna) and high precipitation in parts of the Southwest and Southeast (rainforest and mangrove). This can lead to aridity, persistent drought and desertification in the north; and erosion and large scale flooding in the south.¹⁸ As such, while climate change is a national phenomenon, the challenges associated with it vary across the country.¹⁹ Vulnerability analysis demonstrates that states in the north experience higher degrees of vulnerability to climate change than those in the south.²⁰

No one knows the full security implications of climate change. Some analyses have implicated shifting weather in violent social collapses across the centuries, from medieval China to the collapse of the Mayan civilization to recent events in Darfur. Forty percent of all intra-state conflicts in the last six decades involved disputes over limited natural resources, two dozen of them since 1990. Not all had links to climate change, but adding resource disputes to the mix generally doubles the average length and relapse rates of civil violence. Conflicts over resources have long been a depressingly familiar part of Nigeria's social

¹⁶Abdulkadir, A. et al. (2017). Climate change and its implications on human existence in Nigeria: a review. *Bayero Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences*, 10(2), 152-158
<https://www.ajol.info/index.php/bajopas/article/viewFile/170772/160195>

¹⁷Abdulkadir, A. et al. (2017). Climate change and its implications on human existence in Nigeria: a review...

¹⁸Akande, A. et al., (2017). Geospatial Analysis of Extreme Weather Events in Nigeria (1985- 2015)...

¹⁹Federal Ministry of Environment (2014). United Nations Climate Change Nigeria, National Communication (NC). C 2. 2014.

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Madu, I. A. (2012). *Spatial vulnerability of rural households to climate change in Nigeria: Implications for internal security*. Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at The University of Texas at Austin. <https://www.strausscenter.org/research-reports?download=105:spatial-vulnerability-of-rural-household-to-climate-change-in-nigeria>

order. According to one estimate, communal violence, most of it involving contested resources, killed at least 10,000 Nigerians in less than a decade. Again, links to climate change can be more or less strong. A case in point is Nigeria's frequent farmer-herder conflicts. In a pattern seen across the Sahel since the thirty-year drought, feed and water shortages caused partly by desertification and drought have sent nomadic pastoralists, most of them ethnic Fulani, wandering south, outside their normal grazing routes. At the same time, a mix of weather-related factors has pushed farmers to cultivate more land each year, leaving wanderers fewer places to water and graze their stock.²¹

Climate change is exacerbating drought and aridity, affecting the entire savanna landscape of Northern Nigeria and resulting in a decline of socio-economic activities around Lake Chad. According to some estimates, two-thirds of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara states could turn desert or semi-desert in the twenty-first century.²² Climate change can pose threats to the security situation in Nigeria through conflict over resources. This is exacerbated by increasing water and food scarcity.²³ Desert encroachment and steadily depleting vegetation and grazing resources in the North have prompted massive emigration and resettlement of people to areas less threatened by desertification. This has exacerbated communal clashes among herdsmen and farmers and inter-ethnic clashes, some of which have turned deadly.²⁴

State of affairs since the beginning of the new millennium on security, arising from climate change, has brought political, economic, social, religious and environmental adverse consequences yet to overcome. Agriculture: Over 70 percent of the country's population is engaged in agriculture as their primary occupation and means of livelihood.²⁵ Agricultural produce in Nigeria is mostly rain fed. Unpredictable rainfall

²¹ Madu, I. A. (2012). *Spatial vulnerability of rural households to climate change in Nigeria: Implications for internal security...*

²² Sayne, A. (2011). *Climate change adaptation and conflict in Nigeria*. Washington, DC: USIP. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Climate_Change_Nigeria.pdf

²³ Madu, I. A. (2012). *Spatial vulnerability of rural households to climate change in Nigeria: Implications for internal security...*

²⁴ Elisha, I. et al. (2017). Evidence of climate change and adaptation strategies among grain farmers in Sokoto State, Nigeria. *IOSR Journal of Environmental Science, Toxicology and Food Technology (IOSR-JESTFT)*, 11(3), 1-7. <http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jestft/papers/vol11-issue%203/Version-2/A1103020107.pdf>

²⁵ Onwutuebe, C. J. (2019). Patriarchy and Women Vulnerability to Adverse Climate Change in Nigeria. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019825914> SAGE

variation makes it difficult for farmers to plan their operations.²⁶ Higher temperatures, lower rainfall, droughts and desertification reduce farmlands, lower agricultural productivity and affect crop yields. Increased rainfall intensity in the coastal region, sea level rise, flooding and erosion of farmland will also lower agricultural production.²⁷

Climate change affects the nature and characteristics of freshwater resources on which many Nigerians depend. Sea level rise and extreme weather will affect the ability to fish. The viability of inland fisheries is also threatened by increased salinity and shrinking rivers and lakes.²⁸ Unpredictable rainfall variation, heat stress and drought can adversely affect food production and result in food shortages. The high vulnerability of states in the north to climate change poses a serious threat to food security throughout the country. Drought conditions in parts of Northern Nigeria have also resulted in less drinking water. Erosion and excessive wind reduces the amount of forestry produce such as wood and cane. Forests are under significant pressure not only from climate change but also from increasing populations and greater demand for forest resources. Climate change has serious implications for human health in Nigeria. Direct health impacts stem from extreme weather events such as heat waves . Indirect effects of climate change can arise from malnutrition due to food shortages; the spread of infectious disease and food- and water-borne illness (e.g. typhoid fever, cholera); increased air pollution; and from higher temperatures correlated with increased cases of meningitis.²⁹

Given the importance of the agricultural sector to livelihoods and the economy in Nigeria, problems with crop yields and productivity can have an adverse effect on gross domestic product. In addition, extreme weather events, such as floods can undermine economic growth through production and infrastructure losses and the need for extraordinary spending.

Failure of Democracy as a Catalyst for Insecurity in Nigeria

²⁶ Federal Ministry of Environment (2014). United Nations Climate Change Nigeria. National Communication...

²⁷ Ogbuabor, J. E. and Egwuchukwu, E. I. (2017). The Impact of Climate Change on the Nigerian Economy. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 7(2), 217-223. <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/361739>

²⁸ Ebele, N. E. and Emodi, N. V. (2016). Climate Change and its Impact in Nigerian Economy. *Journal of Scientific Research & Reports*, 10(6), 1-13. <http://www.journaljsrr.com/index.php/JSRR/article/view/21917/40737>

²⁹ Abdulkadir, A. et al. (2017). Climate change and its implications on human existence in Nigeria: a review...

Survival of democracy rests on three tripods: good leadership, respect for the rule of law and due processes, transparency and accountability to the electorates. Success or failure of any system including democracy can be measured through these variables. Nigeria is rated world fourth largest democracy. It set precedence by breaking from her colonial constitutional heritage, rejecting Britain's parliamentary form of democracy it inherited at independence in 1960 and chose in its first wholly Nigerian made constitution to follow the American model of presidential system. With the adoption of American presidential system, Nigeria has to devise structural changes to cope with questions of unity and stability, to overcome obstacles inherent in introducing a complex version of democracy into a massively illiterate population. This year May 29th 2016, is sixteen (16) years of pretence by Nigeria to be a democracy, whereas, by a lay man's definition of ideal democracy, the journey of sixteen years is nothing but a scam.

The fraudulent system that pretends to be democracy has in the last 16 years brought untold hardship to the generality of Nigeria citizens through unimaginable insatiable appetite for corrupt practices of our leaders. Over time, corruption has been defined as the diversion of public funds into private accounts, the betrayal of public trust and perhaps the perversion of the course of justice. Corruption in public life as seen as "the violation of public duty in exchange for (or in anticipation of) personal pecuniary gain, power or prestige". Such and illegal act constitute a departure from ethical or moral standards. Such a violation of the law include such practices as bribery of public offices, falsification of public records, the embezzlement of public funds, diversion of public funds earmarked for providing security, poverty alleviation, youth empowerment, job. wealth creation etc. All these have characterized Nigeria's practice of democracy over the years. "The pervasiveness of political corruption in Africa and Nigeria in particular, constitute a fundamental obstacle to the realization national development agenda". The most basic necessities of life such as roads, pipe borne water, security, electricity, good health have eluded the people. Several trillion of naira earned from oil proceeds cannot be accounted for. The crop of our leaders representing us in the name of democracy have turn themselves to liability rather than assets. For example the national assembly made up of representatives of the people, that is supposed to enact laws for good governance has compromised its constitutional roles. The Nigeria National Assembly in the year 2012, 2013 and 2014 budgets allocated to itself 25 percent of the total overhead cost of the country's annual budget in addition to constituency allowances and sidekicks its members realized from their so called "oversight functions". No wonder elections though which most of them got to the national assembly was marred with series of irregularities ranging from rigging, bribing and

violence. These elected officials steal our jointly owned resources, afflict the helpless masses and maneuver the law to their side. They govern for themselves and pretend to be for the nation and its people. The nation's economy has refused to grow because of high rate of corruption and mismanagement. Sometimes ago, World Bank publication showed that a whopping sum of \$250 billion has been pilfered from the Nigerian economy since 1960. Fifty- five years³⁰ of independence Nigeria is still being tagged as underdeveloped. The corrupt attitudes of our rulers have created deep feeling of distrust among Nigerians. "A fundamental feature of contemporary Nigerian democracy is the deep and profound distrust of Nigerians for their elected representatives". While the pursuit of welfare of the generality of people is viewed as epicentre of democracy, reverse is the case in most African countries. In Nigeria for example, democracy is a representation of betrayal and inhuman deprivation.³¹

Insecurity is a global challenge as no tangible development can take place where there is no adequate security. Economy can only grow when there is peace and security of lives and property. Whatever the misgivings against the military rule, it is now obvious that military fared well in keeping insecurity appreciably low compared to the successive democratic rule in Nigeria whose era have unleashed an unprecedented level of insecurity in the nation. The inability of civilian administration to address chronic unemployment, and millions of displaced persons here and there poverty and socio economic issues brought us to this sorry state of insecurity in the country. Unemployment has made millions of Nigerian youth available for all manners of crime ranging from robbery, cyber-crime, kidnapping for ransom and even terrorism. Extortions and other corrupt practices have reduced our security agencies to accomplice in crime as Nigerians prefer to settle grievance through other means than to seek redress through any of these agencies. Most recently some Ijaw youth in the Niger Delta tagged under the umbrella of Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) since March this year almost take the governance of Niger State through it vowed vandalization policy in pipelines and other facilities. With this nefarious act, the state is losing millions of oil revenue daily.³²

Nigeria's democracy has penetrated the judiciary. In an ideal system, judiciary plays important role as arbiter in all areas of disputes. It is an indispensable complement of democracy. Judiciary in Nigeria has been

³⁰ Beetham, D. (1994) "Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit,"...

³¹ Human Development Report (2002) Deepening Democracy in Fragment World, United Nations Development Programme UNDP Oxford University Press, New York.

³².Awa, Eme, (1996) "Democracy in Nigeria: A Political Scientist's View" On Oyeleye Oyediran (ed) *Governance and Development in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor Billy J. Dudley*: Univ. of Ibadan Press, Ibadan pp.2 and 3

subjected to the whims and caprices of the executive arm and those found guilty of financial and other crimes against the nation-state. The provision of independence of judiciary has been compromised as justice are being miscarried through financial inducement or coercion. Nigeria was never perfect; the past is always rated better than the present. There was no past government in Nigeria that was not rated better than its successor in Dept those in government that will tell you they are doing better compared to the administration that handed over to them. Since the return to civil rule in 1999, there was no time we had it so smooth. Government workers are left pauperized due to unpaid salaries, Osun State workers are being owed up to seven months by the State Governor Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola. In Ekiti State all the civil servants are all on strike since 1st of June 2016 for six month salaries and allowances.³³

Ethnocentrism and Insecurity in Nigeria

Ethnic diversity or pluralism usually inclines to conflict and coercive political behaviour in a society.³⁴ The ethnic conflicts are usually struggles and wars of subordination, rebellion and hegemony. These are characteristically struggles for autonomy and freedom from exploitation by small groups from large groups, for example the ethnic struggles that led to the break-up of the Soviet Union, or by large groups under the thumb of powerful minorities, for example, the wars in Rwanda between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi powerful minority.³⁵

Taking it from the focus of the paper; the amalgamation of the Southern and the Northern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914, by the British colonial administrator, Lord Lugard, unified the disparate ethno-nationalities into the nation Nigeria. This increased the frequency of group and individual interactions in a multiethnic polity, exacerbating the phenomenon of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. These ethnic conflicts have been generated from conditions of contested claims over access to or control of scarce resources, opposing perceptions by multiple users or potential beneficiaries, of limited resources and politico-economic dividends of government and governance.³⁶ The earliest near riot situation that brewed between the Hausa settlers and the indigenes of Jos area for ascendancy was in 1932. This smoldering ethnic struggle culminated in the Jos riot of 1945. The riot was an ethnic conflict between the Hausa and the Igbo that lasted for two days. Two people were killed with many

³³ Awa, Eme, (1996) "Democracy in Nigeria: A Political Scientist's View" On Oyeleye Oyediran (ed)...

³⁴ Nnoli, O. (2003) "Citizenship and Diversity in Federal Systems". Paper Presented at the 14th Biennial Congress of African Association of Political Science Durban South Africa

³⁵ Otite. O, 2000, *Ethnic Pluralism, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Sheneson C.I. Ltd.

³⁶ Otite. O, 2000, *Ethnic Pluralism, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria...*

injured and considerable property was destroyed or damaged. The Igbo masterminded general strike of 1945 occasioned severe hardship for the Hausa who readily, gulped the British colonial administration's insinuation to catalyze the riot.³⁷ There was also the Kano violence of 1953 that erupted between the Hausa and Igbo. The genesis of this violence was the contentious issue of self-government in 1956, but the Hausa-Fulani led ethnic groups in the north were strongly opposed to that date. At the height of the tension between the northern and southern leaders violence ensued which mainly engulfed the Igbo ethnic group, which has, over the years, become the traditional victims of Northern hostility because they are the major socio-economic competitors of the Hausa. This conflict lasted for four days leaving thirty-six dead and two hundred and forty-one wounded (Northern Region of Nigeria Report 1953). Another ethnic uprising of note occurred between the Tiv and the Hausa -Fulani settlers and their supporters in the Middle Belt in 1960.³⁸ Consequent to the Hausa-Fulani ethnic majority in northern Nigeria, Tarka foisted the United Middle Belt congress as a rival political party to the Northern Peoples Congress, to ensure the liberation of the Tiv from socio-economic domination. The United Middle Belt Congress had a landslide victory over its chief opponent, the Northern People Congress in Tiv land to the displeasure of the Hausa-Fulani political and traditional elites. The Nupe-Yoruba conflict in Kwara State in June-July 2000 is a conflict reminiscent of the defence of ethnic interest. Nupe and Yoruba farmers had claims over a small piece of fertile land (Fadama). According to July 31 publication of the "Nigerian Tribune", two farmers, one from Share and the other from Isaragi, had interest in the land. The two fighters were perceived as representatives of the Yoruba and Nupe ethnic groups and this resulted in violent inter-ethnic clashes leading to loss of several lives and property. The Zango-Kataf conflict in Kaduna state was caused by the decision to relocate the ZangoKataf district market to a new and more spacious and accessible site with opportunities for expansion (Akinteye Wuye and Ashafa, 1999). As the new site was located in Kataf area, the relocation proposal was welcomed by them, while it was vehemently opposed by the Hausa community in Zango. Some kataf, women who went to the site for market activities on 6 February, 1992, were harassed and assaulted by members of the Hausa community in Zango town. Kataf men were provoked and the ensuing conflicts claimed many lives and property.²⁶³⁹ The above are random selection of the of numerous violence and crisis that persist in Nigeria to date.

³⁷ Otite, O. (1996). "On the Sociological Study of Corruption in Nigeria" in Odekunle, E. (ed) Corruption in Development, Ibadan University of Ibadan Press

³⁸ Otite, O. (1996). "On the Sociological Study of Corruption in Nigeria"...

³⁹ Otite, O. (1996). "On the Sociological Study of Corruption in Nigeria"...

Conclusion

The “three musketeers” rocking the security of Nigeria are discussed in this paper knowing well the presence of other threats to security in Nigeria. It is needless to mention that crisis recorded from 1960 had root in the three factors discussed; nevertheless they breed other factors militating against peace and unity in the nation. Studies have shown that migration and brain drain are among the implications of the result of climate change; ethnocentrism and failure of democracy in Nigeria. Authors and writers have done a great deal in showing that irregular migration steers and triggers trans-border crime, trafficking, brain-drain and abuse of human. The findings of these authors are contributive yet it could only be tackled by dealing with the causes of irregular migration that are the focus of this paper. Taking cognizance of the three pillars of security crisis in Nigeria; one could argue that the first coup that aborted the progress of the first republic in Nigeria to the Nigerian Civil War, which are the fundamental to other crisis will continue to hunt the nation if more radical measures are not taken, to salvage the future.

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Globalization And Conflict In Nigeria: The Proliferation Of Small Arms And Light Weapons In Plateau State

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Abstract

Globalization after the end of the cold war dashed the hope for international peace and security as it gives wide range of opportunities for trans-border movement, transnational crimes and proliferation of small arms and light weapons across national boundaries and within national territories. Plateau State is a victim of the proliferation of SALWs within and from without its territories. One of the major threats bedeviling Plateau State's peace and security in the 21st century is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The State since 2001 has passed through several faces of conflicts and criminal activities, which have persisted till date. This paper examines the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Plateau State since 2001. It also examines the connection and implications of these small arms and light weapons on violent conflicts and crimes in the state. The study adopted a qualitative research design, with a historical methodology, which is based on the use of primary and secondary data. The primary data emanates from field work and oral interviews while the secondary data were collected from textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, electronic media and the internet. Readily available and easy to use, small arms and light weapons have been the sole tool of violence in almost all conflicts and criminal operations in Plateau State. These weapons, have taken a heavy toll on human lives, women and children accounting for more of the casualties. The findings of the study reveal that the proliferation of SALWs is an enabler for insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and other crimes in Plateau State, Nigeria. The study recommends that there should be strict monitoring and surveillance of all borders by the security in Plateau State and at the larger extend Nigeria's illegal access routes should be block. The paper concluded that the supply and demand factors of SALWs are

interwoven, addressing one without the other will disproportionately exacerbate the fight on security challenges; thus stringent national arms control strategy is very important to regulate SALW proliferation.

Keywords: Globalization; Nigeria, Plateau State; Proliferation; SALWs

Introduction

Nigeria as a country has undergone diverse violent conflicts; these are ethnic conflicts, religious clashes, political tensions, communal conflicts etc. The nexus between small arms and security has been established among scholars. Literature abounds on the national security challenge caused by the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria. Studying security threats and having knowledge on the proliferation of small arms and light weapon is just a bid to consider its effect on human security, especially in Plateau State, Nigeria. This stems from the fact that Plateau State has become a large market and destination accommodating trans-border arms merchants and dealers. The ineffectiveness of government policies to curtail the illicit distribution of arms and light weapons in Nigeria presents a threat to the livelihood of citizens in the country. SALW is not just a threat to the citizens' fundamental right, it also undermines human development. The escalation of violent conflict is a show of the availability of small arms and light weapons in the hands of the perpetrators of crimes and conflict merchants. The threat to human security in Plateau State owes to the fact that Nigeria shares the three stages of the organised trafficking of small arms and light weapons in West Africa region: origin, transit and destination.¹

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) remain the most desirable out of all categories of

weapons known to man. This is as a result of the cost and handling as they are cheap, easily assessable, and easy to use as compared with heavy weapons.² Additionally, SALWs present its users with the opportunity of variation of use. Put differently, Small Arms and Light Weapons provide users with a wide range of users including defense, etc. This is the reason behind the large number of SALWs in circulation in most parts of Nigeria including Plateau State.

According to Fleshman and Jacqmin, Nigeria has over ten million SALWs in circulation, in which a fraction of these weapons in circulation are found in Plateau State.³ This however creates an opportunity for individuals with criminal intentions to employ such weapons to fulfill

their intents.⁴ This in turn creates room for the transference of SALWs through unprotected and porous borders. The security risks posed by the wide availability of SALWs are evident in the number of people killed in the state since 2001, when conflict broke out between Christians and Muslims. According to Malam SALWs kill between 500,000 and 700,000 people annually;⁵ in Plateau State it kills over 1,000 yearly following the end of the violent conflict, these killings are attributable to farmer-herder conflicts, criminal invasion of villages by militia groups known as bandits and reprisal attacks.

Ayuba and Okafor opine that conflicts are invigorated due to the abundance of SALWs procured by individuals, religious groups, criminal non-actors and national governments, with state-owned financial resources.⁶ This is the experience of Plateau State as it has witnessed different dimensions of ethnic and religious conflicts since 2001. Some of the conflicts that have occurred in the State include the 2001 Jos conflict which spiral to other parts of the state, the Yelwa Shendam conflict, Wase, Kanam, Langtang North and Namu conflicts between 2004 and 2015 and a host of others issues such as the Dogo Nahawa genocide of 2011, the Yelwa Zangam invasion in 2021, the incessant Irigwe killings and so on. These conflicts are fueled by the constant demand, availability and circulation of SALWs in the hands of non state actors, individuals and criminals in Plateau State. This study therefore, examines the proliferation of these arms and weapons in the state since 2001 and how it has affected lives and property.

Conceptual Clarifications

Globalization

Anthony McGrew states that globalization constitutes a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation states (and by implication the societies) which make up the modern world system. It defines a process through which events, decisions and activities in one part of the world can come to have a significant consequence for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe.⁷ Philip Cerny furthermore suggests that globalization redefines the relationship between territoriality and authority, shifting authority from the level of the state to supranational and sub-national units, perhaps offering more to grasp onto in operational terms but precious little in causal terms.⁸

Robert Z. Lawrence is emphatic in stating that globalization shifts authority—to specifically the local and the regional level.⁹ Cerny adds elsewhere that: Globalization is defined here as a set of economic and political structures and processes deriving from the changing character of the goods and assets that comprise the base of the international political economy—in particular, the increasing structural differentiation of those goods and assets.¹⁰

Alternatively, globalization might be characterized functionally by an intrinsically related series of economic phenomena. These include the liberalization and deregulation of markets, privatization of assets, retreat of state functions (particularly welfare ones), diffusion of technology, cross-national distribution of manufacturing production (foreign direct investment), and the integration of capital markets. In its narrowest formulation, the term refers to the worldwide spread of sales, production facilities, and manufacturing processes, all of which reconstitute the international division of labor. Globalization involves the compression of space such that distance is less of a factor than it used to be in terms of knowledge, communication and movement. Geography and territory is undermined and things start to develop at a level which is global and more than and above inter-national relations.

Roland Robertson, a professor of sociology at the University of Aberdeen, was the first person who defined globalization as "the understanding of the world and the increased perception of the world as a whole."¹¹ Albrow Martin and Elizabeth King define globalization as "all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society."¹² In his paper "The Consequences of Modernity", Giddens Anthony define the concept thus: "the globalization can be defined as the intensification of social relations throughout the world, linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are formed as a result of events that occur many miles away and vice versa."¹³ Globalization can be linked to the local, the national and the regional. On the one hand, a connection is made between social and economic relationships and networks, organized on a local and / or national, on the other hand, it connects social and economic relationships and networks crystallized on wider scale the regional and global interactions.

Conflict

Conflict is difficult to define, because it occurs in many different settings and facets of life. The essence of conflict seems to be disagreement, contradiction, or incompatibility. Thus, conflict refers to any situation in which there are incompatible Goals, Cognitions, or Emotions within or between individuals or groups that lead to opposition or antagonistic interaction.¹⁴

Conflict refers to more than just overt behaviour. Concentrating only upon its behavioural manifestation is an extremely limiting exercise.¹⁵ The three-dimensional conception of conflict emphasizes the need to consider the situation in which parties (individuals, groups, organisations or nations) come to possess incompatible goals, their structure of interaction and the nature of their goals.¹⁶

As per the traditional definition of conflict, it is the result of opposing interests involving scarce resources, goal divergence and frustration. Conflict is not defined simply in terms of violence (behaviour) or hostility (attitudes), but also includes incompatibility or differences in issue position. Such a definition is designed to include conflicts outside the traditional military sphere and is based on behavioural dimensions.¹⁷

Small Arms and Light Weapons

Small Arms and Light Weapons: for the purpose of this paper it is referred to as SALW. Although there is no universally acceptable definition of SALW, the report of the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on small arms in 1997 sees SALW as: weapons ranging from knife and machete to those weapons that are less potent than the UN register of conventional arms like mortars below the caliber of 100mm. they are designed for use by one person and manufactured with military specifications. Light weapons in the order hand can be used by several persons working as a team.¹⁸

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention defines 'Small arms' as arms used by one person, and which include firearms and other destructive arms or devices such as exploding bombs, incendiary bombs or gas bombs, grenades, rocket launchers, missiles, missile systems or landmines; revolvers and pistols with automatic loading; rifles and carbines; machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns.¹⁹ The convention considers 'Light weapons' as portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team, and which include heavy machine guns, portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted portable anti-aircraft cannons; portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; portable anti-tank missile launchers or rocket launchers; portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; and mortars with a calibre of less than 100 millimeters.²⁰

In examining the proliferations of SALWS in Plateau, it is pertinent to state that the challenge to security of lives and property fall under the freedom from fear and want dimension of the human security concept. This is because arms and light weapons are the basic requirement to secure and/or disrupt the daily activities of citizens. Security threats from inceptions of states in the world traditionally came from other states, whereas today security is challenged by domestic factors within states and it is codified by the era of globalization that renders states borders useless. Traditional studies on security usually focus on the state and/or nation. It is majorly concerned with defending the territorial integrity of nation's states and the resource controlled at their disposal without cognizance for the people they represent. The states focus mainly on protecting the lives and properties of the political elites while the poor are neglected to suffer security problems. It is displayed in their nonchalant attitude to the violence, conflict, disaster and disease which common average person struggle to overcome in his daily activities.

SALWs Categorizations: Article 1 of ECOWAS Convention on SALW, Ammunition and other Related Materials, classified light weapons as portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team and which includes: heavy machine guns; Portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted; Portable anti-aircraft cannons; Portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; Portable anti-tank missiles launchers or rocket launchers; Portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; Mortars with a caliber of less than 100 millimeters.²¹

1.3 The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Plateau State

Over the last two decades, Nigeria records communal conflict, ethno-religious violence, political crisis, civil unrest, these events made Nigeria a huge destination market for illegal sale and use of SALWs. The demand for SALW in Plateau State has increased thereby stimulating the proliferation and easy availability of these weapons. The failure of government at the national level to ensure adequate security for individual in a particular region of the country and the need to protect their lives and property is tantamount to the proliferations of these kinds of weapons (SALWs). The legal SALW for authorised usage have been transferred to illegal hands for illicit usage, especially in terms of crisis just like the ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Wase, Langtang North and others.

The unsecured stockpile of arms by security agencies give rise to leakages of SALWs in to the country;²² in 2002, Nigeria records 1 and 3 million SALWs including lawful chattels of arms with the members of armed forces and the police and majority in the custody of civilians. The 80% of SALWs with civilians were illegal acquisition defying strict regulations.²³ It is worth mentioning that SALWs do not just spread all around, but where demand is placed. Therefore, from 2001, the covert popular demand of arms in Plateau State by Christians and Muslims resulted in the proliferation of SALW. While some scholars centre on the supply chain of SALW like ready sellers, profitability and border porosity others focus on demand reasons like crises, crime, violent conflict, armed robbery, riots and civil unrests.²⁴ Estimated 640 million SALWs are in circulation world-wide. 100 million are revealed to be in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 30 million SALWs while 8 million have their nest in West Africa alone and more than 70% of about eight to ten million illicit weapons in West Africa sub region are in Nigeria, while 5% of these weapons are in private and wrong hands in Plateau State.²⁵ Investigation into the cause of increase in the proliferation of SALWs in the State reveals that the contestation for ownership of Jos by the Jasawa community from 1994 and counter action by the indigenous groups the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom led to stockpile of arms across the two

decades of the 21st century.²⁶ This act unveiled the upsurge of SALWs and local production, making the arms readily available and affordable.

The presidential committee on small arms and light weapons revealed that 60% of the illegal arms in the south East Zone are made locally. Professor Aloysius Okolie the PRESCOM south east coordinator also said some communities are known for their natural fabrication of arms.²⁷ He added that politicians are art of arms proliferation in the area of importation and fabrication. In his survey, political leaders import 40% of arms. Maritime border is a conduit for the escalation of SALWs proliferation from the Sahel region of Africa taking advantage of the porosity of northern borders and southwest borders of Nigeria.²⁸ The recurrent seizure of illegal arms and weapons across Nigerian borders by security agencies reveal the troubling rate of weapon proliferation in Nigeria. Today, the media is replete with alarming reports of modern small arms and light weapon seized by security operatives at ports, borders or highways.²⁹ In 2017, the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) claimed that a syndicate based in Turkey has been discovered to be behind illegal arm imports into the country. Since the beginning of 2022, Nigeria Custom Service disclosed that four batches of arms illegally imported into the country were from Turkey. These include the interception of 661 in February, 440 arms in June; 1,100 in September and 470 arms in September making 2671 arms.³⁰

In August, 2010, a commercial driver carrying 25AK-47 riffles allegedly smuggled into the country from Cameroon was arrested by security forces in Maiduguri. Jos, Plateau state where ethno-religious conflicts has caused unprecedented damage to human security was the destination of these arms.³¹ Governor Simon Bako Lalong of Plateau State highlighted the enormity that led to serious threats to security in the country, which he believes was the proliferation of small arms and light weapons by farmers and Fulani herders. Governor Lalong in a press briefing avers that "today, we are now seeing the hazard of allowing people do open grazing here and there. But they (herders) also want solution; by the time you explain to them, they also want to stay in one place, they would also want to keep away from carrying AK-47. I'm not justifying anybody to carry AK-47 but don't forget that in the course of our deliberations and investigations, it was not only Fulani herdsmen that were carrying AK-47, even farmers were carrying AK-47."³²

Similarly, the police high command, on Wednesday June 2011, paraded suspects who specialized in manufacturing locally fabricated AK-47 rifles in Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State.³³ The rifles were equivalent to foreign AK47 rifles in lethal value and sophistication. The two suspects connected with the illegal local production of the AK-47 rifles, Joe Michael and Iliya Bulus, were arrested for alleged fabrication of the weapons.³⁴ These arm fabricators must have clients/buyers across

the state, who might be criminal gangs, arm robbers and even kidnappers.

In 2021, James Ibrahim of the Punch Newspaper reported that an arm smuggler, Likita Abubakar, 35 years old, was apprehended in Nasarawa State on his way to Jos.³⁵ Abubakar was caught with 53 magazines, over 260 live ammunition, one motorcycle and N38,500. A joint team of the Police and the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) apprehended him at Alushi junction in Akwanga, while he confessed his colleagues were on their way on motorcycles to Jos in Plateau State.³⁶

Nasir Ayitogo on 28th April, 2022 reported in the Premium Times that Operatives of the Force Intelligence Bureau Intelligence Response Team (FIB-IRT), in a sting operation arrested four notorious arm dealers and recovered 57 AK47 rifles and a large catchment of ammunition in Jos, Plateau State.³⁷ The suspects, Hamza Zakari (aka Hamzo) aged 20 years, Abubakar Muhammed (aka Fancy) aged 22 years, Umar Ibrahim aged 25 years and Muhammed Abdulkarim (aka Dan-Asabe) aged 37 years, all males and residents of Jos, were arrested following a credible intelligence on their nefarious activities in Jos and its environs. The suspects were identified as one of the major links for the supply of arms and ammunition to criminal elements terrorizing the state and some other parts of the country.³⁸

In Nigeria, the use of small arms and light weapons dominate most conflicts. A good number of terrorist attacks in Nigeria, is traced to the delimitation of small arms resulting in the escalation and intensification of these conflicts, the series of bomb blast recorded in Jos, the Plateau State capital were massive, for example, the first act of using Improvised Explosive Device (IED) by the Boko Haram sect to attack innocent civilian population in Jos North was on Christmas Eve of 2011, which killed about 50 people in Angwan Rukuba and Kabong of Jos North LGA while over 80 people were terribly injured.³⁹ Subsequent attacks went on without prevention; for example, in January 2012, a suicide-bomber suspected to be sponsored by the Boko Haram attempted to enter the COCIN Headquarters Church Compound in Jos with a car, which exploded at the gate and killed 3 persons.⁴⁰ On Sunday 11th March, 2012, another suicide-bomber attacked St. Finbarr's Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos, on a similar mission. About five (5) people were reportedly killed.⁴¹ On Sunday 10 June, 2012, a suicide bomber drove his bomb laden car into the Christ Chosen Church along Rukuba Road, Jos, where four people were confirmed dead and several others injured.⁴² The Boko Haram insurgents planted two bombs in Jos metropolis, which exploded and killed at least 118 people and injuring more than 56 others in 2013. The first bomb explosion occurred in a busy market place called Terminus market, and the second near a bus station close to the old Jos University Teaching Hospital Campus.⁴³ Two separate bomb blasts on the 28th February, 2015,

rocked the Bauchi road axis of Jos North Local Government in Plateau State, leaving behind many deaths and casualties.⁴⁴ There are many unseen, un-track and unknown arms dealers or smugglers in Plateau State today, these cartels are found across different ethnic groups, religions and criminal gangs who are into criminal acts of kidnapping, arm robbery and cattle rustling.

Several private investigations carried out on international arms dealers' network confirms that terrorist groups cooperate faster with these dealers in acquiring arms and ammunitions than states. Unlike the earlier situation where arms trade was the exclusive preserve of states, contemporary arms traffickers across national boundaries have successfully taken advantage of border porosity, trade liberalization and free movement protocol caused by globalization, which permeate arms in sovereign states, and further perpetuating terrorist related activities in many countries.

The use of SALW in ethnic and religious crisis in Plateau State, inter and intra communal clashes, herder-farmer conflict, banditry and mid-night invasion of Irigwe, Anaguta and Berom communities and banditry have exterminated more than 10,000 lives in Plateau State, an average of 1250 people yearly from 2010.⁴⁵ The majority of casualties of about 76% Plateau people were SALW victims, incurring irredeemable disabilities. Countable people in the state have been harmed due to increase in the proliferation rate of SALWs. The inability of the police to curb violent crimes, guarantee law and order and protect lives and property aggravate the teething troubles of armed violence and proliferation of SALW. Security operatives at present are bereft of the training, resources that could equip them for effective performance in the area of prevention and detecting proliferated SALWs in Plateau State. The proliferations of SALWs have caused untold damage to human security in Plateau State.

1.4 Security Implications of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Plateau State

The security implications arising from small arms and light weapons proliferation in Plateau State are numerous. First of all, SALWs posed severe challenge to human rights everywhere in the world;⁴⁶ small arms and light weapons proliferation is adjudged as the most immediate security problem to individuals, societies, and states worldwide, fueling civil wars, organized criminal violence, insurgency and terrorist activities posing great obstacles to sustainable security and development. Since 2001, Plateau State has been bedeviled by a plethora of violent conflicts because of small arms and light weapons proliferation. These problems include ethno-religious crises, indigene-settler conflicts, herder-farmer feud, armed robbery, kidnapping and Boko Haram terrorism.⁴⁷

The presence of small arms and light weapons in the hands of non-states actors has led Nigeria and Plateau State in particular into multiple security problems: insecurity and threat to lives and property as a result of armed robbery, kidnappings, ethno-religious violent conflicts to herder-farmer conflict and terrorism. Small arms and light weapons proliferations have given rise to banditry and kidnapping in the state. It has manifested in increasing rates of kidnappings in Jos metropolis, especially around State and Federal Low, Rayfield, Haske quarters around Lamingo, ECWA Staff School around Farin Gada and the University of Jos Senior Staff quarters. Act of kidnapping has move into rural communities and villages. This has taken a new dimension, because kidnappers are feasting on the rich and poor in the state; traditional rulers, religious and political leaders are all victims of these kidnappers with series of example in 2022: the Sum Pyem of Gindiri the traditional ruler of the Pyem people of Gindiri was their victim; the District head of Pushit and Panyam districts were kidnapped between April and June 2022. Also, the wife and family members of the Commissioner for Industry Plateau State Idi Bamaiyi picked in at home by the kidnappers in May, 2022. Lecturers from the University of Jos and Bokkos were victims of these criminal elements.⁴⁸ The insecurity has led to lose of hundreds of millions by the victims' families, friends and relations to secure their release; all these criminal and civil unrest are linked to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Plateau State.

The security implications of SALWs in Plateau State have resulted to serious humanitarian tragedy in terms of loss of lives and property in series of violent conflicts. For instance the violent conflict in Plateau State has taken a worrisome and disturbing dimension as more than ten thousand (10,000) persons have been killed since September 2001 following the outbreak of Jos conflict and its escalation to other parts of Plateau State.⁴⁹ Small arms and light weapons have led to killing of thousands of people and destruction of property. Large population of Plateau State citizens and residents alike were exposed to risks of different nature.⁵⁰ The security implications of these small arms and light weapons proliferation has led to mass killing and destruction of property in places like Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rukuba, Congo Russia, Nassarawa, Dogon Dutse, Rukuba road, Wase, Yelwa Shendam, Dengi, and Namu among others.

The International Crisis Group in 2018 reported that from September 2017 through June 2018, farmer-herder violence left at least 1,500 people dead, many more wounded and about 70,000 displaced in Northern Plateau and 100,000 in the entire state.⁵¹ Farmer-herders violent conflict has become a reoccurring phenomenon without end; this is pinned to small arms and light weapons proliferation in places like Wase, Bassa, Jos

South, Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Bokkos.⁵² Without these small arms and light weapons proliferation, these killer entrepreneurs would not muster the audacity of killing people at night and sacking them in their ancestral home. It created the phenomenon of internally Displaced persons (IDPs) in Riyom, Bassa and Jos North LGAs between 2018 and 2022. It has rendered agricultural communities of Irigwe, Rukuba, Berom and Anaguta desolate with farmers living in IDP camps and host communities. This has hampered serious economic and social development in Plateau State.

Anytime there are sad events in Plateau State, the Federal government responds to these issues only by feeble clichéd statements about how it was committed to securing lives and property of Nigerians. The concerned state governors from 1999 to 2022 (Chief Joshua Chibi Darriye, Da Jonah David Jang and Hon. Simon Bako Lalong) sometimes visit victims and shed tears making promises to arrest perpetrators of the heinous crime and give the victims justice. Political elites would pay a powerful condolence visit and use the opportunity to make political statements with little or no aid.⁵³ The police on their part will make promises of ransom for people that volunteer information concerning the criminals, without diligent investigation or having a proactive policing skills to nib all these criminal acts in the bud. We may portend that, the proliferation of different classes of SALWs in Plateau State is responsible for fueling ethnic conflicts, insurgencies, violent crimes such as rape and robbery, kidnapping and banditry.

1.5 Conclusion and Recommendations

The number of SALWs in the hands of individuals, non-state actors and criminals in Plateau state is alarming. Small arms and light weapons proliferation remain one of the biggest challenges in the state. Since 2001 to 2021, these situations have compelled the government to channel resources that would have been used to provide social services and amenities in rural areas to contain this menace. Small arms and light weapons proliferation have led to aggravated armed violence among Christians and Muslims in Jos North and South, farmers and herders feud in Riyom, Bassa, Wase, Barkin Ladi, Jos South and Bokkos LGAs; this has increased the proportional level of poverty, thereby inhibiting access to social services from the government in the state. In an atmosphere of insecurity, business investments that would have provided jobs to the citizens remain become major targets. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons can be reduced if legal frameworks are kept in place. To achieve this:

- i. Strong institutions must be built and supported with strong legal framework that would criminalize every violation and punish offenders.

- ii. A holistic approach has to be adopted to curtail widespread socio-economic and political insecurity arising from unemployment, poverty and corruption among other things that produce and promote the culture of violence.
- iii. Stricter levels of monitoring and surveillance should be instituted at the country's borders to discourage the illicit transfer of weapons into Nigeria.
- iv. There should be regulations on the manufacture and production of SALWs in the Plateau State.
- v. Also, acts of kidnapping, banditry, conflict, cultism and crimes must be decisively dealt with through state legislation and proper punishments to reduce their prevalence in the state.

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The Role of Nigeria In The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 2012 -2016

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Abstract

Nigeria as the most populated African country has been playing significant role in various capacity in order to ensure security, economic development, and political stability across the West African region and the continent at large. The issue of security is one critical aspect that has recently proved to be challenging the West African region, specifically the Boko Haram insurgency which is instrumental in leading to the creation of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin in order to tackle the threat emanating from constant attack by the group across the Lake Chad Basin. The paper focuses in addressing the various contribution of Nigeria in the creation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin from 2012 -2016. Some of the key aspect addressed in this paper includes; the Nigerian contribution in the aspect of Funding, Leadership, and the contribution of personnel for the smooth operation of the MNJTF. The paper established that to a greater extent, the objectives of the commission have been achieved as to addressing the issue of insurgency by limiting the attacks and reducing the activities of the insurgents in the Lake Chad Basin largely due to the role of Nigeria and her security forces. Furthermore, the paper identified the various issues, challenges and successes encountered by the Joint Task Force in discharging their mandate. The paper concludes that, the ability of the MNJTF to achieve to a very large extent the role expected of it in the mitigation of insurgency, all states in the force have to put aside their differences and focus on the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity as well as continuity of their states.

Keywords: Collective Security, Joint Task Force, Insurgency, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Multinational Joint Task Force.

Introduction

Despite sharing history with other African countries, Nigeria stand out as it has been able to initiate and contribute to the development of the continent politically, economically and socially to ensure stability and peaceful coexistence between and within states. Politically and economically, it has led efforts that resulted to the creation and transition of the Organization of African Unity(OAU) to African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as its military organ (ECOMOG)in order to engage the organization's military manpower in various seize-fire, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission along with other security issues that were engulfing the African continent in the periods after the decolonization process. Another area, where Nigeria stands out is in its role in the Lake Chad region and the establishment of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964.The roles Nigeria played, facilitated cooperation between the states sharing the resources of the Lake Chad and subsequently, the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force. This paper therefore, assesses the role of Nigeria in the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Forces up to the period the MNJTF was reconstituted to engage the Boko Haram insurgents operating within the lake Chad Basin.

Definition of Term

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a combined multinational formation, comprising units, mostly military, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria an. It is the military organ of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), headquartered in N'Djamena with the mandate to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency and other forms of terrorism within the Lake Chad Basin.The task force was first organized as a solely Nigerian force in 1994, during the administration of Sani Abacha, to "checkmate banditry activities and to facilitate free movement" along its northern borders. In 1998, it was expanded to include units from neighbouring Chad and Niger with the purpose of dealing with common cross-border security issues in the Lake Chad region, with its headquarters in the town of Baga, Borno State.

Origin of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

The MNJTF was formed in Lake Chad Basin as a result of conflict and other uprisings that threaten the peaceful co-existence of the member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission; particularly in Chad, Niger and Cameroon.These states have been experiencing series of internal insurrection by a sizeable number of its citizens, who later formed armed groups to terrorize their various countries. Despite, the crises in the affected areas being quelled down, and some of the perpetrators being arrested by the security agencies, some managed to escape arrest. Those insurgents who escaped from their respective countries found their way

to safe haven, across the borders into Nigeria, and other neighboring islands provided by the shrinking of the Lake Chad Basin. To survive therefore, they engaged in several illegal activities which include armed banditry, kidnapping, smuggling and drug dealing which became rampant. In some border towns along the Northeastern part of Nigeria banditry and terrorism was becoming a menace that was referred to as *kwantakwanta* (lie down lie down), carried out by armed bandits who were also referred to as *Udawa*. According to the report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

There is growing concern in parts of Northern Nigeria over insecurity caused by bandits suspected to have come from neighboring countries. Scores of people have been killed and many robbed of valuables in the past years by bands of heavily armed gunmen identified as remnants of rebel forces from years of civil war in Chad and by militant herdsmen known locally as 'Udawa' and said to come from Niger.

The activities by these ex-militants from the different countries around Nigeria became detrimental to the livelihood of citizens in towns bordering the Lake Chad Basin. The United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs stated that pastoralist, farmers and travelers have fall victims to bandits, which have affected their economic activities. The pastoralist and farmers are the ones most targeted by the bandits, as they are engaged in the search for food to sustain their stay in the various hideouts in the Lake Chad Island due to the shrinking. Consequently, resulting to farmers refusal to go to their farms to harvest products due to fear of being attacked. These activities, were also affecting Nigerian citizens along the border towns of Borno, Adamawa, Gombe and Taraba states having significant impact on their economic activities.

In an effort to put a stop to the activities by bandits, a Joint Task Force was established by the then Head of state of Nigeria General Sani Abacha in 1994, aimed at tackling these banditry activities within its territory in the North Eastern part of the country. Although, these activities were not common to Nigeria border towns alone, as the border town of the other countries were experiencing same ill fate facilitated by the nature of the border they share within the Lake Chad Basin.

Subsequently, the efforts by the Nigerian government in putting an end to the banditry activities were met with challenges. These challenges according to Brigadier General TA Lagbaja was the ease that bandits could cross from one country to the other through the lake Chad, back into their home countries, contributing to the increase in crime rate there too. As a result, and a means to capture bandits and curtail banditry

activities around the Lake Chad Basin, an International Joint Patrol was agreed on by Nigeria, Niger and Chad to combine military security around the Lake Chad Basin.

It became fully operational as the Lake Chad Basin Commission Multinational Joint Task Force in July 1998. The taskforce took effect in September 1998, but subsequently went dormant, with only regular patrols carried out by member states around the Lake Chad. This was largely due to the loss of interest in the shrinking Lake and the lack of trust between Nigeria and its neighbors. These coupled with Cameroon not being a member, owing largely to the crisis over Bakassi Peninsula with Nigeria. Although, as corroborated by a source that as at 2009, when Nigeria was fighting the Boko Haram group within her territory, the MNJTF still engaged in patrols around the Lake Chad Basin.




Figure: Map showing the headquarter of the Multinational Joint Task Force and the different sectors, military operations are being carried out by the joint taskforces of the contributing member states around the Lake Chad Basin. The map also shows the current head quarter in Ndjamena, Chad.

The MNJTF was headquartered in Kukuwa LGA of Baga town, Borno State of Nigeria. Its initial mandate was to conduct military action and patrols for checkmating banditry activities along the borders while facilitating movements between member nations of the LCBC freely. Few years after its establishment, the MNJTF activities reclined in the Lakes basin area.

However, the MNJTF role by the Lake Chad Basin Commission Head of States of Nigeria, Niger, and Chad expanded. Initially the role of the force was to combat banditry activities in the Lake Chad Basin, from April 2012; the role was expanded to include the fight against Boko Haram insurgency within the Lake Chad Basin area. The first step to bringing the MNJTF back to checkmate common issues was once more taken by the Nigerian government. Several efforts were made to curtail the insurgent group perceived by the Nigerian government to be solely a Nigerian problem. After its resuscitation, the military collaboration came under the command of a Nigerian Brigadier General Enitan Ransom-Kuti. Despite, these efforts to put an end to the insurgent activities, Chad pulled out of the MNJTF in 2013 and Niger in 2014 Niger also pulled out, this made the Boko Haram group expand their activities in the region.

The expansion of the Boko Haram group was followed with an increase in terror attacks by the Insurgents. This resulted to another agreement reached by some members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission of Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon in July 2014 to speed up the tackling of their common issue in the Lake Basin. This agreement led to the reactivation of a Multinational Force with the mandate to 'ensure peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin in order to guarantee the free movement of goods and persons, economic as well as social development. Provision for 2700 men, to counter the Boko Haram insurgent group within the Lake Chad Basin areabased on the contribution of 700 men by each member nation. This deployment was only attainable in documents. The reality on the ground was totally different, as there were only troops from Nigeria on ground around the Lake Chad Basin.

Although, it was not until 25th November 2014 that African Union peace and security council endorsed the reactivation of the forces to fully carry out their operations in the Lake Chad Basin area along with Benin's, with its attendance of 7th October 2014 LCBC countries extraordinary summit in Niamey. The objective of this meeting was to discuss modalities for the deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force and the establishment of the command headquarters to coordinate its operations. During this gathering, the Heads of State and government decided to deploy the national contingents that were to make up the force, troops were therefore deployed formally on 29th January 2015, for a period of 12months. This effort at ensuring the deployment of troops was also largely the result of the diplomatic missions in 2015, by Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari to the countries around the Lake Basin to again solicit their cooperation to ending the menace Boko Haram. This was later extended with an additional 12months to end in 14th January, 2016. Troops are to be drawn from Niger, Chad Cameroon, Nigeria and Benin, which was to be 8700 military men strong.

Structure of the MNJTF from 2015

The MNJTF as a military collaboration is established under the current organizational structure of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, agreed to be headed by a Nigerian as the force commander, a Cameroonian as the deputy force commander and a Chadian as the chief of staff. Thus far, the Nigerian force commander includes: Major General Tukur Yusuf Buratai who later became the Chief of Army Staff of Nigeria, Major General Iliya Abbah from 31st July 2015, Major General Lamidi Adeosun appointed in 2016, Major General Lucky Irabo 12th June 2017, Major General C.O. Ude 12th August 2018, Major General I. M Yusuf 19th November 2019, Major General J.J. Ogunlade 19th March 2021, Major General Abdul Khalifah Ibrahim 6th August 2021. This was put by Assanvo et'al;

Nigeria was given command of the force for the entire duration of its mission. This decision - which was not contested by any of the other countries - reflected Nigeria's commitment to eliminate Boko Haram and its determination to reassert its leadership. From an operational perspective, it undoubtedly acknowledged the fact that the fight against Boko Haram was mainly likely to occur on Nigerian territory, making it judicious for Nigeria to assume this office.

While this statement was true at the initial resuscitation of the MNJTF especially from 2015, as corroborated by Brigadier General Ali Keffi., this has metamorphosed to a fight fought at all front with the subsequent expansion of the terror groups attack into the other neighboring countries. Another mile stone in the establishment of the MNJTF, was in the LCBC countries efforts to help the MNJTF meet up in elevating its standards in response to the insurgent activities in the Lake Chad Basin area by focusing on some defined strategic objectives, structure and the rules of engagement. This is due to the constraints in adhering to humanitarian laws. The results, was the technical work on formulation of strategic, legal and operational frameworks for the MNJTF, which in turn gave rise to the various defined Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) pertaining to their strategies, operations and logistical supports.

The African Union played a key role in the organization of these processes. During the meeting of experts held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, 5-7 February 2015; the Strategic CONOPS of the MNJTFS and its rules of engagement were adopted. Details of the CONOPS modalities were later given in a planning meeting held on 23-27 February 2015 in N'Djamena. The Strategic CONOPS were validated by the AUPSC on 3 March 2015, defining the inter-alia, the mandate of the force, its objectives, its specific tasks, the command, control and coordination structures and composition, its troop strength, and its zones of operation, notably the operational sectors, etc.

Another summit which served as a mile stone in the establishment of the MNJTF was the Extraordinary Summit of 11 June 2015 in Abuja. The member state of the MNJTF reached a compromise of the command structure of the force, because this was as a key element to ensure the effectiveness of the force. The command structure of the LCBC was the command structure of the LCBC, which was located in Nigeria prior to the Boko Haram Insurgents attacks. This changed after the summit and mainly due to the fact that other member states of the MNJTF felt it was given Nigeria a leverage over them. Hence, they argued for the command HQ to be located outside Nigeria and on the 30th July 2015, the Headquarters became operational in Ndjamena, Chad.

The Mandate of the MNJTF Includes:

Creating a safe and secured environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups ... facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs [internally displaced people] and refugees; and facilitate, within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations.

The mandate also include; carrying out military operations to forestall the expansion of the Boko Haram group, searching for and freeing people abducted by the Boko Haram group which includes the Chibok girls that were taken from Nigeria, carrying out border patrol, blocking every means aimed at facilitating the transfer of weapons and logistics by the insurgent group, carrying out psychological operations on Boko Haram defections, as well carrying out activities in areas of human right, intelligence, information and media. An anonymous sources puts it simply that, the mandate of the MNJTF is to put an end to the Boko Haram insurgent group and ensure peace reigns within the Lake Chad Basin again.

The Multi-National Joint Task Force Military Composition

The actual size and number of the troops that were needed by the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram was in flux. On 29th January 2015, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union endorsed 7500 military personnel needed for the job. In Yaoundé 5th -7th February, an adjustment was made on the number of troops needed, leading to an increment of 1200men bringing the number to 8700military men. This was followed in March 3rd, during the 480th meeting of PSC to 10,000 military personnel. Furthermore, in the meeting held by the Chief of Staff of the LCBC, the number of troops were said to be 11,150. With each state contributing personnel: Nigeria - 3750men, Chad - 3 000men, Cameroon - 2 650men with another source estimating to be 2450, Niger - 1 000men, and Benin- 750men. However, this number was not the same number of troops that were deployed to the different sectors under the MNJTF around the Lake Chad Basin. The MNJTF as endorsed by the

African Union Peace and Security Council operates in four different sectors:

1. Sector one is responsible for carrying out counter insurgence operations located in Cameroon and headquartered in Mora. It is also referred Cameroon Brigade, sub-divided into sub-sectors, having an estimated 950 troops with the promise to be increased to 2250 troops in April 2016 as promised by Cameroon. This promise was based on the decision that was reached by the chief of army staff of the committee of the LCBC states along with that of Benin to increase the number of troops in that sector. Benin was to contribute 800 troops but reduced the number by promising to deploy 200 troops and in May 2016, ended up deploying 150 troops.
2. Sector two in Baga-Sola, Chad. It also referred to as the Chadian Brigade having two sectors including the 4th Military Regiment of Chad. It was to be 3000 troops strong based on the promise of Chad to the MNJTF contingents as at 2016.
3. Sector three is located in Monguno in Nigeria. It the Nigerian brigade of the MNJTF and includes the 19th Brigade of Nigerian Army Made up of 3000 army personnel as pledged by the Nigerian government.
4. Sector four in Diffa Southeastern Niger Republic. Coincidentally corresponds to the 5th Military Regiment of Niger, covering the Extreme Southern Eastern part of Niger along the Koumadougou-Yobe.

Each sector is therefore under the command of the states they are located and reports back to the MNJTF headquarters in Ndjamena, Chad. The command sectors also per take in operations around their border town in the Lake Chad Basin area. According to an Officer Command, when an attack is to be carried out by the Nigerian army on the insurgent group, close to either of the MNJTF member states, the commanding unit in that country was contacted. Thus, creating a synergy where the insurgent groups are caught in the middle of the two states commanding unit, hence the rounding up of the insurgent elements and blocking the routes for them to cross into another country, to go into hiding. These tactics, of creating a blockade on both fronts against the insurgent according to TA Lagbaja was just like the operations conducted by the MNJTF during Chadian crises in the late 1990's. This yielded several successes for the Multinational Joint Task Force. The insurgent elements have been canalized to a large degree as they are pushed from all fronts by the different commanding units to carry out their activities within the Lake Chad Basin. This success operation is aptly captures by the African Defence Forum

The first hard evidence of the task force's strategy came in the summer of 2016 with Operation Gama Aiki, implying operation "Finish the Job," in the Hausa language of northern Nigeria. The coalition began striking Boko Haram strongholds around the Lake Chad basin. From the north and northwest of the lake, Chadian and Nigerien forces, backed by combat helicopters, hit Boko Haram enclaves. Their goal was to wipe out bases on Niger's side of the border and cross over to Nigeria to liberate the area near the Yobe River, which had become a launching pad for attacks. At the same time, Nigerian forces moved north along the Cameroonian border, pushing Boko Haram militants into the Sambisa Forest. To the east, 2,500 Cameroonian forces left the town of Makari, crossed into Nigeria, and attacked a Boko Haram base near the town of Saguir.²⁷

The result was also seen in the reduced cases of bombings with the disruption of the line of supplies to the Boko Haram group. This led to the Boko Haram group lacking basic needs to function and carry out their attacks like food and ammunition. Also, communication to the outside world by these Boko Haram group seems to have been reduced. Other achievements of the MNJTF include the improvement of the security situation as many of the territories hitherto controlled by the insurgents were taken back and people are returning home like Baga and most towns that were inhabited by people around the Lake Chad Basin. In addition to these achievements is the release of some of the Chibok school girls abducted, along with release and repentance of some of the Boko Haram Recruits.

The Role of Nigeria in the Multinational Joint Task Forces Fight against Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin 2012 -2016

Finance

The MNJTF activities are financed with 4.2 billion U.S. dollars. This amount is contributed by member states of the MNJTF. Although, it has been argued that Nigerian government is responsible for the finance of the MNJTF, this claim has no basis. According to interview conducted, each of the countries of the MNJTF is responsible for its military personnel. It was added by Maj. Gen. Ali Keffi of the Nigerian army that, Nigeria though bears the greater burden of the finance. This he argues was due to her economic standing when compared to other members of the MNJTF as she did during the Liberian crisis with ECOMOG where the final brunt of the menace was borne by her. He also added that, the extra burden by Nigeria does not include paying other member soldier salaries but allowances and other logistical expenses for their participation in various operations within the Lake Chad Basin, because the collaboration

against Boko Haram was sorted by Nigeria. While no work has corroborated this, Nigeria has given 21 million out of her 100 million pledges in 2015. The efforts by the MNJTF has also received contributions financially from the international organizations like the European Union who contributed 50 million dollars, and CEN-SAD offered 1.5 million to Chad, Benin, and Niger.

Furthermore, it is clear to assert that, Nigeria bears the greater burden of shouldering the financing of the operations. This is mostly credited to the fact that the country is rich in natural resources while other states around it are poor when compared to it coupled with their continued internal crisis resulting from their constituted authority's inability to ensure political, social and economic stability. Nigeria, as such, was the only country to ensure that it gave part of the finance pledged to ensure the smooth running of the MNJTF to achieve its mandates in 2016.

Leadership and Personnel

The recent resuscitation of the MNJTF by the members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission under the auspices of the African Union Peace and Security Council was due to the influence of Nigeria. Despite the task force not taking actions and troops not deployed as planned to their area of operations in the Lake Chad Basin, the subsequent enthusiasm that member states started showing from 2015 with regards to the location and deployment of troops as promised owes a lot to the leadership, diplomatic and security decision of the Nigerian Head of Government President Muhammadu Buhari. The president engaged in diplomatic visits to the different heads of states of the country around Nigeria and also engaged in the visit of their colonial master France who still had a sway in the political, economic and social decisions of these states.

The MNJTF since its inception has been headed by a Nigerian Major General. Up to 2012 when the force was resuscitated to fight against the Boko Haram group, it was under Major General Enitan Kuti. In 2015, the force once more under a Nigerian, Major General Tukur Yusufu Buratai. This was based on agreement by member states, who believed that Nigeria had more experience when compared to others, in commanding the combined forces to achieving success. Along with the fact that Nigeria had been battling the insurgent group since 2009, as such had more knowledge in fighting them. On 31st July 2015, with the coming in of President Muhammadu Buhari, Major General Tukur Yusufu Buratai handed power to Major General Lamidi Adeosun who also handed power in January 2016 to Major-General Lucky Irabor. These commanders were responsible for directing the forces, translating the decisions of head of states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission into operations to be carried out by the different sectors.

Challenges Confronting the Multinational Joint Task Forces Fight against Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin

However, being in place to ensure the peace and security of the people around the Lake Chad Basin area and the Lake Chad Basin, certain challenges impedes it ability to achieve the desirable success.

Mistrust: From the initial inception of the MNJTF, the force had been plagued by mistrust. This is one of the reasons that it went dormant until 2012, providing the ungoverned environment for the insurgent group to take refuge on the islands due to the shrinking of the Lake Chad. This mistrust further manifested in 2012, with member countries blaming one another for the continued activities of the Boko Haram group. This also was seen in 2015, when the MNJTF set December 2015 as the deadline in wiping out Boko Haram, Nigeria's Chief of Defence Staff, General Olanisakin, complained to his Chadian counterpart, General Seyni Garba, who was at the Defence Headquarters, Abuja in continuation of talks on Nigeria-Niger bilateral efforts in fighting Boko Haram that by November 2015 Chadian troops were yet to be deployed as part of about 8,700 troops that were supposed to make up the MNJTF. According to Olanisakin, 'The Commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force has gone round the countries involved in this operation to ensure that troops were deployed in their location and command. Most of the troops have been deployed especially from Niger which is in the same sector with Nigeria and performing their roles effectively'. However, by not mentioning Cameroon but Niger in his speech, it showed that even the Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff equally felt that the country was not totally committed to the fight against insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin.

Lack of Political Will: the lack of political will of the member countries of the MNJTF to participate at the initial stage of the emergence of the insurgent group in a collaborative and joint manner hindered the achievement of its mandate. A source reported that, cooperation was not at its peak initially. This challenge of political will by member states of the MNJTF was not one-sided but on both sides as the Nigerian government also did not allow foreign intervention and agree that unilaterally it could resolve the issue of Boko Haram until it went out of control. On the part of Chad, Niger and Cameroon they perceived the issue as a Nigerian one, coupled with the fact that they were French speaking country acting in accordance to what suit the French. As corroborated by source, their allegiance to their colonial master hindered them from taking crucial decision that was in their own interest without considering that of their colonial masters first. Furthermore, member states were putting not only the interests of their colonial master above theirs but also their own states interest above those of the collaboration. Zaggat *et al* in their work made it clear that states involved in the counter insurgency operations of the MNJTF were focused on their national interest and individual approaches rather than the collective approaches which was responsible for the initial success and operationalization of the Joint Taskforce. This was reiterated by an interviewee.

Although, issue of trust and political will have since been put aside by states in the zeal to solve a common problem. This owes a lot to the political and security decision of President Muhammadu Buhari after coming into power from 2015 as well as Chad and Cameroon realization of the spillover effects of the insurgent activities on their stability and economic interest.

Inadequate Logistics: At the initial reactivation of the MNJTF in 2012 to counter the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin area, the force lacked the necessary logistics and understanding of the terrain. While this was corroborated by some source to be true, others argued that terrain was not a hindrance. With regards to logistics, it was corroborated to be true with respect to vehicles and boats to move on water as well as equipment to persecute the operations. However, the issue of logistics was rectified by the Nigerian government giving part of its pledge to the combined force as promised with the coming into power of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015.

Funding: This was another challenge of the MNJTF up until 2016. This was corroborated by source; that funding aimed at facilitating the operationalization of the MNJTF was not available. The source added that despite the contribution of the bulk of the money by Nigeria and other stakeholders, it was not enough as other member countries were far behind in contributing their pledges to the force. The fund needed as at 2015 for the MNJTF to effectively carry out its operations was estimated US\$700million to cover the cost of logistics, material and other human resource needs and 50million Euro as promised by the European Union was to cover the cost for the purchase of weaponry and military equipment. Bulk of this financial pledge has not been met and also owes not only to the lack of pledges by MNJTF member countries meeting up with their pledges but also due to the administrative practices of the African Union auditing processes. William et'al further added that the financial challenge also delayed the relocation of the force headquarters to Ndjamena as countries were already burdened with the human and material costs of the Boko Haram insurgent activities in their countries. Coupled with the fact that, member countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger are faced with their own fair share of internal insurrections.

Weather: Another challenge that the MNJTF encountered was out of the control of man. This was the weather condition of the area they were operating. The Lake Chad Basin area climate is hot and dried, determining the weather condition of the area. This, it is expected that the weather will be dried all through making it easy for the MNJTF troops to carry out their operation. However, the case is different. According to a source, operations by the MNJTF can only be conducted from January to May when the Lake Chad Basin area is dried and the period from then onward operations become difficult upto the end of the rain season which

could last for more than four months, making it difficult to carry out operations that reaches the enclaves of the insurgents far into the like of Sambisa forest in the Lake Chad Basin area.

Lack of Joint Training: Another challenge of the MNJTF affecting the achievement of its mandate in the Lake Chad Basin area is the lack of combined or joint training, logistics as well as information gathering and sharing. This is because members of the Multinational Joint Force belong to two different regional economic blocs with different orientation, belonging to different colonial masters and as such need combined training to have synergy among its forces in carryout their operation. Furthermore, corroborated by source, one cannot divulge the above from synergy in training and the achievement of success. In military there must be area of common interests, where there are different doctrine and interest its forestalls combined training. Osakwe and Bem also agreed to this. However, with regards to the MNJTF operations against the Boko Haram insurgent group in the Lake Chad Basin this was been debunked. A source stated that training is only effective to the extent that it is deployed, even if there is a combine training or not. And because the MNJTFS operate in different commands in the country, combined training did not affect their operations. Nigerian soldiers under the MNJTF operates within their Nigerian borders and it is so for the other member states soldiers. He added that soldiers train in such a way to achieve the goal of the operation. In the case of joint operations by two sectors under the MNJTF, there is synergetic collaboration that ensures the achievement of the goal of the operation by the sectors involved. This is largely due to adequate and effective sharing of information as at when necessary.

Conclusion

The MNJTF as a security architecture has been in existing long before the emergence of the Boko Haram group to counter Banditry activities around the basin area. The increasing terror activities of the Boko Haram, whose activities are again within the basin area has necessitating the resuscitation of the MNJTF. The paper has been able to show this establishment and changes that occur in the MNJTF structure through efforts of state around the Lake Chad Basin. These efforts are to a large extent the successes of the MJTF against the Boko Haram. Like many joint forces, made up of several countries with disparate origin, the MNJTF faced series of challenges. The paper has also been able to put forth some of these challenges. While these challenges exist, the MNJTF was able to recoup against a common enemy once again cooperatively within the basin area, to ensure the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as the continued existence of the states.

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Historical Account of the Origin, Migration And Transformation of The Tigun Society In Kurmi Local Government Area

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Abstract

This paper centers on giving a historical account of the origin, migration and the transformation of the Tigun society in Kurmi Local government area. Ethnic groups all have an origin where their roots can be traced to. These ethnic groups follow some channels of movements before settling in their present locations. The Tigun people are not alienated from this known fact. They are amongst the three major ethnic groups found in Kurmi Local Government Area of Taraba state. These three major ethnic groups include the Tigun, Ndola and the Ichen. This paper hopes to trace the origin of the Tigun people and how they moved in stages and in batches to settle in the area they are found today. The paper will also talk about the different dialects that form what is called the Tigun Federation. This paper also attempts to exhaustively discuss the formation of Kurmi Local Government Area as it is today. The work will discuss how things were from the scramble for and partition of Africa at the Berlin conference of 1884/1885, down to the world wars, the independence of Nigeria and the events that came into play afterwards. This paper generally hopes to add to the existing knowledge about the Tigun people

and about Kurmi Local Government Area as a whole. The major sources used in obtaining information is the primary and the secondary sources. Oral interviews were conducted and written sources such as projects, books and other relevant documents were also used.

Key words: Tigun, Kurmi Local Government Area, Migration.
Introduction

History of Origin of the Tigun

The Tigun people have been independent even before the emergence of the modern state system following the Westphalian treaty of 1648. They are generally referred to as a federation. This is due largely to the fact that the ethnic group is a conglomerate of clans that come together to form one broad ethnic group.¹⁰ While the Tigun Nzare form the bulk of the Tigun people, other components are the Jukun-Tigun (Ashuku) which is also a part of the Nzare-speaking people, the Abong (Mbwami), the Njuwande and the Batu which include Batu Kamino, Batu Affih and Batu Amanda. These different clans of the Tigun speak different dialects. According to C W Cole, Tigun is not a single language; it is a collection of Jukunoid, Bantoid and even the Ndola.¹

There are two main traditions about the origin of the Tigun people. These are the Bantoid and the Jukunoid traditions². The components that are believed to have originated through the Bantoid tradition include the Njuwande, the Abong and the Batu, while those that are believed to have originated through the Jukunoid tradition include the Ashuku, Eneme (Nama-Baba), Adobe, Ambwe, Ekwachu (Nama-Gangare), Mbisa and Chon.³ Those regarded as the Jukunoid are believed to have broken out of the great Kwararafa kingdom and moved through the Republic of Cameroon to settle where they are found today.

Those of the Bantoid origin believe that they may have emanated from the Bantoid languages which are generally referred to as a body of some 150-200 or more languages positioned geographically between Nigeria and Cameroon. These languages are said to be more related to the Bantu than with other branches of the Benue-Congo, thereby the name "Bantoid".⁴ The Tigun group that claim to be one of the Bantoid languages are said to have originated from Cameroon. They moved from Cameroon, through present day Sardauna Local Government Area, down to the area they are found today⁵.

History of Migration to their present Location

According to Baba Joshua Garba, the Tigun people migrated to their present location in distinct waves without any form of wars of conquest.

The first to settle in the area were the Chon people. And followed in the sequence were the Ambo people, the Adobe people and then the Abong people.⁶

The Chon people are believed to have migrated from the Kwararafa Kingdom and passed through Cameroon to settle around present day Abong. There is a widely accepted tradition that Chon had a brother, Ebhere with whom they left Kwararafa and first settled together in the Republic of Cameroon. Chon and Ebhere are the sons of an unknown man.⁷

The Tradition states that the two sons always helped their father out to exchange goods in the market. They were into the business of grinding and selling henna, also called "*Lelle*" in Hausa. In the process of transaction in the market, Chon was more accountable than his brother Ebhere. Chon's accountability made him his father's favourite and for that reason, his father blessed him and gave him a grinding stone as his reward. The tradition states that Ebhere later became jealous of his brother and even snatched the grinding stone from his brother, Chon, and later sent him away from the area. Before leaving his elder brother Ebhere, Chon told him that he will cross the river and Ebhere will hear of him. He vowed to be more successful than his brother. The name Chon is actually "*Chuanh*" meaning "*labari*" in Hausa or story in English.⁸

Upon leaving his brother, Chon came to an area known as "*Kwenta*", which was to him, a safe haven.^{xxxxi} The Chon are today found in some villages such as Chon Akumbo, Chon Akofri, Chon Achukwen (who are found on the mountains), Chon Nthun, and Chon Dyashi⁹ The Chon people dispersed to these different locations mainly as a result of the quest for better land to cultivate.

It is also believed that after Chon settled in the area, the Njuwande people, also known as the Bitare came to the area. Chon decided to give "*Kwenta*" to them. After allowing them to settle there, he gave them a cock and he told them that if the cock crows, they can stay and have the land but if the cock does not crow, it means the land has rejected them and they must leave immediately. The cock crowed, signifying acceptance, which is why the Njuwande people were allowed to settle in the area.¹⁰

A similar version of Tigun migration narrated by Ofan Emmanuel Idi Danga, states that some Tigun are believed to have migrated from the Cameroon Area. These categories of the Tigun include the Akwento (Nzare), Mbwami and the Njuwande (Asha) who specifically came from "*Asah*" village in Cameroon. The term "*Asha*", which is what they are commonly called, is a corrupted version of the word "*Asah*". He further

states that some of the Tigun: The Eneme and the Ashuku people migrated directly from Kwararafa.¹¹

In a memo written by CW Cole on September 12, 1934, it was stated that after some enquiry, it was discovered that the Fulani raided the *Kentu* area which was a general term used in describing the area occupied by the Ndola, Tigun and the Ichen (Kentu). The Fulani that raided the area are the *Kwoncha* Fulani. The Kwoncha is an area near the Anglo-French border in the French Cameroons. This account has it that one Haman Gabdu, Sarkin Kwoncha had two sons named Sambo and Usuman who subdued the Kentu area. They used emissaries who seized the Tigun people found along Bissaula-Nama footpath. These Fulani people made the Tigun people found in the area stated above their children. They sold these Tigun people in slave market known as "Kundi market".¹³ The coming of the Europeans to this area however liberated the Tigun people found along the Bissaula-Nama footpath and they returned to their former home and adopted the name Kwoncha.¹⁴

There is a tradition that the Tigun from Ekwachu also known as Nama-Gangare migrated from an area around present day Maihula area in Bali Local Government Area of Taraba State. This Tigun component is believed to have met the Chon people in the area. The tradition states that they, with a basket containing items of a common cult known as the "*Chu*" found among the Chon, Eneme (Nama Baba), Ambwe and the Adobe came in to meet the Chon people. The basket of *Chu* is like a handbag, with fetish stuffs such as feathers, blood and other fetish stuffs that are applied on the body.¹⁵

The groups, i.e, Chon, Eneme, Ambwe and Adobe are bond by the *Chu* cult and the *Chu* cult allows only women to see its masquerades. The Chu cult is primarily for the protection of people against danger and rituals that involve blood is not part of the cult. Sacrifices made are often farm produce or locally brewed beer (burkutu).¹⁶

Worthy of note is the fact that the white man was influential in the names of some Tigun villages. Batu for instance, has Batu Affih, Batu Kamino etc. Batu Affih, is a corrupted term of a statement made by the white man.¹⁷ Upon seeing the skillfulness of the Batu man in hunting, trying to speak the Hausa language, the white man exclaimed "Batu Yafi" the way the white man pronounced the name sounded like Batu Affih and that is what the people are called to this day. Batu Kamino is also an adaptation of the white man's statement. It is a corrupted version of "coming now".¹⁸

Components of the Tigun people

The Tigun people are among the three major ethnic groups that occupy present day Kurmi Local Government Area of Taraba State. Kurmi Local Government Area has three major ethnic groups which include the Tigun, the Ndola and the Ichen. Other ethnic groups that can be found in the area are the Tiv, the Fulani, the Igbo, the Yoruba, and a host of others. The Tigun occupy the southern part of Kurmi Local Government Area of Taraba state. As at 1998, the approximate population of the Tigun people stands around 62,451 people.¹⁹

The Tigun are composed of five components. The components share similarities and some striking differences as well.²⁰ The components are: Akwento (Mbembe), who speak Nzare, Jukun-Tigun (Ashuku) that speak a slightly different form of Nzare, Njuwande (Bitare), Batu and Abong who speak a language known as Mbwami. Apart from the similarities of Akwento and Jukun-Tigun in language, they have some differing pronunciations and histories of origin. However, the language of Akwento, called Nzare, is understood by all.²¹

The Akwento people, otherwise known as the Mbembe speak a dialect known as the Nzare, which is considered the widely understood language of the Tigun people and though pronunciation of words may differ here and there, it is still regarded as one and the same among the villages that speak same.

The Jukun- Tigun, otherwise known as the Ashuku, also speak Nzare. They, however, have so many similarities with the Jukun tradition which poses as a differing factor between them and other Nzare-speaking Tigun. This Ashuku people have taken the Jukun addire as their cultural attire and they refer to their king as “*Ku*” which is similar to the Jukun “*Aku*”.

The Njuande is another dialect of the Tigun. They are commonly found in Asha village. The Njuwande language is also completely different from other Tigun tongues. The Batu is also another category of the Tigun with a completely different dialect as well. The Abong is also another group with the Mbwami language spoken amongst them. Below is a tabular representation of the Tigun people based on the different languages spoken.

Table one: A representation of the Tigun dialects and villages under them.²²

NZARE	MBWAMI	NJUWANDE	BATU(BOKO)
Ashuku	Abong	Asha	Batu Amanda
Ambwe	Abongyere	Ata	Batu Affih
Ekwachu	Akwakwa	Akia	Batu Kamino

Eneme	Tudun wada	Kararuwa	
Adobe	Gidan Makeri	Yelwa	
Mbisa	Kwambri		
Gidan Isa			
Yaboro			
Chon (Achukwen, Akumbo, Akofri, Dyas hi)			
Akwento (Akwanwe, Akuwo, Awoh, Akofo, Akwabe etc.)			

It is important to note that these dialects and villages tabularized above are gradually passing through the process of cultural diffusion. An instance is the Buru people who were ab initio considered a part of the Batu people. Recently, however, it has been observed that the Buru people, also known as the Banyo people have lost their original language and have now embraced the Nzare language instead.²³

Worthy of note, however, is the fact that Kurmi Local Government Area, as at the year 2000, had a total of fifteen village areas derived from the three major ethnic groups. Out of the fifteen, the Tigun had six. These village areas are however not grouped in accordance to the different dialects spoken by the Tigun people. The village areas are also not in accordance with the various components of the Tigun because a village area can consist of Tigun from two or even more components. Abong village area for instance has Tigun people that speak Mbiami and also those that speak Nzare. The village areas occupied by the Tigun and the villages under them are highlighted in the table below:

Table two: A Tabular Representation of the Six Tigun village areas


ABONG	ASHUK U	AKWENT O	BOKO	ENEME	NJUWAND E
Abong	Ashuku	Sabongid a Akwanwe	Batu Amanda	Eneme (Na ma Baba)	Asha
Abongye re	Gundum a	Akuwo	Batu Affih	Abombya	Ambo
Akwakw a	Nama Gangare	Akabo	Batu Kamino	Mbisseh	Attah

Ashikwe	Kararuw a	Afoh	Nyakwe	Gidan Sule	Akiya
Yaboro	Ambwe	Akonko	Buru		Gidan Waya
Gidan- Isa	Adobe	Akwabe	Gidan Bature		Amburu
Mbissa	Bitsun	Nkiri	Ndombo Useini		Maihula
Gidan Makeri	Gidan Dodo	Jokwi	Ndombo Gishi		Adama
Chon Akumbo	Gidan Lamba	Akrapa	Kan-Iyaka		Gwoman
Chon Akofri	Apikune	Zondo	Gidan Mambilla		Chandam
Chon Achukw en	Mashan yi	Abweh	Ndombo Tolori		
Chon Nthun	Tawand oni	Zabe	Anwe		
Chon Edashi	Gidan Wagba	Tunga Garba	Gidan Ardo		
Tsakuw a	Disun	Akoforo	Gidan Bente		
	Gidan Tumbu	Afrobeh	Mayinbe		
	Gidan Tome	Awoh	Dujire		
		Gidan Wakili			
		Gidan Mbateh			

Source: A memo on the Request for the Creation of Kurmi-South Local Government Area with Headquarters at Abong, 2000.

The villages reflected in the table above are predominantly occupied by the Tigun with a handful of the Ndola and the Ichen as well. It is pertinent to note that the wards are not entirely shared according to the components of the Tigun. The Tigun people can co-habit with any ethnic group peacefully. Consequently, the differences between the components do not really matter to the Tigun people because they live together as one, putting their differences aside.

Geographical Location of Kurmi Local Government Area



AP 1: MAP OF KURMI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA²⁴

The Transformation of the Tigon society in Kurmi Local Government Area

Kurmi Local Government Area was created on 4th December, 1996, by the administration of former Head of State, Gen. Sani Abacha, with its headquarters at Baissa. The Local Government Area covers a land mass of about 4,353 square kilometers.^{cxxxii} It has a population of 91,282 according to the 2006 National Population Census with a projected population of 138,369 in 2021.^{cxxxiii} It is bordered to the North East by Gashaka Local Government Area, Sardauna Local Government Area to the East, while to the South-South; it is bordered by the Republic of Cameroon.²⁵

The Local Government Area enjoys both rainy and the dry seasons. The area experiences much rainfall which begins in February to November and sometimes early December. From late December to January, the area is always very cold and dry. The area favours the production of products like timber, cocoa, palm oil, banana, plantain, sesame, coffee, kola nuts, rubber, etc.

Kurmi Local Government Area is said to be the most forested Local Government area in Taraba state. The rainfall distribution and

topography of the area are the factors that influence the nature and pattern of vegetation in Kurmi Local Government Area.²⁶

It is important to note that the area known today as Kurmi Local Government Area went through series of formation, dissolution and reformation. During the balkanization of Africa at the Berlin conference of 1884-1885, the area which was known as the Trust Territory of Northern Cameroons was ceded to Germany and was administered from Bamenda. German administration of the area however lasted from 1885-1916 when the German troops were defeated by a combined force of the French and the Britain during the first world war. The territory was later mandated to the British government and Northern Ireland for administration on behalf of the league of nations in 1922²⁷

According to Usman H. Maikidi, the area known today as Kurmi had series of dissolutions and mergers from 1915-1996.²⁸ In 1926, Kurmi was transferred to Mandated Trustee Council of Britain under Adamawa Province, overseen by Gashaka-Mambila. In 1933, Kurmi was transferred to Benue Province of Wukari federation.^{cxxxiv} The mandate system of the league of nations was later replaced by the trusteeship system of the United Nations in 1946.²⁹

Usman further stresses that Kurmi Local Government Area was formerly known as "United Hills". The name United Hills was derived from the many hills in the area. The United Hills was a Native Authority created under the Sardauna Province, together with Gwoza, Ganye, Gashaka-Mambila, by the former Premier of Northern Nigeria and the Sardauna of Sokoto, late Sir Ahmadu Bello. Kurmi was one of the Native Authorities in the United Nations Trust Territory (UNTT) which were asked to choose to become an independent nation of its own or be amalgamated to any one of the two neighboring countries: Nigeria or Cameroon^{cxxxv}. Two plebiscites were conducted to determine the fate of these people, one in 1959 and the other in 1961. The 1961 plebiscite was organised by the United Nations on 11th February, 1961, and it was one of the most significant events in the history of the southern and northern parts of the British administered trust territory in Cameroon.³⁰

Between 1959 and 1960, the Premier of Northern Nigeria, also known as the Sardauna of Sokoto, late Sir Ahmadu Bello, took a diplomatic visit to the United Hills ahead of the 1961 plebiscite to campaign for votes in favor of Nigeria, to ensure that they voted for Nigeria and not Cameroon in the plebiscite^{cxxxvi}. Sir Ahmadu Bello visited Baissa, the district headquarters of Kurmi and made a binding promise to the people. The premier's visit to Kurmi and other areas that were to partake in the plebiscite was in a bid to expand the northern parts of Nigeria and win the heart of the populace of the Trust Territories to join Nigeria and not

Cameroon. His campaign was tagged "*mu zaba zaman tare*" which when translated to English is 'choose unity'. Sardauna urged the people to choose Nigeria. He was always saying "*ku zaba haduwa da Nigeria*" which in English is 'choose uniting with Nigeria'. During the campaign, he promised to make Kurmi, which was then known as "*kasan amana (land of promise)*", a Native Authority.³¹

The area known as Kurmi was under German control. After the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, lands that were under her control were taken as booties of war by Britain and France. This automatically brought Kurmi under both British and French authorities as earlier stated. The promise of a Native Authority greatly influenced the people of Kurmi and the entire Trusteeship Territory of Northern Cameroons to vote massively for Nigeria in the 1961 plebiscite as against the 1959 plebiscite when they had merely remained passive.³²

The first plebiscite was done in 1959 but this plebiscite was a failure because the people voted for deciding their future on a later date. The result of the 1959 plebiscite made a second one inevitable because it was a big slap to the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and to the French Cameroonian authorities because their aspirations of winning these people or region failed woefully. When the Sardauna of Sokoto understood that northern Nigeria was not the only region interested in this region but that the French/Cameroonian authorities were also interested, he took it upon himself to see that the region voted to stay in Nigeria.³³

After the success of the plebiscite of 1961, the northern Cameroons was renamed Sardauna Province with its headquarters in Mubi, with native authorities like Dikwa (now in Borno state), Mubi (Adamawa state), Chamba (Ganye, Adamawa state), Gashaka-Mambilla (Taraba), Gwoza (Borno state) and the United Hills (Kurmi, Taraba state). The name Sardauna came from the title of Ahmadu Bello who was known as the Sardauna of Sokoto. However, after the plebiscite, Kurmi remained United Hills Native Authority from 1961 to 1971. In 1971, ten years after the 1961 plebiscite, the Native Authority (NA) was dissolved during which Kurmi and Gashaka Native Authorities (NA) were merged with Mambilla. Gembu became the new headquarters of the areas merged, while Kurmi and Gashaka then became Districts under Mambilla Local Authority.³⁴

The United Hills Native Authority was transferred to Adamawa, and the District Head of Gashaka, known as the Lamdo Gashaka, was mandated to rule the area during the colonial era. Kurmi (United Hills Native Authority) was later transferred to the then Benue Province to be administered from Wukari, under the administration of Mr. H. S Bridle, the then Divisional Officer (DO) in 1960.³⁵

The United Hills was again merged to the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the 1963 plebiscite. Kurmi, which was part of the defunct Gongola State, was given back the status of United Hills and renamed as Kurmi in 1982 during the Abubakar Barde administration in the defunct Gongola. That act of restoration of the status of United Hills gave the people of Kurmi a ray of hope and sense of belonging. On 1st April, 1991, Kurmi Native Authority was again merged with Gashaka/Mamblla and still as a District under the Sardauna Local Government Area.³⁶

It is however important to note that Kurmi did not emerge as a Local Government Area without agitations from its inhabitants. An important event that will still be remembered in the hearts of many people in Kurmi is the Tuesday, 24 September, 1991, riot when the peace-loving people of Kurmi area turned to warriors^{cxvii}. This riot came into play following the creation of 89 new local government areas with the exception of the expected restoration of Kurmi in 1988. The people made efforts to become a Local Government Area. They wrote letters and even went extra miles to take their request to the former military Head of State, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, via some delegates made up of Joshua Garba to represent the Tigun, John Garba to represent the Ndola and Justice Paul Galumje to represent the Ichen.³⁷

On the presentation of the foregoing request, the people made arrangements to celebrate what they expected to be their newly acquired, status of a Local Government Area soon to come.^{cxviii} Sadly, Kurmi was not among the newly created Local Government Areas. This led to demonstrations by the youths, which led to the destruction of the Police station and an Area Court in Baissa. This event caused the United Nation flag to be hoisted in the heart of Baissa by the youths of the area because they wanted self-government. At that time, they even appointed a person they referred to as their 'president' in person of Mr. Shehu Belgaro^{cxix}. The riot attracted some eminent sons of the then district area all the way from Yola, Jalingo and Gembu to calm the youths down. The eminent sons included Justice Paul Galumje, Justice Emmanuel Dodo Audu, Chief Registrar, Audu Daudu, then lecturer Joshua A. Garba, and the then District Head, late Mr. Ishaya Etsu. These delegates were however held hostage by the demonstrators for about eighteen hours. In reaction, the then Sardauna Local Government Council Vice Chairperson, Mrs. Alice Ibrahim Ade, and her team from Gembu were physically attacked at Abong on their way down to Baissa and asked to explain why Kurmi was not announced as a Local Government Area³⁸

The foregoing incident marked the first time Kurmi youths had to resort to the use of violence. It also affected the political behavior of the people, as it brought about ethnic sentiments, religious bigotry, self-interests, sectional interests, etc, into the politics of the area.^{cxl} After the struggle

and the efforts of the people, Kurmi was declared a Local Government Area on the 4th of December, 1996, by Gen. Sani Abacha-led military administration with Mr Bitrus Kefas emerging as the sole administrator and Hon. Simon Inusa Dogari as the first elected chairman in 1997.³⁹

Conclusion

The foregoing narratives imply that the Tigon people came in separately from different locations to settle in their present abode. Their differences, however, do not affect the way they relate with one another. They speak different dialects but still interact as a unified group under one name. Kurmi Local Government Area, which is the area where the Tigon people are found alongside other ethnic groups also went through stages of transformation. These transformational stages can be traced back to pre-independent Nigeria down to post independence of Nigeria.

These stages of transformation are like bricks on which the entire local government is built. The people struggled for the Local Government Area and for that reason, they do not want to disagree on anything that will tamper with their peaceful coexistence. This is evident in the rotational system found in the area to this day, where positions of authority like the chairman of the local government area, the member house of assembly are rotated based on the major ethnic groups of Tigon, Ndola and Ichen. Also, the traditional institution is also rotated among ruling houses of the Tigon, Ndola and Ichen that have been in existence from time immemorial.

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- XIX. The portraits of all principals of the College with dates are in the office of the principal, FGC Wukari.
- XX. *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003.*
- XXI. *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.2, No1, 1988, p.25.*
- XXII. Prof Etemi Garba was the head boy of the College in 1993/94 session. He made this statement during the 94 set Reunion in Abuja on 28th May, 2022.
- XXIII. *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003, p.84*
- XXIV. Ruth I. Angyu was among the students that participated in the cultural competition in Potiskum, 1990.
- XXV. *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003.*
- XXVI. Examples are Captain Ismaila Waziri and Captain Idoko Michael.
- XXVII. Examples are Engr. Ibe Amanze, Engr. Idris Ogunsesan, & Engr. Yakubu Audu, among many others.
- XXVIII. Dr. Hamidu Lawan, Dr. Abubakar Musa Hong, Dr. Osahun Enabulele, Pharm. Hauwa Baba Idris, Dr. Ahmadu Baba Usman, Dr. Ahizechukwu Eke & Dr. Lazarus Bosler, among many others.
- XXIX. *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003.*
- XXX. A random survey of the ex-students of FGC Wukari in the science-related disciplines showed that many of them are medical doctors, some are consultants in their fields of specialization, some are pharmacists, pilots, engineers, among others, and they are excellently doing well in the disciplines.
- XXXI. *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003.*
- XXXII. Some of FGC Wukari ex-student in the Judiciary & Legal profession include: Justice Bilkisu A., Justice Momsisure, B., Prof Offornze D. Amucheazi (SAN), Eko, E.E. (SAN), Nwokoma W., Adamu A., Funsho, A., Zainab K., & Late Enoch M. Azariah (former president of FGC Wukari Old Boys Association).
- XXXIII. Examples of FGC Wukari ex-students performing in the entertainment industry include Ogheneovo Imonieroh (Novo), an actor, songwriter & stage performer; Emmanuel Emelu (Luciano), a singer; Mike Ezuruonye, an actor, and others.
- XXXIV. One of the authors, Atando Dauda A. is among the students that went to Potiskum for the competition in 1990.
- XXXV. *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003.*

- XXXVI.** *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.3, No1, 1998, p.42.*
- XXXVII.** Tanko, A.V. 'History of Federal Government College, Wukari, from 1978 - 2005'. B.A Project, Department of History, Taraba State University, Jalingo, 2016, p.34.
- XXXVIII.** Tanko, A.V. 'History of Federal Government College, Wukari, from 1978 - 2005'. B.A Project, Department of History, Taraba State University, Jalingo, 2016, p.24.
- XXXIX.** Mr Aliyu, a one-time House Master of Republic House & a former Senior Boarding House Master in the College, making comment during the 94 set reunion on 28th May, 2022, in Abuja.
- XL.** *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.3, No1, 1998, p.50.*
- XLI.** Examples are Abimbola Bello of LTV and Kissinger Bukar of Adamawa Broadcasting Corporation, Yola.
- XLII.** Examples of ex-students of the College that made it in the Military are Rear Admiral Akinga A., Air Vice Marshall Usman F., Maj. Gen. Vintinabe., Navy Capt. Ogbeche, O., Wing Commander Kanu, M., Lt. Col. David, W. & Lt. Commodore Agbu, A.I.
- XLIII.** Novo was the Entertainment Prefect in the College, 1999/2000 session.
- XLIV.** Today, many of them are Pastors and Imams in their respective places of worship.
- XLV.** Abdu Buba M. 47yrs, Health Prefect of FGC, Wukari, 93/94 Session. He was interviewed on 11th June, 2022.
- XLVI.** Rev. Canon. B.O. Okafor (now 80+) was the first teacher to have reported to FGC, Wukari, in 1978, when the College was to take-off. He was interviewed on 27th May, 2022, at his residence in Kubwa, Abuja.
- XLVII.** Mr Josiah Gani (50+) was the Chairman of PTA, FGC Wukari, from 2016 to 2020. He was interviewed on 1st June, 2022, in Wukari.
- XLVIII.** *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003, p.34.*
- XLIX.** *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003, p. 34.*
- L.** *The Laurel: A Magazine of Federal Government College, Wukari, Taraba State, Vol.4, No1, 2003. P.34.*
- LI.** He is a member of the 1990 set of the College.
- LII.** She is a member of the 1994 set of the College.
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- LVI. In 1991, during the Jukun & Tiv crisis, Tiv parents withdrew their children from the College. Among those students is Thomas T. Usha, who was in JSS3 then. Today, he is a medical doctor in Makurdi, Benue State.
- LVII. Diden, N.Y. is the Principal of FGC Wukari since 2018.
- LVIII.** Mr Josiah Gani (50+) was the Chairman of PTA, FGC Wukari, from 2016 to 2020. He was interviewed on 1st June, 2022, in Wukari.
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